ELIMINATING CRIME

The 7 Essential Principles of Police-based Crime Reduction

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Dedication

This book is dedicated to Mayor Dianne Watts, LL.D (Hon.) who was first elected as the Mayor of Surrey, British Columbia in 2005 and was re-elected to a third term in November 2011. Under her leadership, the City of Surrey implemented its award-winning Crime Reduction Strategy, which reflected a deep commitment to the underlying principles of crime reduction. Since its introduction in 2006, Surrey has achieved significant progress in increasing public safety and much of this success can be attributed to Mayor Watts's vision and leadership on the issues of crime and public safety.
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Acknowlegements

The authors would like to thank the following people for sharing their experiences and expertise:

Adam Palmer, Deputy Chief, Investigation Division, Vancouver Police Department, British Columbia.

Alex Tyakoff, Senior Crime Analyst, Port Moody Police Department, British Columbia.

Brian Foote, Sergeant, Instructor/Field Coordinator, National Performance Programs, RCMP “E” Division, British Columbia.

Brooke Thomas, Crime Analyst, Burnaby RCMP, British Columbia.

Colin Thomson, A/Inspector, Operations Control Branch, Abbotsford Police Department, British Columbia.

Dan Barnscher, Deputy Fire Chief, Facilities/Emergency Planning, City of Surrey Fire Service.

Don McKenna, Inspector, OIC of “K” Community Policing, RCMP, Alberta.

Jim Begley, RCMP Superintendent (Retired).

Kevin Kunetzki, Sergeant, Detachment Commander, RCMP, Beaumont Detachment, Alberta.

Len Garis, Fire Chief, City of Surrey Fire Services.

Mike Sekela, Director of Investigations, Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT), Alberta.

Rick Lucy, Deputy Chief Operations, Abbotsford Police Department, British Columbia.

Ryan Prox, Special Constable, Analytic Services Coordinator, Vancouver Police Department, British Columbia.

Sarah Palmer, Criminal Intelligence Analyst, RCMP, Kelowna Detachment, British Columbia.

Shane Barber, Inspector, West Vancouver Police Department, British Columbia.

Shelley Cole, Crime Prevention Coordinator, Crime Prevention Unit, Community Services Sections, New Westminster Police, British Columbia.

Sherry Mumford, Fraser Health Director of Clinical Programs, MHSUS, Langley and Maple Ridge Mental Health and Child, Youth, and Adult Substance Use Services, British Columbia.

Taylor Quee, Constable, Police Mental Health Liaison Officer, Surrey RCMP, British Columbia.

Tim Shields, Inspector, Regional Duty Officer, BC RCMP, British Columbia.

Tom McMahon, Senior Addictions Outreach Worker, Fraser Health, British Columbia.
Here is a book that provides the tools for any police organization to drive down crime. It sets out the proven principles for making a community safe. It will allow police leaders and agencies to design their own strategies to solve the unique challenges to make any community safe.

Criminologists have been working on the causes of crime for many years. Theories and studies abound, each explaining part of the puzzle. Unfortunately, for a number of years, police and community leaders believed that if social, psychological, and demographic factors were the root causes of crime, the corollary was that police were powerless to substantially reduce crime in a community. The mindset was that police were competent to solve a given crime, but the only way to make the community safe was to solve the underlying community issues that were driving the commission of crime. Until the 1990s, this “understanding” of crime was endemic in police thinking, without reference, evidence, or discussion.

William Bratton, the Commissioner of the NYPD in the mid 1990s, famously pointed out that, in reality, it was people who were committing crimes, and the police play a critical role in stopping people from committing crime. In other words, whatever the root causes of crime might be, it turns out that police can engage in strategies that reduce crime and make their communities safe. And, it turns out that police can make dramatic changes in a community in a very short period of time.

The first and biggest step for a police agency is to truly believe that they are capable of reducing crime significantly in their community. In the past decade, many police agencies have shown that they, in fact, can make their communities significantly safer, and can do so in a very short period of time. Yes, we should still find ways to support young people who are at higher risk of being drawn a criminal lifestyle, and yes we should work with our partners to help people who commit crime because they are drug addicted or mentally ill. These are good initiatives that create the promise of better community health in the long run. But, first and foremost, the mission of police must be to drive down crime and make our communities safe.

Police have tried a lot of different strategies and programs to make this happen. Some worked, some did not. It turns out the right strategies will depend on the specific challenges in the community being served. There is no doubt that some communities do present larger challenges than others; however, the fundamental principles remain consistent. This book lays out the working principles that will reduce crime. It is a great blend of crime fighting stories and a summary of the research showing what has worked and why. It provides a template for any police agency of any size that wants to change the “way things are” and contribute substantially to reducing crime in their community. It will also help a police agency already down this path by providing a checklist to see if they are firing on all cylinders. In the fight to reduce crime, the trick for us all is to incorporate those ideas, strategies, and tactics that work. For law enforcement practitioners, here is a great, well-researched guide, drawn from the collective policing experience and knowledge in the Canadian framework. It is a must read for anyone who works in our business who wants to make a difference!
In the early 2000s, it was becoming increasingly obvious that British Columbia was in the midst of an emerging serious and violent crime problem. The City of Vancouver was labeled the property crime capital of Canada, the City of Surrey was identified as the auto theft crime capital of the world, and the City of Abbotsford was experiencing such serious gang problems that it was eventually recognized as the murder capital of Canada. Throughout the province, the number of gangs or quasi-gangs had grown from a dozen or so groups to more than 135, which contributed to an all-time high number of gang-related homicides, attempted murders, and drive-by shootings. An explosion in illicit drug production, particularly marijuana and synthetic drugs, was fueling many of these problems, and it was clear that the police did not have the capacity to respond effectively. Although general crime rates were in decline in the province, like they were throughout Canada and the Western world, the concern was the police’s growing inability to prevent and respond to serious and violent crime associated to gangs and prolific offenders. It was within this context that police leaders – in particular Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Assistant Commissioner in charge of criminal operations for British Columbia, Gary Bass, and the RCMP Deputy Commissioner in charge of the RCMP in British Columbia, Bev Busson – called for government and police agencies throughout the province to reimagine the way in which police responded to crime.

An emerging crime problem in British Columbia in the early 2000s led to a call for police agencies across the province to reimagine the way they respond to crime.

They paid particular attention to the strategies used in New York City and the United Kingdom, both of which had been extremely successful at reducing crime. What these strategies had in common, to varying degrees, was a concentrated focus on who the most active criminals were and what the most significant crime problems were in their jurisdictions. They made extensive use of crime data and analysts to understand and predict prolific offenders and crime hot spots. They used this information to develop targeted interventions and programs with community stakeholders to preempt, prevent, deter, and respond to crime. This was assisted by the integration of sophisticated technology to better determine and predict crime events, cycles, trends, locations, and networks.

The strategies that tended to have the most significant effects on reducing crime were prolific offender management programs and initiatives based on the principles of problem-oriented policing. What was also immediately apparent to the RCMP was that these other police agencies were committed to being performance-based, evidence-based, and accountable to the public. Based on these ideas, police agencies in British Columbia moved to create a made-in-British Columbia model of crime reduction.

To begin building a new British Columbia approach to crime, the RCMP examined what other police agencies throughout the world were doing.
Even with some police and government leaders acting as champions for the widespread implementation of crime reduction in British Columbia, one specific challenge, at that time, was that acceptance of crime reduction required a significant cultural shift within policing. In effect, the shift required police to move away from being a reactive force to a proactive agency, it required a move away from a focus on crimes to a focus on offenders, it required a move away from a belief that one can arrest one’s way out of crime trends to focusing on rooting out the primary causes of crime in a community, it required a move towards partnering meaningfully with other stakeholders, it required no longer relying on traditional approaches of crime control, but relying on evidence-based practices, and it required moving away from using statistics on police activities as a measure of success to being more accountable for achieving defined crime reduction outcomes. The result was that, while some RCMP detachments and municipal police departments embraced some of these principles, there were very few police agencies that accepted, implemented, and integrated all of them.

Despite the lack of a full commitment by all RCMP detachments and municipal police departments in British Columbia, crime reduction has been spectacularly successful. Some jurisdictions in the province have reduced crime by more than 50% over the past decade, and, as a province, British Columbia has reduced crime to a greater degree than every other province in Canada. Even with this level of success, it is important to keep in mind that, in British Columbia, crime reduction remains in its infancy. While there are many reasons for why crime rates have dropped in Canada and throughout the world, such as demographic shifts and technological advances in private and public security, it is clear that the crime reduction initiatives that have been put in place have contributed substantially to the speed and depth of the reduction in crime in British Columbia when compared to the trends in the rest of the Western World.

One of the indications of the significance of British Columbia’s contribution to crime reduction is the degree to which other provinces in Canada have studied the many successes in British Columbia and implemented similar crime reduction tactics, strategies, and programs.

When considering the totality of the resources needed to ensure public safety in British Columbia, it is clear that, given the current fiscal reality, governments at all levels will find it increasingly difficult to satisfy all of the resourcing demands placed upon them. Given this, adopting crime reduction is even more important because of its proven ability to make police more effective and efficient without necessarily increasing resources or demanding more from taxpayers.

The purpose of this book is to present the seven essential principles that police agencies should apply to be effective and efficient at consistently reducing crime. While some police agencies have adopted some of these practices, as mentioned above, there are very few, if any, agencies that have fully adopted and integrated all of these core principles into their everyday business rules. In order for crime reduction and police agencies to have the greatest success, it is necessary for all seven principles to be integrated together, rather than be viewed and applied as seven distinct foci.

Although there are many stakeholders in every community that have an important role to play in reducing crime and ensuring that declines are sustained over time, this book focuses on what the police need to do to achieve the greatest success in effectively and efficiently reducing crime in their communities. Recommending to all seven core principles, ensuring that their values permeate the entire organization, measuring outcomes, and sharing successes will ensure that British Columbia continues to enjoy substantial crime reductions. This book is your guide to crime reduction.
Chapter 1: Be Information-led

A Renewed Emphasis on the Value of Information

Maclean's magazine (2009) listed Kamloops, British Columbia as the 13th most dangerous city in Canada for 2007; however, in just 5 years, Kamloops changed its ranking to 20th in Canada (Maclean's, 2013). Much of this change resulted from an increased police presence in the city, as well as aggressive policing procedures and more advanced crime analysis technologies. In effect, Kamloops reoriented itself from the more traditional approach to policing to a detachment that was information-led. While this transformation began with a change to the detachment's entire upper management team, the newly appointed RCMP Officer in Charge Jim Begley and his team began to rethink the approaches being used to respond to crime in Kamloops. One of the initial steps that they took in revamping Kamloops' approach to crime was the identification and preliminary examination of prolific offenders in the area. Not surprisingly, their analysis determined, much like in many other jurisdictions, that a large proportion of crimes were being committed by a small number of individuals. Although the names that emerged from this assessment did not elicit many surprises among the police, the way in which this information was to be used was very different.

With the critical decision to hire a crime analyst¹, and a commitment to the continual collection of timely crime information and the identification of repeat offenders, Kamloops introduced daily information bulletins and top prolific offender lists so that everyone within the detachment was kept informed. Using the information developed by the crime analyst, the detachment established a small crime reduction team comprised of ambitious young police officers who were made responsible for the first new enforcement initiatives, namely conducting curfew and street checks on identified prolific offenders. The key characteristics of these tactics, which led to their irrefutable success, included substantial dedication and diligence on the part of the officers involved.

In practical terms, the assigned officers visited the homes of identified prolific offenders or spoke to them on the streets daily, recording their names and the location of the interaction(s), which often matched the analyst-identified crime hot spots. These approaches enabled members and offenders to become familiar with each other, and, in some instances, quasi-relations began to develop. A beneficial complement to this strategy was that it placed officers in a position to better link criminals to offences after they had occurred.

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1. Throughout this book, the authors use the term ‘crime analyst’ to refer to the work that both RCMP and municipal police crime and intelligence analysts in British Columbia undertake.
Based on the adoption of solid information collection practices during every street check, police officers could identify which individuals had been at specific locations where crimes had occurred. This was accomplished by using the collected intelligence on the offender, the offence, and the environmental elements of the offence. In combination with zero tolerance policies for even minor crimes, including breaches of conditions, offenders quickly recognized that the RCMP was not going to yield.

According to Superintendent Begley, they sent prolific offenders a very clear message; offenders had three options: clean up their act, get out of town, or go to jail. Importantly, the RCMP, applying key principles from the crime reduction model, would use the information they had about these offenders and the partnerships they established in the community to offer targeted assistance for those offenders who wanted help, treatment, or support. However, for those who did not take or want the offer of assistance, or did not leave town, relentless apprehension and prosecution tactics were used.

Having team leaders and members feel a sense of accomplishment and accountability for their activities during street patrols increased the value of this routine police practice. General duty members previously conducted informal street checks that involved talking to offenders and establishing a police presence, but they did not, as a matter of routine, take and share their notes from these frequent interactions. As a result, valuable information, such as offender associates, their schedules, and the areas they frequented were not logged and shared with crime analysts or other general duty members, and they did not become part of the detachment’s institutional knowledge base. However, with the combined commitment from senior officers, crime reduction team leaders, and general duty members, street checks became more efficient and effective as they contributed a wealth of valuable information to the detachment.

Once the success of the crime reduction initiative became apparent, as measured by increased compliance with curfew conditions and decreased street contacts, the responsibility of checking in with offenders was eventually shared throughout the entire detachment. A key feature of this strategy was that the checks continued, and the critical information was collected, entered into databases, and analysed. Importantly, the team remained relentless and did not decrease its efforts after some initial success. In time, the list of top prolific offenders began to shorten and, after sustained offender and offending analysis, it was revisited and updated with new offender names and profiles.

Largely attributed to this crime reduction initiative and the better use of the information collected by the police, targeted property offenses have fallen by an average of 55% since 2007 in Kamloops (RCMP, 2011). Moreover, prolific offenders have come to learn that the Kamloops RCMP have taken the ideas of getting to know your neighbours and the old adage of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer to new heights, which has also been credited with preventing the establishment of major organized crime groups in this city.
Still, why did Kamloops see such significant improvements? The former Superintendent credits it largely to the formation of a new management team, a clear and strategic direction, extensive communication, and the right people in the right jobs. These strategies are not entirely new; however, the combination of instituting shared practices and policies and strategic planning has led to notable changes and improvements. Being information-led in defining key objectives, targeting prolific offenders, using street and curfew checks more effectively, and having the continued support and commitment of policing teams to efficiently and effectively employ these strategies has resulted in visible decreases in specific crime categories.

The Lesson

For the police to be most effective, they must be aware of their community’s unique crime and disorder concerns. Moreover, police have to be acutely aware of past, present, and future crime and disorder problems in their jurisdiction. They must know who comprises their criminal population, who is currently active, who is at risk for criminality, and what strategies, policies, and techniques are in place to gather and hold information about offenders and crime problems. Police organizations must also have the commitment from leadership, the resources, and the partnership structures to act on the information.

Being Truly Information-led

Communities all have particular concerns, such as the presence of gang members, high rates of break and enters, or a visible open drug or sex market. While police may believe that they have an accurate and current understanding of the local criminal issues and where they are located, without engaging directly with their communities, they risk not recognizing when a social or public disorder that has typically been characterized as non-criminal, such as homelessness, is directly contributing to a greater concern for people. They may also risk not recognizing when a neighbourhood is experiencing an increased fear of crime out of proportion to their likelihood of being victimized (Morton, 2006; Ratcliffe and McCullagh, 2001). When police are out of touch with or unaware of community concerns, it can result in a lack of support for and confidence in police.

Importantly, the public can begin to believe that the police can do little to deal with real community issues or the underlying causes of crime. The practice of dealing with social disorder is the broken windows model of policing, where police attention to issues of community disorder, such as vagrancy, homelessness, or graffiti, can increase the community’s confidence in the police, reduce the public’s fear of crime, and signal to offenders that neighbourhoods care about their communities and will report crime and offenders to the police (Kelling and Wilson, 1982).

A well-established fact for the police and the public is that crime tends to be concentrated in certain areas within a jurisdiction, referred to as crime hot spots (Rogerson, 2008; Ratcliffe and McCullagh, 2001).
Knowing where hot spots are in a neighbourhood, what types of crimes are associated to a hot spot, and who is active in that area allows police to develop targeted strategies and projects to respond and prevent the behaviour’s occurrence. Not only does this make intuitive sense, but, in practice, has demonstrated to substantially reduce crime (Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995; Koper, 1995).

Importantly, being information-led rather than instinctively led does appear to make a difference, at least for certain types of crime. Ratcliffe and McCullagh (2001) compared hot spots identified by crime data against hot spots identified by police perception and found that, although police were quite accurate in identifying residential burglary hot spots, their ability to identify hot spots related to auto theft and non-residential burglary was much less accurate. Given this, when engaging in hot spot policing, police would be more effective in being information-led to identify what and where crime and disorder problems are in a neighbourhood. Moreover, the actual specific nature of crimes seems to vary depending on location (Rogerson, 2008; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989).

While particular areas of a city may be known for solicitation offences, the public may avoid other areas because they are recognised as a hot spot for auto theft offences or violent crimes.

Although police tend to believe that they know where the hot spots are in their community, their focused enforcement attention on these areas may actually displace crimes into other neighbourhoods where community members would typically be the first to notice the creeping signs of disorder. Therefore, having relationships within the community and systems to collect, collate, and analyse crime and offender information will assist police in tracking the movement of offenders and crime, thus making police more effective in reducing and preventing crime.

In the same way that the profile of crime and offenders varies throughout a community, the underlying nature of victimization also differs. Some neighbourhoods may have a large number of different individuals being victimized, whereas other areas might be characterised by a few people being repeatedly victimized. This information is extremely important for police to be aware of because chronic or prolific offenders are more likely to engage in habitual criminality against a particular individual or group of individuals and in a single or specific location (Everson, 2003; Rogerson, 2008; Sherman et al., 1989). Consistently analysing and integrating this community-based information about offenders, their targets, and their locations of operation is essential in devising effective crime reduction strategies. For example, the strategies developed and executed by police to respond to areas experiencing a specific crime problem, such as hot spot policing or target hardening, would naturally be different from those intended to prevent a type of crime from gaining a foothold in the community. However, to be effective, it is a necessary first step for police to have as much information as possible and to use this information to guide their strategic and operational decision-making.
The Value of Connecting

Being truly information-led means involving the local community in crime prevention and crime reduction strategies. Unfortunately, police have not done the best job of relaying crime information to the public and, as a result, the relationship between police, the media, and the public has been challenging at times (Kingshott, 2011). Yet, free or cheap technology now offers a direct means for the police to involve the community in their crime prevention initiatives. Through the use of social networking platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, text messaging, blogging, and police-based websites and wikis, communication about local crime and disorder can become an immediate way for the police and the public to connect in ways that provide the police with timely information that can make them more effective and efficient, while providing the public with information to allow them to have a realistic view of crime in their communities (Copitch and Fox, 2010; Morton, 2006). The added value here is that when community members feel informed about crime and disorder in their neighbourhood and the police strategies in place to reduce it, they are more likely to take an active and ownership role in responding and preventing crime problems, such as by being more likely to report crime to the police when it is observed, by providing information to the police about who is participating in crime, and in supporting police crime reduction initiatives (Morton, 2006).

The 80-20 Rule

In addition to an emphasis on being information-led to understand the nature and extent of a community’s crime and disorder problems, being information-led should also contribute to the police knowing who is actively engaged in crime in a community and who is at risk for criminality. The ‘80-20 rule’ suggests that, in theory, 80% of outcomes can be attributed to 20% of the causes for a given event. When applied to criminality, the rule would suggest that 20% of offenders are responsible for approximately 80% of crime. While this is clearly not the case in most jurisdictions, it is true that a small proportion of offenders are responsible for the majority of crime. With this in mind, in 2004, the United Kingdom announced an initiative to target the offending of Prolific and other Priority Offenders (PPO) by preventing and deterring them from committing crime, catching and convicting them when they did commit crime, and rehabilitating and resettling them once their official involvement in the justice system ended (Culshaw, 2008; Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007; Erol and Millie, 2005; Millie and Erol, 2006). At the time that this policy was introduced, it was a very unusual process for police. Although a main goal of policing is to prevent and reduce crime, policing is typically reactive in that it responds once a crime has been committed. However, to be successful in both preventing and reducing crime, police must be as fully aware as possible about who is committing crime, why, and where. This information must then be used to develop specific strategies to best deal with this criminal population and reduce their risk of future offending and re-offending.
As mentioned above, the majority of crime is typically committed by a fairly small group of criminals (Croisdale, 2007; Cernkovich and Giordano, 2001; Johnson, Simons, & Conger, 2004; Roberts, 2002; Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986; Farrington, 2003; Farrington and West, 1993; Home Office, 2001, 2002; Moffitt, 1993; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). In fact, among the offending population are a subgroup of “prolifics”, and an even smaller subgroup of “super-prolifics”. These are career criminals who are responsible for at least half of all crime (Mednick, 1977; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1986; Roberts, 2002; Home Office, 2005).

It should be the priority of all police detachments and departments in British Columbia to identify their prolific and super-prolific offenders and develop teams and policies to respond to them. Doing so will achieve the most dramatic reductions in crime (Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007; Erol and Millie, 2005; Millie and Erol, 2006). Maintaining the commitment to being information-led in consistently updating the list of prolifics and staying the course of intensive police pressure on these offenders will ensure that initial reductions in crime rates are not lost over time.

Who’s Who in the Zoo

In addition to being information-led to know who is actively engaged in crime, it is also necessary for police to understand who is at-risk for criminality in their community. The reasons why people engage in crime is numerous and complex; however, it typically involves a mix of mental health issues, addiction, peer associations, familial and social development, educational and employment opportunities, and poverty, among many other social, economic, and political issues (Andrews and Bonta, 1994; Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007; Erol and Millie, 2005; Marlow, 2007; McCahill and Finn; Moffitt, 1993). Knowing why people commit crime is important because this is linked directly to the intervention strategies designed to prevent crime. Being information-led in this context means using data to be informed about who is most at-risk of engaging in crime and why, and using this information to develop projects and programs most likely to be effective.

In the UK, the three overriding pillars of their PPO program are to prevent and deter, catch and convict, and rehabilitate and resettle. Using an information-led approach to reducing crime is a fundamental part of their PPO approach. In addition to focusing on those actively engaged in crime, the PPO strategy also attempts to identify, prevent, and deter those who have the potential to become prolific offenders, such as young persons on the verge of becoming life-course persistent offenders. The program was introduced in 2004; 17 months later, the United Kingdom witnessed a 43% reduction in offending and a 62% reduction in reconvictions among a group of approximately 7,500 offenders processed through the PPO program (Dawson and Cuppleditch, 2007). Similarly, an evaluation of the Prolific Offender Project (POP), which emphasised catch, convict, rehabilitate, and resettle offenders, with 101 prolific offenders identified that, in the month prior to their involvement in the program and the completion of the evaluation two years later, offending was reduced to 58% and one-third had not reoffended, far exceeding the project goal of a 12% reduction (Marlow, 2007).
In effect, knowing not only what the specific crime and disorder problems are in a community, but also exactly who is responsible for creating those issues is paramount to successful crime reduction strategies.

Targeting prolific offenders works for three main reasons: (1) individuals at high-risk of re-offending are identified by police and brought under their focused attention; (2) the complex reasons for their offending are understood and are targeted through specific interventions designed to reduce risk; and (3) the offenders are monitored closely in the community following their release.

Knowing the criminal population, knowing why they are at-risk, and monitoring them, as rehabilitation strategies aim to reduce their risk, is a successful way to achieve substantial reductions in re-offending.

It also prevents the development of prolific offending habits among those at-risk for similar criminogenic reasons and is, therefore, an effective and efficient use of police resources. Critically, to identify who comprises the offending population, including prolific offenders, police must engage the community, be informed on the specific crime and disorder problems characterizing their neighbourhoods, and use this information to base their strategic and operational plans.

Recommendations for Being a More and Better Information-led Police Organization

There are three main preliminary things that police can do to ensure that they have an accurate understanding of what is going on with crime and offenders in their jurisdictions. While other chapters in this handbook deal with the practical and technical aspects of being truly information-led, all police agencies should ensure that they have a complete list or accounting of their criminal population. This includes not only prolific offenders, but also those who are presently in their crime cycle. The list or database should also include those offenders living in the community and those most at-risk for crime.

The second thing that police should do, which complements the list of active and at-risk offenders, is undertake a full accounting and understanding of the jurisdiction’s crime and disorder problems. Again, this includes information about the quantity and quality of crime and disorder in the community, crime hot spots, crime attractors and detractors, and the social and economic organization of the community. Developing a complete list of offenders and those at-risk with a complete list of crime and disorder problems for managers and crime analysts to consider when making decisions will contribute to being more information-led.

Three ways to ensure you understand the crime and offenders in your jurisdiction:
1. Create a database of all criminals
2. Fully account for and understand your jurisdiction’s crime and disorder problems
3. Maintain an up-to-date list of all community resources
The third thing that police should do is develop and maintain an up-to-date list of all relevant community resources. Not only will this information identify potential strategic partnerships for the police, a concept that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 5, but arming police with current information about available community resources will provide additional options when talking with offenders and those at-risk. It will also identify to the police and their partners whether there are service provision gaps that could better assist offenders make a successful transition from crime to a prosocial lifestyle, thus reducing the risk for crime and the actual rate of crime.

In order to obtain the necessary data to be truly information-led, police should develop specific policies that mandate a consistent process for information flow from the community to the police and back to the community. As discussed through the Kamloops example, requiring that general duty members collect certain types of information when performing street or curfew checks, ensuring that this data is recorded in a single, searchable database, insisting that this data become part of the data analysed by crime analysts, and ensuring that the information is shared within the detachment and with the community, contributed immeasurably to the success that Kamloops had in reducing crime. Moreover, ensuring that the police are notified and have the necessary criminal history, treatment schedules, risk assessments, and social information when an offender is released from custody would contribute to having a more complete picture of crime risk for a community.

To ensure that the police understand what the public feels are crime and disorder problems, police should commit to a routine schedule of public safety surveys focused on issues related to fear of crime, victimization, crime and disorder problems, and attitudes towards the police.

All of the data collected from the public, from offenders, and from criminal justice agencies should be housed in a single database that can be analysed by crime analysts. Being truly information-led means not just having a system in place to warehouse data, but committing to a regimen of quality control for data entry, cleaning, and analysis. It is important for everyone, from the general duty member to the data inputter, to the consumer of the information, to understand the value of quality information, and the importance of accurately gathering and entering all of the necessary data, appropriately analyzing the information, and using the results to make better informed decisions.

As mentioned above, the public is often the best source of information about offenders, crime, and disorder. As such, establishing and maintaining positive and frequent contacts with the public is central to being information-led. There are many people and organizations, such as neighbourhood watch programs, that have access to timely information about crime and criminals. Moreover, community police stations could also be recommitted to serve as a more direct information link between the community and the police and the police and the community. A final suggestion would be to ensure that there are officers with the responsibility to consistently search the research literature for crime trends, explanations for crime, and promising policies and practices that contribute to reducing crime, and to maintain formal links with the RCMP University Research Chairs in the province to ensure that the latest research is being integrated into the daily operations of the police organization.
Indicators of success include a reduction in the crime rate, increased public safety and confidence in police, and reduced signs of social disorder

Are We an Information-led Police Organization?

There is not one simple measure of success. Instead, there are a number of key questions that police leaders should ask of their organizations in assessing levels of success. The first indicators of success are the degree to which the organization has been able to develop and maintain the aforementioned lists of offenders, crime and disorder problems, and community resources. While it is critical that these lists be created, simply having them is insufficient. A clear indicator of accomplishment is the degree to which the organization is appropriately and successfully responding to the people and issues on their lists. A reduction in the crime rate, an increased level of public safety, an increase in public confidence and satisfaction with the police, and a reduction in the visible signs for social disorganization or disorder are all indicators of success.

Another indicator of success can include the consistent validation of the information the organization has collected and entered in a database. In other words, success is knowing that the data is correct and being used appropriately. Having crime analysts report that they have enough information and that the information is accurate enough to provide quality and timely intelligence and analyses is an important indicator of success.

Similarly, having sufficient information to make evidence-based, quality decisions when facing a specific crime type or offender problem is an indicator of success. Problem solving through the application of timely, crime or offender specific information, rather than relying primarily on traditional police practices, institutional culture, or how things have always be done, is a key indicator of success for information-led organizations.

A final indicator of success is the degree to which an organization has enough information about the specific causes of an offender’s criminality and the resources available in the community to be truly helpful to the offender. While arrest and incarceration is one way to respond to crime, in many instances, it is not the most effective in terms of the use of police resources, ensuring community safety, and reducing recidivism. In many cases, linking an offender or someone at-risk of offending with specific, targeted community resources is a much better solution for everyone. Being truly information-led means that police have knowledge of and access to many more tools and options beyond the constraints of apprehending, arresting, charging, and processing offenders.
References for Chapter 1


Chapter 2: Be Intelligence-led

A Renewed Emphasis on the Value of Intelligence and Crime Analysis

Between 1995 and 2009, a series of attacks occurred in Vancouver, Delta, and Surrey, British Columbia against young girls on their way home from school. The children were being carefully watched, targeted, and attacked in secluded areas where an individual sexually assaulted them. A joint forces operation (JFO) comprising the Vancouver, Delta, and Surrey police departments, titled Project Scourge, was established to try to determine who was responsible. The team was able to conclude that it was a single offender responsible for all of the attacks; however, after months of investigation and public pleas for information, the police were unable to put a face or name to the offender. The team of officers from all three detachments worked tirelessly, spanning hours of overtime work without any success. During the investigation, they identified 561 potential suspects, but following the results of DNA castoff exams and interviews, none of the names resulted in a positive match. An FBI profiler was even seconded from the United States to assist and provide an expert evaluation of the case facts. After a while, with no further developments, the offender struck again, attacking his youngest victim and exhibiting escalation in his modus operandi. The police began to fear that if they did not identify the person soon, the next attack would be fatal.

Data analysis can provide a broader perspective to traditional law enforcement practices that may overlook non-traditional offenders.

This case was atypical as the offender was someone who exhibited sophistication in the level of planning that was invested in each offence. The police recognized that the person responsible was a calculated, well-educated man who prepared before each attack, making it more challenging for the police to identify and apprehend him. A year and a half into the investigation, a new inspector was assigned to the case. One of the first things he did was question the lack of an assigned crime analyst to the case. It was then that Special Constable Ryan Prox of the Vancouver Police Department was approached to meet with the members of Project Scourge to review a few details of the case. Along with a visiting Sergeant from the Rotterdam Police Department (who was at the Vancouver Police Department to build her intelligence-based policing repertoire), Constable Prox and Sergeant Milena Bruns started working on the file. After taking some time to collect their own data and to review the work already conducted by the investigative unit, Constable Prox and Sergeant Bruns decided to start fresh and follow a new approach.
The activities and resources in place for the case were ineffective because they followed very traditional law enforcement practices that included tracking the suspect's modus operandi, searching for known offenders with similar characteristics, and developing an inventory of known offenders.

It took approximately eight weeks for the two-person team to collect a wide range of structured and unstructured data, such as geographical patterns (e.g., residential tenancy changes based on housing sales, movements of renters, driver’s license change histories, BC Medicare change of address notifications), telecommunications (e.g., cellular phone pings from fluctuating towers), and the offender’s methods, hunting paradigms, and movements from geographic location to geographic location. This data analysis included predictive algorithms using the Vancouver Police Department's GIS system (a geography-based program that enables the creation and organization of linked geographic information), to see where the attacks occurred to try to isolate the most likely places where the offender might have lived based on common locations and a comfort zone of operating. At the time, this type of data was not traditionally examined in police investigations.

Once it was collected, this mass of data was combined with information from the Vancouver Police Department's CRIME system (the provincial data warehouse repository) and the system began to crunch through the numbers. Soon, the system supplied the name of a man who hit on 98% of the criteria that Constable Prox and Sergeant Bruns analysed. From this, they were able to locate the individual on Facebook to obtain his picture, which corresponded with the sketches compiled based on the descriptions provided by the victims. Upon this discovery, Constable Prox contacted his supervisor, who was justly skeptical of this concrete discovery given the extensive ongoing investigation that elicited hundreds of false identifications. It was also a time in which analysts were only beginning to be employed in police departments and their value was still unclear. Constable Prox was able to convince his supervisor that this case was different because it was the first to apply exhaustive crime analysis and soon the supervisor pulled teams off of another major investigation to begin surveillance on the identified suspect. It did not take long before the team was able to collect one of his disposed coffee cups, secure it into an evidence bag, and send it off for DNA analysis. The match was one in six quadrillion.

Ibata Hexamer was quickly arrested and charged with four counts of sexual assault and two counts of unlawful confinement, to which he pled guilty. The challenges with the Hexamer case lay in the fact that this individual was completely unknown to the police. He had studied commerce at the University of British Columbia, owned a house, had a girlfriend, worked as a financial manager for a Vancouver political party, and ran a successful business. He was simply not the traditional offender. Intelligence-led policing can be especially critical when working on cases of this nature involving a first-time, organized, smart, and pragmatic offender.
Constable Prox believes that “had we not been called in and applied our approach to it, and they had stayed with traditional policing investigative techniques on this file, we might not have caught him for the second hit or the next hit or the next. And, he was escalating; he was probably going to kill next…”

Analysts offer a unique set of skills and also a fresh approach to investigations. Once the senior management saw the net return on this case, the approaches applied in the Hexamer case became best practices that the Vancouver Police Department now implement as standard protocol. In the past, the standard investigative team comprised a team commander, affiant, and file coordinator. With the success of the Hexamer case and others like it, currently, the first task is to assign a team commander and analyst, letting the rest fall into place later. According to Constable Prox, “it’s shaped and changed the unit, the way we approach investigations completely. The analyst is probably the single most important position within an investigation now.”

The Lesson

There are a number of reasons why the Vancouver Police Department has become one of the leaders in crime reduction in Canada. In many ways, it was the combined results of a highly supportive upper management looking for skilled and educated officers and staff, and the implementation and appropriate use of sophisticated computer systems. The management structure supported the procurement of new technologies essential to data mining and analysis and the development of a team within the Vancouver Police Department of incredibly talented IT staff. This resulted in the creation of specialized intelligence analyst positions, each imbedded into a particular Vancouver Police Department crime unit and playing a primary role in investigations. Police organizations cannot be intelligence-led without intelligence analysts taking raw data and outputting it as intelligence; they also need structures in place to ensure that the intelligence and information produced by analysts is shared throughout the organization, used to develop new police practices, strategies, and policies, and is central to everything that the police do.
The “standard model” of policing has been criticized for several decades as being an ineffective reactive policing strategy focusing on detecting crime and deterring its re-occurrence through arresting offenders, rather than attempting to understand and prevent crime through the use of intelligence-led approaches that allow for the development of customized, effective, and efficient strategies (Goldstein, 1979; Ratcliffe, 2008; Skogan and Frydl, 2003; Weisburd and Braga, 2006). Unfortunately, while police are generally well aware that the traditional way of doing policing is no longer viable given the gap between the incidence of crime and the capacity of police to respond and solve crime, many police organizations have not been able to make the transition to proactive policing, where the policing strategy is forward-thinking through the use of intelligence-led strategies that rely heavily upon the use of crime analysts. In effect, many police organizations have failed to effectively develop informed proactive intelligence-led policing strategies, given their inability to use crime analysts to their greatest possible extent to identify, define, and understand the nature of the problem (Skogan and Frydl, 2003).

To be truly intelligence-led, police organizations must collect, analyze, integrate, and disseminate vast amounts of structured and unstructured data to make the best strategic and tactical decisions, and to develop and effectively implement strategies, projects, and programs that are most likely to prevent and reduce crime. To accomplish this, police must invest in, develop, and incorporate a number of different types of related analytics into everything they do. Specifically, police must develop a culture of using data and analysts. In this context, being truly intelligence-led means police organizations developing the human and technological resources to use entity analytics to have a current and detailed understanding of their criminal population, who is who, who knows whom, who is doing what, and how are people, objects, locations, and events connected.

Importantly, as outlined in the Vancouver example above, this information must extend beyond the jurisdictional boundaries that the individual police organization is responsible for to the entire province and the country.

For example, in British Columbia, in May 2012, Burnaby RCMP’s crime analyst Brooke Thomas, who is responsible for creating weekly maps of property crimes for the detachment, identified an increase in thefts from motor vehicles. These thefts had been occurring late at night in a specific part of the city that had not traditionally been known to attract property crime trends. The offences in this part of Burnaby were quite distinct because the area was primarily comprised of large commercial and recreational buildings that did not operate late into the night. To determine the severity of this apparent crime series, Brooke collected and carefully reviewed each police file related to the property crimes that had occurred within that mapped area. From this, she was able to extract all of the information that would be relevant to determining whether this was a crime trend that should be presented to the police. She recorded the estimated times that these offences had occurred in a separate database. The database contained information that she had collected related to the specific location of the offence, the types of vehicles the offenders were targeting, the offenders’ point of entry into the vehicles and other details of their methods, and any possible suspect descriptions.
During her review of the suspect descriptions, there was one particular suspect's case that caught Brooke's attention because of a similar street check she had been alerted to a few months earlier in the associated area. The suspect description depicted an individual who had been acting suspiciously. There were no other marked characteristics; however, a police report from February 2012 from a proximal location also noted a suspicious person in the area late at night. When approached and questioned by the officer, the person was unable to offer a valid reason as to why he was present in that area. The officer proceeded by taking photos of the individual, which he then emailed to the entire detachment. The crime analyst had these images on file and decided to examine the picture and make a side-by-side comparison with the witness's description. She continued her examination by searching for the individual in the PRIME database where she discovered that this person was a property offender who was actually being actively targeted by the Surrey RCMP for similar crimes.

In light of this finding, Brooke contacted the Surrey RCMP investigator who was connected with this file and requested a series of updated information on the offender; she also requested a copy of any surveillance logs that had been done on this person. A review of all the surveillance logs revealed information on the offender's typical behaviour, such as the times during which he was active, his mode of transportation, and any addresses visited in connection to him. The analyst was able to generate a crime series bulletin based on the information she had compiled detailing the offender's lifestyle, the police and analyst's information in relation to the thefts from autos, and the street check information. This bulletin was forwarded to all members of the detachment. After this, Burnaby RCMP’s general duty members were also asked to increase their patrols late at night in the specific area in anticipation of some movement by the identified suspect. The suspect was then deemed to be an “emergent offender” by the detachment's Prolific Offender Suppression Team who subsequently produced a target plan that incorporated the RCMP investigators from Surrey throughout the planning stages.

Shortly thereafter, in the early part of June 2012, the Prolific Offender Suppression Team made an arrest of the identified suspect based on the collaborative effort and intelligence provided by the crime analysts. Due to the extensive level of information and reports they had collected on this individual, they were able to charge him with several criminal code offences in conjunction with the numerous thefts from vehicle incidents the analyst had connected him to.

**Processing descriptive data**

Next, police must develop the capacity to understand, analyse, and integrate descriptive data. In other words, police must know what is happening in their jurisdiction and the surrounding areas, how often it is happening, how much of it is happening, and where specifically it is happening. As part of the overall crime reduction strategy, rather than just focusing on the incidents of crime, police need to consistently examine their data to better understand what exactly is the problem or problems that are contributing to crime or disorder in their communities and use this information to develop strategies to respond to and prevent the problem(s).

Being an information and intelligence-led police organization also means using predictive and prescriptive analytics. As one of the best predictors of future behaviour is past behaviour (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; White, Moffitt, Earls, Robins, & Silva, 1990), police should, as a matter of routine, consistently use data to understand historical and contemporary crime trends, understand what drives their specific crime trends, and understand the ‘rhythms’ of crime in their jurisdictions. In other words, data analysis provides police with a wealth of information about crime and its predictable patterns in a jurisdiction, such as the changing nature of crime as a result of weather, day of the week, or time of day.
This would allow police to develop strategies and tactics to both prevent and reduce crime, rather than simply responding to crime after the fact. Using prescriptive analytics would allow police to have a better understanding of how they can achieve the best results and have greater confidence in their actions. In effect, using real time data, police can model and test the effect that specific actions would have on crime before designating and deploying their limited resources on a crime problem or offender population.

Finally, there is vast amount of valuable information and intelligence that is not typically used by police because it comes in the form of unstructured data, such as reports or legal documents, which are not entered into a database. Moreover, there is a vast amount of information available to police in the form of open source streaming data or the Internet. All police organizations should develop the expertise and capacity to extract insights and meaningful relationships from these unstructured and internet-based data sources. For example, much like law-abiding citizens, criminals provide a lot of information about themselves, their activities, their associations, their locations, and their pictures on the Internet. Using existing software tools, the police could incorporate all of this information in their analyses of offenders, criminal organizations, and criminal activities.

However, achieving all of these analytic objectives requires an investment in people and technology, and a commitment to using crime and intelligence analysts, in real time, to drive projects, initiatives, and investigations. Central to truly being intelligence-led is the crime analyst, having the necessary hardware and software, and a commitment to data collection, analysis, and integration.

Elementary, My Dear Watson

One of the key insights that police leaders have made is the recognition of the value that crime analysts add to the organization in terms of the collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence. Under the crime reduction model, crime analysts have frequently been associated with the identification of prolific offenders; however, crime analysts are necessary to proficiently identify emerging crime trends, understand who is responsible for crime, the relationship between offenders, tracking offender mobility, offender crime patterns, and trends, detecting existing and developing crime hot spots, mapping high crime areas, and identifying and developing approaches to respond to and prevent crime.

Another important component of their role includes examining the relevant research literature and successful practices, programs, policies, and strategies utilized in other jurisdictions around the world to ensure that their police organization, whenever possible has adopted and implemented the most effective approaches to respond to local crime issues or challenges.

An intelligence-led approach to policing is built on knowing who is connected to whom, how people are connected, when and where they are connected, why they are connected, and under what circumstances they are connected (Tilley, 2002).
To know these details, police must maximize their use of intelligence by collecting data and sharing it with their crime analysts who can use their skills and technology to analyse all of this valuable information. Crime analysts are an incredibly important resource for the police when used effectively. Although the practice of crime analysis has existed since the creation of the first full-time, paid, professional police force in the United Kingdom in the 1800s, it was not until the 1970s that crime analysis was done systematically or by people trained in the skills of data analysis. Previously, this task was undertaken by police officers off the side of their desk or by volunteers or interns (Clarke and Goldstein, 2002; Santos, 2013; Tilley, 2002). Yet, even with the recognition of the important contribution of crime analysis to intelligence-led policing and the early development of crime analysis professional groups, it took several more decades and the introduction of related policing strategies, namely problem oriented policing and community policing, for crime analysts to receive standardized training and be more fully integrated into policing departments (Santos, 2013).

**Identifying hot spots and patterns**

Crime analysts are trained to study crime and disorder information, detect patterns, and provide police with the intelligence necessary to prevent, respond to, and reduce criminal activity (Santos, 2013). For instance, using crime information collected by the police, crime analysts can statistically identify hot spots. This is important because while general duty officers believe that they are familiar with their city's hot spots, there is evidence to suggest that this information is not always accurate (Ratcliffe and McCullagh, 2001). For example, by analyzing daily data on reported motor vehicle thefts, crime analysts can quickly inform the police if a hot spot suddenly appears or is moving within the city. Analysts also provide more long-term analyses of crime patterns to inform police administrators of the success of their various intelligence-led crime reduction strategies. Their analysis of geographic crime patterns and the socio-demographic distribution of crime can also help police to determine likely suspects (Santos, 2013).

Given their familiarity with the typical crime patterns and offenders responsible for those patterns, crime analysts can provide police officers with targets to focus their attention on that creates a more efficient use of police resources.

For example, in the late summer of 2011, a series of break and enters of dwellings had begun to take place targeting condominiums in the resort town of Sun Peaks, British Columbia. This area is unique in that it accommodates an ever-changing population dependent on the season, and given the particularly small population residing there at any given time, there is no regular police service. As a result, the Kamloops RCMP responds to crime problems in Sun Peaks when needed. Towards the end of the summer and into the fall, the Kamloops RCMP were receiving reports of break and enters of unoccupied residences to steal flat screen televisions. Although these homes were uninhabited during these months, the vast majority of condos had a flat screen television in their living room and in every bedroom. Over the course of three weeks, the police noticed that this crime problem was growing exponentially and a crime trend had emerged. The analyst was then assigned to the collection of comprehensive intelligence on these cases so that the limited police resources available for that area could be distributed effectively.
As the RCMP did not service the town regularly, another concern was that, in many of these break and enter cases, the owners of the condos did not become aware of the theft of their belongings until two or three days after the offences had occurred. It became the task of the analyst to begin piecing together information on the possible dates and times that these crimes had actually occurred based on the times the incidents had been reported.

To estimate the possible crime times, when a crime is discovered, analysts look at when the last person was present at the scene and when the crime was reported, a process known as weighting the possible crime times. Within this quantified time frame, they place equal weights to every hour. This information is organized in a spreadsheet to which the analysts continually add weights dependent on likely time ranges and definitive times. In some cases, the analysts know almost the precise time of an offence because neighbours or passers-by witnessed a person in the specific location at a specific time (e.g., they saw lights on at midnight). This was the case in some of the Sun Peaks break and enters. From the collection of known offences, the analyst continued to add times until the highest weights were recorded and became apparent. In this case, the highest weights produced the most likely offence time period to be Thursday morning, from midnight Wednesday to four o’clock in the morning. By this point, 16 break and enters had been reported and so the analyst reviewed each of the reported incidents that appeared to be linked. Based on the circumstances of the files, the analyst and his team inferred that it had to be the same individual or group of individuals involved in this crime series.

In this case, the analyst distinguished that it was the same group that was responsible for the break and enter trend because they had broken into the residences the same way, by kicking in the door, and they targeted the same item, namely flat screen televisions. The offenders then left the area, which supported the belief that they were driving to the area. This information was disseminated in a report to other members in the detachment outlining the crime problem and where it was located.

The analyst also presented a map illustrating his prediction of what two potential sets of condos would be targeted next based on the circular arrangement of the condos in the identified area and which ones had previously been targeted. The police did not immediately utilize this information in their strategies, but, as projected, in the early hours of Thursday morning, there were new reports of break and enters. The following week, the police were more attentive to the analyst’s findings; he revisited his analysis and provided the investigators with the updated information. They then dispatched a team to Sun Peaks to survey the condos in question.

As expected, they caught two young males in the act as they were stealing items from the unoccupied condo. Upon the arrest of these two individuals, the police identified a third suspect who was linked to these offences. Of the three offenders, one was known to police; however, the other two were not. The three individuals would drive to Sun Peaks from Kamloops, steal televisions from two or three units, and then drive back to Kamloops. This discovery and arrest was very significant for the Kamloops RCMP. The entire strategy was based on the gathering of intelligence by closely reviewing the detailed police files, accurately assigning different weights to what times and days the break and enters could have happened, and linking each case based on how the suspects entered the condos and what items they took. From this information, the analyst provided police with the necessary tools to catch the individuals responsible.

Monitoring offenders

Analysts also conduct regular checks on their crime stats and offender releases from custody, which is an invaluable component of identifying and catching the responsible criminal(s). To keep a close eye on offenders, analysts cross-reference that date with any specific offence increases or developing trends. In one case, the police in Kamloops arrested a prolific offender with property offences. He had been sentenced to jail, yet his custodial release was approaching. The analyst was notified and paid special attention to this important piece of information.
Within a day of the offender’s release, there was an increase in break and enters and thefts from motor vehicles. Because they follow prolific offenders’ movements, the analysts almost immediately identified the person responsible for these crimes. The subsequent step was to strategize how the police could catch this offender in the act. When the analysts learned that the offender had a curfew, they presented a surveillance-based strategy to the police. They suggested that they perform their curfew checks on the offender, but to then follow-up by surveying his conduct and movements after these checks. This strategy was what led to his subsequent detection and arrest after five days and 40 or more offences. By relying on the analysts’ information and strategy, the police caught the offender during the commission of another offence. While it is often challenging to catch offenders in the act, analysts can be instrumental to enabling this.

Deciphering the data

Analysts can also be important to providing police officers with in-depth information by analyzing police reports and working closely with the department members. An analyst with the Kelowna RCMP noted that the members in the detachment often approach them to decipher who offenders are and where they may have come from. There was one case where the police received reports of break-ins by a person from Calgary, Alberta. The police could not determine who the individual was, but they had obtained his nickname from other sources in the community. With this information, the police approached the analyst who phoned her contacts in Calgary. Based on the nickname and offence type, the analyst determined who the offender likely would be, which led her to establish where this individual was residing. The police began surveillance on the identified person and were soon able to catch him in the act and arrest him for another break and enter. The analyst’s job, however, does not stop there. Once they identify the offender and the police make an arrest, the analysts review the types of offences the suspect was charged with and every similar existing police report to establish how many appear to be related.

The police can then know how many files the person is likely responsible for and use this when they interview the suspect. This information is what can be truly effective for clearing files. According to this Kelowna RCMP analyst, these types of collaborations between the police and analysts happen on a daily basis. From working with the police and sharing knowledge with one another, analysts can obtain and organize intelligence in a manner that will be most useful for the police and their crime reduction efforts.

Crime analysts also play a central role in the prevention of crime. Preventing crime by being informed about where it is most likely to occur and who and what it is most likely to involve, frees limited police resources for use to respond to more entrenched criminal activity. Importantly, crime analysis not only informs police about strategic targets and persons, but also allows citizens to engage in crime prevention through reducing their chances of victimization. By analyzing the nature of a community’s crime and disorder issues, crime analysts can provide strategies for citizens to protect themselves (Santos, 2013). As discussed in Chapter 1, the nature of crime and victimization varies depending on location (Everson, 2003; Rogerson, 2008; Sherman et al., 1989). Given this, strategies for preventing crime will differ by location, even for the same type of offending, depending on who or what is involved.
Respecting the role

The job of a crime analyst is “to assist the police in criminal apprehension, crime and disorder reduction, crime prevention, and evaluation” (Santos, 2013: 3). However, because crime analysis is frequently a civilian-filled position, their perceived lack of familiarity or experience with ‘real policing’ can lead to a lack of respect by sworn police officers and a failure to utilize the abilities of crime analysts to the greatest extent possible (Santos, 2013). Even today, many crime analysts still report being “off to the side” within police organizations (Santos, 2013). To be truly intelligence-led, it is important that police recognize the critical role played by crime analysts and integrate them physically and socially within the organization as this will lead to better communication and more frequent use of intelligence to inform policing tactics and strategies. In addition, Clarke and Goldstein (2002) argued that crime analysts should be more fully integrated into police management activities as they can help direct police priorities. Thankfully, some police organizations recognize the value of crime analysts and are more actively integrating their participation into regular briefings and reports and are locating them physically within strategic locations in the department.

The ability of crime analysts to do their job well is not only dependent on their training, but also on their access to technology to help them organize and analyse crime and disorder data. For instance, crime mapping has been used in Europe since the mid-1800s to inform police about high crime neighbourhoods or the clustering of particular offences.

Yet, until several decades ago, this involved physically pinning crime locations onto a map on the wall of the police department (Santos, 2013). Today, modern crime analysis involves a range of applied skills, including quantitative statistical data analysis of electronic records management systems (RMS) and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems, qualitative interpretations of crime patterns and offender characteristics, spatial analysis and complex crime mapping using geographic information systems (GIS) and CompStat, and networking of offenders using technology, such as IBM’s I2 software (Santos, 2013). With the growing body of research demonstrating their value to police, an increasing number of police organizations have accepted these new technologies to not only organize their information more efficiently, but to use the information to predict and prevent future criminal events, clear existing criminal files, and design more effective and efficient strategies based on the information produced by their crime analysts (e.g., Weisburd and Lum, 2005, as cited in Santos, 2013). Special Constable Prox of the Vancouver Police Department has been working to define his department’s crime reduction and targeting needs, and based on this information, implementing a computer infrastructure that assists in the organization and tracking of their growing intelligence collection, including detailed offender, offending, and crime pattern information. Unlike in previous decades, it is not a matter of having too little data, but having too much. Given this, police must invest in cutting-edge organizational and analytic software that can manage the volumes and complexity of data being collected, refine the data, and present it in an understandable, accessible, and usable fashion.
The process and application of an intelligence-based policing approach was truly tested when Vancouver hosted the Winter Olympics in 2010. The Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit (V2010 ISU), a multi-agency security team led by the RCMP, assumed the responsibility of managing the safety and security for the Games. Just prior to the Olympics, a member of the RCMP intelligence team was quoted as saying that the police had identified and was prepared for any and all potential security threats relating to Vancouver and the Games. The structure and methodology of the Vancouver 2010 Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) was similar to the approach that was used for the 28th G8 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta in 2002. Due to the magnitude of the Olympics, the intelligence component of the security preparations was the work of the Joint Intelligence Group’s proactive efforts launched years in advance. The unit drew on the expertise from national and international management and intelligence teams.

While there were many partnerships that naturally existed between police agencies, the police and intelligence community were integrated into these security teams, as they regularly collected and organized intelligence (Plecas, Dow, Diplock, & Martin, 2010). The V2010 ISU included partnerships with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Department of National Defence (DND), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Canada Post Corporation, Health Canada, Industry Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Safety Canada (PS) and Transport Canada (TC), Industry Canada (IC), Health Canada (HC), Canada Post, and the Privy Council Office (PCO) (RCMP, 2012). Members of these groups were brought together to share information as cooperatively and seamlessly as possible to ensure that the intelligence collected was accurate, that a high quality product was created, and that the appropriate teams were provided with the necessary intelligence to develop the most effective response plan.

These relationships and the relevant intelligence sharing began small and developed into larger projects depending on the identified security threats.

**Principles of Major Case Management**

To maximize their resources and information collecting capabilities, the Olympics’ Joint Intelligence Group relied on the Major Case Management (MCM) principles originally designed for and applied to homicide case files. This approach is used in serious, complex, and high profile police investigations to minimize risk and to increase the likelihood of success in the investigation. Given the nature of these incidents, major cases are headed by individuals in a structured approach. The first element of the Major Case Management Team (MCMT) is to establish and develop the command triangle. The command triangle is comprised of a Team Commander, who is the assigned authority leading the project; a Primary Intelligence Investigator, who manages the speed, flow, and direction of the investigation by delegating tasks and overseeing the related processes; and a File Coordinator or Intelligence Information Manager, who supervises all file documentation, such as its collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination, and provides guidance that determines the necessary resources and personnel, including their roles and the extent of their involvement needed for these tasks. Under these key management roles, there are numerous subgroups responsible for various tasks that comprise the rest of the team.
The team in the JIG was comprised of liaison management teams or individuals who would develop the partnerships, information management teams, analytical teams, threat assessment teams, investigational teams, and secure information network teams. Below each one of these, there were investigators, “surveillance teams” made up primarily for covert operations involving groups or persons of interest involved or believed to be involved in criminal behaviour, and a community relations outreach group comprised of individuals who met with protestor groups to facilitate lawful protest. During the course of the security preparations, all information that was obtained by the joint intelligence teams was submitted to an information manager who then forwarded it to members of the command triangle.

Creating a cohesive team

The critical point for the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit was that all members formed a cohesive team relying on the intelligence of the JIG (Plecas, Dow, & Diplock, 2011). In all investigations, particularly for events as large as the Olympics, the police cannot be effective if they are working in what one member of the V2010 ISU called silos of excellence, which occurs when there are talented groups successfully achieving their goals, but failing to share that information with other groups. While these teams may accomplish great work individually, in the absence of combined efforts and shared intelligence, serious gaps may arise. The collected information and data should also go through a command structure where the person in charge can either request further analysis or disseminate the information to the appropriate people. Canada is in a unique position because the RCMP acts as the municipal police force, the provincial police force, and the national police force, and also has international policing responsibilities. Most policing models around the world are not designed like this. In working with agencies from the United States and Europe, for example, it can be more challenging because there are different agencies that have different mandates, so it is important for teams within these units to follow policies to ensure they are working within their mandates and within the confines of their respective laws.

Despite these hurdles, partnerships are essential and security teams have to be able to connect and collate all of the intelligence they collect.

To assist in this process, the JIG utilized an electronic template that assisted in the creation of the unit. The template was created at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis. The template has drop-down menus that itemize every task into assignments that can be assigned to different groups. There was also a task sheet outlining each task, the individuals assigned to the task, the assigned date, its diary or deadline dates, when it was completed, and a space for any additional notes. The template included 20 start-up tasks for each role, a number deemed to be a manageable undertaking. As delineated in the Major Case Management principles, there were clear processes for the managers, supervisors, and investigators to follow in documenting all decisions that were made, and there were clear, appropriate, and timely reporting practices established early for all members and teams. Under the Major Case Management model, the first task of the Team Commander was to obtain a clear understanding of each team’s roles, responsibilities, and purpose. This assisted in guiding initial meetings that covered basic topics, followed by meetings that focused on the quality and quantity of resources required and budgets, and then subsequent discussions of significant dependencies and possible challenges. Each of these points were included in the security planning template and hyperlinked to the corresponding task and the mandates of the intelligence groups that was responsible for collecting, collating, analyzing, and disseminating all relevant intelligence in a timely manner.
The Team Commander’s second task was to designate someone as the deputy commander based on his or her proficiency and suitability for the role. From this point, the next tasks were the role of managers and partner agencies, initiating the process to prepare threat assessments and organizing file coordination. These tasks were also all hyperlinked on the electronic document.

As an extension of this process, the V2010 ISU’s intelligence-led approach included the formulation of threat assessments. Operational and administrative tactics should be based on current threat assessments, so that in cases where the threat level is low, teams can adjust the number of resources required. The Joint Intelligence Group continually assessed their threat level for the Olympics and assisted senior management in the V2010 ISU who made resource-related decisions to ensure their readiness for potential threats. Nevertheless, considerable attention was focused on the cost of security for the Vancouver Games, which ballooned to over $800 million (McLean, 2010). These costs largely came from the provision of resources and manpower from other provinces, with 6,000 police officers brought in from across the country. Mike Sekela, a former Chief Superintendent for the RCMP and member of the V2010 ISU, stated that security intelligence teams, or the JIG, need to develop accurate intelligence products that can assist senior managers in making decisions that allow for scaling back or increasing and deploying resources based on changing threat levels. An added challenge to this, however, is that today’s information is constantly changing, and so police and security agencies must have the most up-to-date information at their fingertips.

Keeping the focus on the Games, not security

Former Chief Superintendent Mike Sekela stressed that the JIG was put in place very early on for the Vancouver Olympics and was already well established before any events began. “If you’re not up and running and confident in what you’re doing before the Games start, it’s a little late when the torch gets lit. So, the proactive approach is the best way to instill confidence in your security unit’s abilities and display the leadership required during these major events”.

Before any major event can commence, it requires meticulous planning and preparation, the establishment of clear roles and related responsibilities, and the effective management of information through ongoing communications. These projects implement a solid structure at the initial stages to increase the chance of success and to minimize the likelihood of risks and failures, such as the result of tunnel vision or overlooked information. The true test of the V2010 ISU’s intelligence-led preparations came during the operational side of the process when the Olympics commenced. According to Sekela, “The measure of success, at the end of the day, [was that] the Olympics was seen as a sporting event, not as a security event. That’s the whole goal; the whole idea of an intelligence group or security team is not to be seen … so the front pages at the end of the day was Canada winning gold, not the security, so that’s the true measure of success”.

Chapter 2: Be Intelligence-led
An additional component in the success being seen in British Columbia is the province’s shared, comprehensive records management system that provides officers and analysts with province-wide crime data. Many British Columbian police organizations are pulling information from disparate systems to a consolidated repository to have interoperability. In the spring of 2001, an amendment was made to the British Columbia Police Act, as advocated by then BC Solicitor General Rich Colman, and then Inspector and current Chief Jim Chu of the Vancouver Police Department, which led to the creation of the province-wide data sharing program PRIME BC, now in use by all police officers and agencies across British Columbia (Brewer, 2009). In many other Canadian and American police departments, there are multiple databases and spreadsheets that, in many cases, are not shared or discussed with other police staff. With few exceptions, PRIME enables an almost instantaneous sharing of police reports between all municipal police departments and RCMP detachments in British Columbia.

In British Columbia, police organizations have also begun to share intelligence more readily. As recently as two years ago, there existed a perceptible divide between bordering jurisdictions in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. For example, there were a number of major cases of sex offenders who lived in one city and would travel to neighbouring cities to engage in their offending. Although the police eventually identified the cross-jurisdictional nature of these crimes, in many cases, the lack of intelligence sharing between police departments, at a minimum, provided time for offenders to commit a string of crimes before any connections between the crimes could be made. In an encouraging move regarding previously missed opportunities in catching predatory criminals, there have been a few exemplar cases of tracking and apprehending offenders sooner with the application of cross jurisdictional intelligence. Not surprisingly, these successes have also been recognized as possible, in large part, to the now existing relationships between police departments to share intelligence.

For example, there was the case of Shalendra Kumar Sharma, a Surrey man charged with a series of serious offences, including sexual assaults, common assaults, kidnapping, confinement, and uttering threats. His crimes took place in 1994, 1997, and 2001 in Burnaby involving women from the Downtown Eastside, Vancouver. Evidently, this case involved considerable multi-jurisdictional overlap and the need for efficient and effective sharing of intelligence. Even after charges were laid, the RCMP and the Vancouver Police Department continued to work collaboratively to investigate some of their earlier files to determine whether additional links existed between other offences and this individual. The identification and charging of Sharma occurred as a result of the dedicated work and use of state-of-the-art technologies of the Vancouver Police Department’s sex crimes analyst. This analyst laid out the victims and where they were from, the locations of the offences, and the living place of the potential offender. With these three critical pieces of information, the analyst and Vancouver Police Department were able to make the necessary connections and be confident that they had identified the individual responsible for these offences.
This type of investigative practice has resulted in substantial successes for the Vancouver Police Department and the RCMP in their work on major violent criminal cases.

A problem that the Vancouver Police Department and others have been successful in eradicating is “the silo of information” that once plagued police departments everywhere. The police in British Columbia have a collective repository of millions and millions of police records going back as far as 2001, when they began this consolidated collection. With the introduction of integrated computer infrastructures stored on central servers, extremely large warehouses of information can be better organized and connections between offenders and offences can emerge. The Vancouver Police Department serves as a “best practices” model for police in terms of how they develop and implement strategies and integrate technologies that can help their department keep pace with existing and advancing crime problems. As an intelligence-led police organization, the Vancouver Police Department have pre-defined strategies, use trained analysts, and have a centralized, enterprise system for data analysis. They are also focused on using a variety of analytics, such as data mining and non-standard data sources.

What the Vancouver Police Department and some RCMP detachments have demonstrated over the past few years is that a commitment to true intelligence-led policing, regardless of where the police department is located or what the crime trends or patterns are, must include a breaking down of intelligence silos, the capacity to integrate a large amount of data from various sources, a willingness to share and receive data from other police organizations, and a culture that places incredible value on the contributions of crime and intelligence analysts.

One detail that should be clear for all police departments and policing units is that coordinated efforts involving collaboration within and between detachments are vital to truly being an intelligence-led police organization. Communications between neighbouring communities and provinces must be transparent, and policing units, including the crime/intelligence analysts, must engage in open dialogue with the officers and upper management. While each is responsible for its respective/assigned tasks, the units can and should provide each other with supportive assistance as required depending on the types of different cases.
In God We Trust, Everyone Else Must Bring Data

One important innovation in policing involving the use of crime analysts was the New York Police Department’s CompStat program, which was developed in 1994. CompStat uses up-to-date information on crime, arrest, and disorder data to create informed statistics and maps that police administrators can use to create intelligence-led strategies to prevent and reduce crime and to hold police leaders accountable to reducing crime (Santos, 2013). Although this geographic mapping system has been criticized for not being responsible for the high crime decreases sometimes suggested (Levitt, 2004; Eterno and Silverman, 2012), it has been successful in identifying and responding to New York’s once extensive crime problem. The software has since expanded and is now utilized in a number of large cities across the United States and also in Vancouver, Canada by the Vancouver Police Department and West Vancouver Police Department (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003).

CompStat is comprised of four main principles: accurate and timely intelligence; effective tactics; rapid deployment; and relentless follow-up and assessment (The West Vancouver Police Department, 2013). Each principle builds from the previous one, moving from the collection of comprehensive data and its organization in a large data repository, to rapid refinement, and the utilization of this intelligence in calls to service and measurement of effectiveness with regular follow-up. For example, the Vancouver Police Department conducts analyses with CompStat, with a moderated application of the program referred to by members of the Vancouver Police Department as CompStat lite. CompStat is carried out on a 28-day cycle and the data is stored in a massive data warehouse that can be accessed when needed and conglomerated with crime data collected more regularly by police. In effect, CompStat is the central data storage house and provides the collateral data reviewed in monthly meetings where the department tracks and discusses growing crime problems, and monitors any positive developments in the reduction of crimes.

CompStat’s four main principles:
- Accurate and timely intelligence
- Effective tactics
- Rapid deployment
- Relentless follow-up and assessment

The assigned teams can be held accountable for addressing specific issues before they become larger crime problems, putting the necessary resources in place, and then monitoring successes or failures. In effect, CompStat is another component of the intelligence process and is a means of upholding a certain level of accountability for all members of the police department, including those in upper management.

The Consolidated Records Intelligence Mining Environment (C.R.I.M.E.) is another intelligence-led crime system based on geographical mapping developed by the Vancouver Police Department. The C.R.I.M.E. system uses mapping, spatial, temporal, and link analysis to collect specific offence data that is stored in a common data warehouse. The comprehensive system allows analysts to review collected data to present an overview of where and what types of crimes occurred in a given area. This information can be used to readily pinpoint crime patterns, hotspots, and general crime trends throughout the city (Prox, 2013). Based on this information, officers are deployed throughout the city. C.R.I.M.E. has triggered the swift detection and arrest of serious criminals operating in and around Vancouver who had been offending for years without being identified.
It has also been used by the Vancouver Police Department’s Gang Violence Task Force to authenticate the names of individuals active in violent crimes and gang activities in the heart of downtown Vancouver (Brewer, 2009). The data from C.R.I.M.E. is also what feeds the data for CompStat analysis.

The use of the latest technologies may also assist with predictive policing and the intersection of criminal events before they actually occur (“Police tech”, 2013). As an example, the Vancouver Police Department is working to mobilize their officers by providing them with instruments needed to create their own crime prevention and reduction tactics. In addition to the already extensive crime tracking tools at the Vancouver Police Department’s disposal, the department further developed a graphic dashboard interface called GeoDash, the first of its kind in Canada, and now available on all police car mobile terminals. The data feeding GeoDash is refreshed three times per day providing officers with ‘almost live’ data that can be modified according to the officer’s area of interest or where they are patrolling. Such advancements are designed to enhance the police’s ability to stay ahead of criminals and any developing crime problems.

Special Constable Prox stated that the next phase of GeoDash will include a predictive capacity based on algorithms combining a multitude of variables that will anticipate where crimes are most likely to occur within a three to four hour time frame, in a certain geographical radius, as far as 24-hours in advance, based on historical data.

Intelligence-led policing has undoubtedly led to more efficient and effective policing throughout major municipalities in British Columbia. While many RCMP detachments and municipal departments are using some form of CompStat, as part of being intelligence-led, the Vancouver Police Department are working with others in British Columbia to assist them in routinely logging on to these data infrastructures. The Victoria and Saanich police have already started to use these systems. With the introduction and continued development of C.R.I.M.E., CompStat, and GeoDash, policing has begun to shift from a reactive to a proactive philosophy and have adopted many intelligence-led approaches and strategies to policing.

**The Secrets Offenders Do Not Keep**

An underutilized form of intelligence-led policing is the development of an informant network. Informants, or covert human intelligence sources (Billingsley, 2005), are a key source of information for the police as they can provide intimate details regarding the operations of criminal operations and prolific offenders (Innes, 2000). Informants are typically recruited by front line police officers, including general duty and investigative officers, usually as a result of police detection of their illicit activities (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999; Innes, 2000). The officer and offender make a deal in which the officer agrees not to arrest the offender or to seek a more lenient charge or disposition in exchange for the regular provision of useful information regarding crime and criminals of interest to the police (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999; Greer, 1995; Turcotte, 2008). Although the police cannot always reduce charges in exchange for information, they may want to engage with a potential informant to establish a professional relationship that can benefit both sides in the future. Quite often, individuals are arrested and charged for a certain offence and the police can then start a source-handler relationship from that point forward. For this reason, communication skills and the development of trust are crucial to securing such a bond.
To encourage this process, the police conduct a complete background check on the source to determine who they are, what their history is, whether they have a criminal record, particularly if they have been convicted of perjury, and who they are associated with and what their associates’ backgrounds are. The police generally stay away from individuals who have an untrustworthy past and they may not immediately use information obtained from them. Nevertheless, if the potential source persists and provides information on cases involving more serious charges, the police would have to look at it. The police have to take into account that the reason many of these people can provide such useful information is because they are also involved in a criminal lifestyle.

During this ongoing relationship, the offender may be paid for any valuable information they provide to their “handler”, while the police benefit from the ability to use the informant’s information to gain better insight into the nature of criminal activity and the networks or relationships involved. As a result, they can use this information to build a case against other offenders, or to request that an informant try to obtain specific information or evidence from a particular individual or suspect (Billingsley, 2005; den Hengst and Staffeleu, 2012; Greer, 1995; Innes, 2000; Turcotte, 2008). The police, through enforcement opportunities, can identify informants or an informant may approach the police on their own to share what they know about a particular case or investigation. Because informant information must be voluntary, the police employ various techniques and follow very specific procedures to ensure that information is not obtained under duress and that the source and their information are kept safe. In making contact with a potential informant, the police may also use what they call a “cold bump” where they simply approach individuals and ask them to provide information on the people they associate with. While there are a number of possible motives for an individual to become an informant for the police, such as charge consideration and reduction, revenge or a vendetta, eliminating the competition, leaving the criminal lifestyle, or simply doing the right thing, money is the most common motivation. Handlers must be aware of the motivation and take this into consideration during the relationship and procurement of information. While nobody wants to have a reputation as a “snitch”, there are numerous potential sources, and even the police are sometimes surprised by who is informing on whom. Some handlers also believe that no one is untouchable because everyone has something that will make them decide to talk. Due to the nature of the information that sources provide and their connection to criminal activities and investigations, informants’ identities are kept confidential and for this reason they also do not testify in court, which distinguishes them from witnesses.

Utilizing information from sources

In addition to crime analysis, the provision of intelligence by informants benefits police and the public more generally through reductions in time associated with investigating a previously committed crime the informant may have intelligence about, as well as increased rates of case clearances due to police’s use of informant information to catch the offender in the act of committing a planned crime (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999; Innes, 2000). Sources can give police investigations the necessary direction to successfully determine ongoing crime problems and problem offenders. Based on their conversations with informants, handlers take detailed notes that they submit as debriefs to the department’s source coordinator.
The source coordinator – who is in charge of the administration for all the sources and handlers – reviews the information and disseminates the necessary details to the appropriate department related to ongoing cases. At times, there are serious active investigations that may result in relevant information that needs to be acted on immediately. In these situations, a handler may approach an informant directly, but, in many cases, the sources bring the information which is then shared in debriefs.

While considered an important aspect of traditional policing, the regular use of informants seems to have lessened in recent years, possibly as a result of perceived high financial costs from reimbursing informants for their information, as well as the additional labour and travel costs resulting from the recruitment and management of informants (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999). In addition, according to Billingsley (2005), civil suits may possibly be brought against police organizations for perceived breaches of duty of care towards informants should they be victimized as a result of their “special relationship” with the police. Furthermore, in some cases where offenders have turned informant, they have agreed to this role on the condition that a serious charge against them is dropped, which may put the criminal justice into disrepute, may cause the public to lose confidence with the police, or may, in itself, constitute a criminal offence (Dunnighan and Norris, 1999). Turcotte (2008) suggests that the increasing formalization and management of informant networks by police managers has led to a decreased willingness on the part of offenders to participate as informants for reasons including that their compensation for the information they provide is no longer instantaneous nor enough to elicit cooperation, and because guarantees of anonymity and promises of rewards for information by their immediate handler are not necessarily honoured by the police organization. Finally, the information provided by informants may be unreliable and lead to wasted police resources (Innes, 2000). Yet, the potential financial and human cost savings associated with the prevention of offending and increased likelihood of case closure and criminal conviction may be enough to convince police of the value of this form of intelligence-led policing, particularly as it relates to the proactive prevention of criminal activity (Audit Commission, 1993; Innes, 2000).

As a part of being information and intelligence-led, police departments often draw on information that is obtained from informants. The Abbotsford Police Department is a police agency that relies greatly on the information provided by informants, most extensively within their drug enforcement unit. This unit carefully collects and combs through intelligence and source-based information that assists in leading them to offenders in their area who are associated with criminal organizations and the drug trade. Similarly, the Abbotsford Police Department targets property offenders using their prolific offender management list in combination with source information. Informants provide information voluntarily that they have obtained, typically in relation to criminal activity that has happened or may be about to happen. Best practices for using informants dictate that they cannot be actively involved in the crime that they are reporting on, so it is important that handlers make the careful distinction between suspects, witnesses, informants, and agents. In addition to identifying crimes, informants can assist in several ways, including helping to identify suspects and avenues of investigation for police departments.

**Rules of engagement**

Given the sensitivity of informant-handler relationship and work, there are strict rules about how police engage with informants. When police meet with informants, they wear plain clothes and ensure that there is another officer who can also attend their meetings with the source. The location of the meeting is also very important; handlers try to vary the locations and meet with informants in public places where their interaction are not likely to be detected by others. There should never be a male and a female alone in a car, hotel room, or wherever the meeting is taking place, as there cannot be any risk for later possible accusations. The meetings must remain professional and the handler must take meticulous notes during the conversation.
Since source information is the only information that does not require disclosure in court, unless it is subject to a court order, the handlers’ documentation is critical. The determination and disbursement of payment is also something that must be handled delicately, again by two officers, once the information has been obtained and assessed. As a part of this, handlers will also corroborate all of the information they receive.

While the use of sources is not common practice for offences in which there is a victim, such as sexual assault, crimes ‘without victims’, like drug offences, are ideal cases for police to take advantage of the information of sources. In many cases, for example, the police will arrest someone for possession of a controlled substance. Although possession is a crime in its own right, possession for the purpose of trafficking is an offence that the police would likely be more interested in. In these types of cases, the police have to decide whether they want to sacrifice one minor charge with the intent of uncovering a far more significant ringleader or crime. Many cases will begin in this way with the police learning, through talking with an identified offender, that s/he possesses information on an offender who is higher up in the organization. From this point, the police can begin their investigative work to determine if and how they can use this information to focus on that much bigger target. While this can be challenging, handlers are well trained in how to conduct these investigations. In investigations where the police utilize a cold approach to seek out informants, they rely on their knowledge of offenders and their associations. The police first determine who the person’s associates are, and how and why they are associated. Next, they can approach or target that individual for the purpose of flipping them and moving up the organization. Likewise, in cases where the police identify informants during enforcement opportunities, they may also decide to take the opportunity to pursue bigger criminals. The determination of whether to target bigger, more entrenched offenders or to take the case at hand depends on what kind of investigation or potential charge the police are dealing with. The cases that involve a victim vary depending on what the source is providing information on. The police consider a series of factors and even talk to prosecutors regarding sentencing.

Police additionally obtain source information that is provided during periods of ongoing conflict between criminal groups and involves a target being placed on someone. These cases unfold when an informant discloses that a specific individual is going to be injured or murdered by another individual or group. Under their duty to warn, the police act on this by contacting that person to inform them that their life may be in jeopardy and to offer any assistance they can to protect that individual. Although the police cannot provide the source’s name, or the name of the person the threat is from, in some instances, the targets are already aware that a threat has been made against them. Another related scenario identified by the Abbotsford Police Department is that offenders will try to assess their own internal security. They may use their own techniques to reveal individuals who have acted as sources for the police. One way they do this is to share a piece of fabricated information with a specific drug dealer or small group to see if the information will result in a police contact. Similar to how the police determine who’s who in the zoo, offenders must also single out who’s who and who is talking to the authorities. The police then have the task of determining whether these threats are real or not, and must be cognizant and cautious of this when they are working with informants. For this reason, one of the first questions that handlers ask a potential source is how many people have been privy to this particular piece of information. In cases where the source reveals that they are the only person who has received this information, the police will not normally act as they have to protect that person’s safety or find alternate methods of dealing with the threat while preserving the identity of the source.
Developing the relationship

Though less commonly pursued by the police, some source-handler relationships take a longer time to develop. In one case, an Abbotsford Police Department handler courted a person for about one year before an official source-handler relationship formed to the point that the source actually provided information. The officer had elected to target this particular person because of their known associations to a more criminally imbedded offender. During the course of the year, the officer developed a strong rapport with the individual, and was successful in turning this person into a source. When the relationship was first established, the individual did not appear to possess, or wish to share, any information with the handler. However, later in their relationship, there developed an enforcement opportunity involving the source that opened the door for the source-handler relationship to truly evolve. In many cases, this can be all that is needed to make someone become an informer. The officer then became a handler and used information that the source provided to get a higher-end target who they were able to charge and convict with trafficking offences. The target was someone who was also associated to homicides as a result of his drug and gang-related activities and so he was a significant target for the police. The trust that was established in this relationship was likely part of the motive for the source deciding to reveal what he knew. Trust is one of the most important factors in a source-handler relationship because of the dangers associated with the criminal lifestyle; the police do their best to assure the informant that they can protect them if they choose to provide classified information.

Informants can save police departments hundreds of man hours, as they can provide police access to information that they would not normally have. For instance, the police can conduct an investigation and surveillance for several months and still not know what is inside a target’s home. If they have someone who has been in there and then shares certain information, what could require weeks of surveillance and several officers, can be achieved in one visit with a source. In departments where informants are frequently used, the police are able to obtain information on essentially all types of criminal activities taking place in their community, whether it is stealing vehicles, break and enters, marijuana grow operations, or homicides. They can then initiate or further an investigation efficiently and, in many cases, experience greater success.

Examples of successful informant-handler relationships

As an example, in 2012, the Abbotsford Police Department used an informant to investigate a case against a full patch Hell’s Angel from the White Rock, British Columbia chapter. The offender had been operating in the Fraser Valley region of the province and the police received information advising that he was dealing drugs out of an inn in Aldergrove. Once the police received the information, they initiated their investigation and began surveillance on the suspect and the inn. As a result of their continued surveillance, the police collected further evidence of the suspect’s involvement in drug trafficking and the Abbotsford Police Department’s Drug Enforcement Unit obtained a search warrant, which the Emergency Response Team (ERT) used to execute a search on the member’s residence. Inside, they found almost a kilogram of cocaine and approximately $26,000 in cash, which were seized and forfeited. Based on the police’s investigation and strong case, this individual pled guilty to the charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and he was sentenced to two years in jail. A police sergeant with the Abbotsford Police Department noted that this was how many informant cases proceeded. In some cases, a source will reveal the exact location of illicit activities and a precise quantity of an illicit drug or item.
In still more detailed informant cases, the source may reveal the name of the offender. While even this is rarely enough information on its own, it pinpoints a target for the police. In the case of the full patch Hells Angel, the police acquired information on the offender, his activities, and the location of these activities; information that permitted them to quickly concentrate their efforts and catch this offender.

Although this case does not appear to be a huge case as far as drug trafficking investigations are concerned, the police's attraction to this individual was fueled by his ties to criminal organizations. Since the police have to make decisions concerning which offenders they follow-up on, public safety targets are a priority. For example, the Fraser Valley is home to a number of native Abbotsford residents who have developed strong criminal connections to organized crime. Drug production and trafficking have contributed to a spike in violence across the Lower Mainland in the past, and so as a part of their crime reduction and public safety measures, the Abbotsford Police Department allocates much of its resources to targeting these individuals; a component of this includes releasing public notifications alerting the community to dangerous offenders. Since these individuals are so embedded in criminal activities and organizations, police do receive information on them and this information is acted upon whenever possible. In the case of illegal drugs, offenders who are involved at any level are associated to one another in some fashion, which ultimately links back to gangs. Full patch Hells Angels are, therefore, significant targets for the Abbotsford Police Department's drug unit.

Another case in which an informant played a key role in identifying a suspect and securing charges was with a series of major robberies that took place across multiple jurisdictions in the Fraser Valley from 2009 to 2012.

There had been three cases of robberies where a masked individual entered large-scale public institutions with firearms and demanded either jewelry or cash. As is a part of standard police practice with these types of crimes, the police had collected DNA from each of the crime scenes. The test results from the RCMP lab revealed that all of the DNA samples matched the same profile, yet there was no known profile match in the databank, and so the police could not identify the offender who was responsible. Months later, an offender was arrested and charged with a break and enter, but because of the type of offence, it did not require the collection of a DNA sample. In the absence of DNA, the police did not know at the time that this was the individual responsible for the aforementioned robberies. In November 2012, shortly before the offender was charged with the property offence, an existing source independently approached a handler and disclosed that the police should concentrate their attention on this same individual for the two robberies that had occurred in 2012 (one historical robbery was committed in 2009). Upon obtaining this information and arresting the suspect for the break and enter, the police started putting more information together and resumed their investigation. An undercover officer was used while the suspect was in custody and, in due course, the police were able to collect a sample of his DNA. The results from the lab confirmed that all of the DNA profiles were a match. This person was arrested and charged with several offences tying back to the three robberies. Without the informant's revelation, the police might never have known the identity of the suspect and the case likely would have remained unsolved. This case exemplifies the strength of some informant-handler relationships and how they can lead sources to come forward, of their own free will, with information on a possible suspect.
In order to measure the degree to which you have an intelligence-led organization, there are a number of key indicators that police leaders should look for within their organizations. The first indicator of success is that the organization has undertaken a review to ensure that they have the necessary number of analysts who are properly trained and have access to the most helpful technological tools with which to do their work. Related to this point, it is critical that analysts receive regular training and have opportunities to share their knowledge and experiences with other analysts. As this field is constantly evolving, it is in the best interest of the organization to ensure that their analysts have opportunities to develop and expand their skills and knowledge. While it is not necessary for organizations to invest in every new piece of technology that comes to market, an indicator of success is the establishment of a group of senior officers responsible for ensuring that the organization is constantly assessing and integrating new analytic technologies and practices. While it is critical for organizations to have the people and the resources necessary to conduct crime and intelligence analyses, simply having analysts is insufficient.

A clear indicator of accomplishment is the degree to which the organization is appropriately and successfully integrating and using the intelligence generated by analysts into operations. In other words, it is not sufficient to simply have analysts produce reports. Instead, the information generated by the crime and intelligence analysts is used by the organization to inform decisions about which offenders to target, which crime problems to address, and what strategies will be used to achieve these objectives.

Another indicator of success is the degree to which your organization has reoriented itself from a primarily responsive organization to one that relies on sophisticated, evidence-based intelligence and informants to become a predictive policing organization. In effect, success is a demonstrated ability to use the information produced by analysts to allow police to be much more proactive, to be aware of emerging crime trends prior to their establishment and, therefore, be able to develop strategies to ensure that they do not develop beyond their nascent stage, to be in a position to disrupt offenders before they become prolific, and to identify upcoming policing challenges before they become a strain on police resources. Critically, indicators of success are crime analysts consistently reporting that they receive sufficient information and support from sworn officers to make accurate and timely predictions that are translated into specific crime reduction strategies and actions. Being truly intelligence-led means that police have access to and integrate much more data and that this information directs police activity.
References for Chapter 2


Chapter 3: Focus on Offenders

A Renewed Emphasis on the Value of Focusing on Offenders

Starting in January of 2013, the city of Abbotsford in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia experienced a substantial increase in property offences that left the community with serious concerns about public safety. The first wave of offences was a series of vehicle thefts, while the second wave, which occurred over the summer, involved residential break-ins and car thefts by offenders requiring a quick mode of transportation. Another important element of these crime waves was the number of offenders involved, as these offences were not the work of one offender, but multiple prolific offenders active in the community at the same time. While a single chronic property offender can create a major crime problem in an area over a short period of time, multiple prolific property offenders working simultaneously can be a serious challenge to the police, the public’s confidence in the police, and general perceptions of safety. As prolific offenders can account for 50% to 75% of all crime in a community (Home Office, 2001; Huizinga, Loeber, & Thornberry, 1995), police departments’ efforts to address prolific and persistent offenders are critical to crime reduction strategies and increasing public safety.

When a crime wave emerges in a city, developing and implementing an effective police response can take a significant amount of time. The identification of offenders can sometimes occur in a shorter period of time through matching fingerprints or DNA from a crime scene to an already known prolific offender.

Police departments’ efforts to address prolific and persistent offenders are critical to crime reduction strategies and increasing public safety.

However, other cases may require the involvement of several police investigators and crime analysts, and the review of countless files, surveillance videos, tips from the public, and sophisticated crime scene analysis. In addition to being information and intelligence-led, police organizations in British Columbia have adopted more offender-focused approaches as a means to respond to their ongoing crime problems. Although this has become a component in several agencies, it seems to be extremely integral to the work of the Abbotsford Police Department.

One of the tactics that had the greatest positive effect for the Abbotsford Police Department in trying to respond to their prolific and persistent offenders was with the vigorous enforcement of any breaches of community-based conditions. In the case of the three offenders who had been arrested as part of the summer crime wave, the Abbotsford Police Department identified them as highly active offenders who were commonly involved in property crimes. In response, the department followed up with these offenders in the community and quickly became aware that they had not been adhering to their probation conditions.
Based on this information, officers set up more careful surveillance on these persons and, instead of waiting to apprehend them for committing new property crimes or even other crimes, they were able to arrest them for breaching their conditions of probation. Of these three offenders, two were part of the department’s Prolific Offender Management (POM) Program, while the third was not on the prolific offender list, but was an active property criminal in Abbotsford.

The criminal justice response to each of these offenders followed very similar principles. Since not all active prolific offenders can be added to a prolific offender management list due to the limitations associated to departmental capacity and resources, police agencies must prioritize which offenders should receive the most aggressive forms of supervision. This strategy should also attempt to balance a meaningful response for other problem offenders who have not been placed on a prolific offender list.

In Abbotsford, when these prolific offenders are arrested on a breach, the approach focuses on determining the best management strategy for each type of offender, especially when there is not likely to be a considerable custodial sentence. The practice is for the prolific offender management team to identify those offenders that require significant monitoring in the community, and then to determine the unique and specific conditions to best disrupt that offender’s routine behaviours and associated criminal activity.

The Abbotsford Police Department’s Deputy Chief Rick Lucy maintains that this approach has been successful because offenders “don’t enjoy the fact that, not only are they under conditions, but that, in fact, the conditions are being supervised…it interferes with their ability to commit crime and then, of course, if they do commit crime or breach their conditions, they understand that they’re going to get arrested for that fairly promptly.”

Another objective involved appropriate supervision and support so that the offenders were viewed as having an opportunity to address their criminal behaviours, their substance abuse problems, and their level of contact with negative associates. Alternatively, if they did not make these positive choices, offenders understood that they would be persistently arrested by the Abbotsford Police Department.

Abbotsford’s property crime reduction-specific initiative began in 2008 and, according to Abbotsford Police Department statistics, since its inception there has been a 45% reduction in household break and enters, a 70% decrease in the number of break and enters on businesses in the community, and a 73% drop in stolen cars and general thefts from vehicles (Hopes, 2013). More recently, Abbotsford has one of the lowest property crime rates among other large municipalities in the Lower Mainland, including Mission, Langley, Chilliwack, Surrey, Coquitlam, and Vancouver.

## The Lesson

Offender-focused approaches include a number of diverse strategies that share the common purpose of reducing crime in a given area. At the Abbotsford Police Department, their most successful offender-focused approaches are based on the reaction, intervention, and prevention of crime problems in their community. A major element of this is targeting prolific offenders and employing specific strategies in the management of these people in the community.

In effect, police agencies throughout British Columbia departments, including the Abbotsford Police Department, have adopted intense Prolific Offender Management Programs that focus on both maintaining the pressure and surveillance on prolific offenders, but also provide access to resources and programs to assist those who want to move away from their criminal lifestyles.
Being Truly Offender-focused

Police agencies in British Columbia are prioritizing and embarking on their respective missions to address their cities’ most problematic populations. From direct approaches involving the identification of prolific offenders to the institution of the most sophisticated technologies, a number of strategies are helping change the face of policing in British Columbia and Canada. Modern policing procedures utilized in British Columbia have introduced offender-focused approaches that identify, target, and manage the most problematic offenders’ specific needs and offer supports in these areas in the hopes that this will also assist in curtailing their offending.

The first two chapters of this guide discussed the need to know who makes up your criminal population and how these people and their offending are connected to others, objects, and locations. Once this is well understood, police must then develop strategies to target and manage these problematic, priority, and prolific offenders, as well as target those who are becoming persistent offenders. In other words, strategies need to be implemented to deal with current offenders and those considered at risk for chronic criminality. Assuming these populations have been identified using intelligence-led approaches, a crime reduction strategy built on targeted policing of these high-risk populations will have a substantial effect on reducing crime rates.

The Yellow Brick Road to Offending

Criminologists have long been aware that a relationship exists between age and crime. Consistently, in Canada, analyses of the histories of offenders and non-offenders indicates that a very small proportion of people begin committing crime during childhood. Instead, there is often an increase in offending that begins and persists throughout adolescence peaking around 16 and 17 years old before decreasing again, for most individuals, as they enter their early adulthood (Diplock, 2009; Farrington, Piquero, & Jennings, 2013; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2007). While this pattern was thought to apply to all people, police have been aware that this pattern of offending is not the case for everyone. For instance, Moffitt (1993) first suggested two pathways to offending, the more common being the adolescence-limited pattern in which offending begins during adolescence, peaks around 17 years of age, and decreases again as the individual enters adulthood.

This type of offending pattern is typically blamed on peer influences during adolescence, a testing of one’s identity, and a growing desire for independence.

The less common pathway, and the one that is of greater concern to the police because it usually represents the pattern of offending for those who become prolific and priority offenders, is the life-course persistent offender. This characterizes the offender who begins to engage in criminal behaviour during childhood, persists in a high rate of crime and delinquency during adolescence, and continues to offend throughout early and middle adulthood (Moffitt, 1993). Their involvement in crime is more often due to developmental issues, such as issues with brain development that have led to a tendency to be impulsive and uncaring, which explains why they are a much harder group to deter from offending.
While this is a fairly simplistic model of the different types of criminal offenders, advances in theory and statistical analyses over the last several decades have resulted in tremendous growth in understanding the various pathways offenders follow over the course of their life (e.g., Moffitt, 1993; Nagin and Land, 1993). These pathways have implications for the most appropriate interventions to reduce crime and, therefore, are important for police to understand and integrate into their crime reduction strategies.

Yet, while research has since identified many more pathways to offending, research consistently identifies a small group of the offending population, approximately 10%, who commit a high rate of offending and who are more likely to persist in antisocial behaviours, such as physical aggression and crime, over time (Croisdale, 2007; Farrington et al.,; Lacourse, Dupéré, & Loeber, 2008; Laub and Sampson, 2003; Piquero et al., 2007). A focus on these offenders is likely to have the greatest impact on a community’s crime rate and crime reduction initiatives.

Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me

Chronic or prolific offenders are in need of interventions that differ greatly from those used with less persistent/less serious offenders. To reduce crime when dealing with a career criminal population, an obvious tactic is to rely upon incapacitation through the criminal justice system. Locking up prolific and other priority offenders will have a demonstrable effect on crime rates, as these offenders are responsible for a large portion of the crime statistics. This perspective has led several police forces to adopt targeted approaches to policing in which they closely monitor the activities and behaviour of known prolific or priority offenders while they are in the community to deter the likelihood that they will engage in criminal behaviours. These offenders may be identified through a combination of past offending or conviction history; a history of failures to successfully complete community-based sentences, such as parole; persistent underlying issues, such as substance dependence or mental health; family background, both protective, such as being married, and risk-based, such as familial criminality; and current lifestyle and activities suggesting involvement in crime, such as living beyond one’s means or having known criminal associations (Braga, 2010).

However, police need to do more than just monitor these offenders while in the community, as this approach is not sustainable in the long-term. Even if police are successful in identifying sufficient evidence to support charges and convictions, offenders often receive short custodial sentences that they serve in provincial jails, which restricts their ability to either access or benefit from the available programming. Therefore, as the problems contributing to offending behaviour are often not being addressed in the provincial correctional setting, the system becomes a revolving door where an offender with untreated risk factors is returned to the streets at risk of committing more crime. Given this knowledge, rather than focusing exclusively on getting these offenders into jail, it is important for police to focus on how they can assist to reduce or eliminate an offender’s need or desire to commit crime. In effect, police should consider employing a two-pronged strategy where they approach a known high-level offender, take the opportunity to inform the offender that they know who they are and what their offending history is, and warn them that if they step out of line, the police will be there to catch them. Alternatively, if the offender is willing to use the available services to deal with their underlying needs, the police will help to connect them to services, including to addictions counselling, mental health treatment, skills training, or to other supportive services. Cities like Kamloops and Abbotsford have had excellent results using this type of approach with their prolific and persistent offenders.
One of the most valuable tools for police to know what is happening in their communities and who is engaging in crime or at risk of engaging in crime is the use of street checks. Also known as ‘carding’ and stop and frisks, street checks are a proactive method of policing where police gather intelligence information from and regarding their criminal population. In New York, street checks were integrated into the city’s Code of Criminal Procedure in 1964 as a way of temporarily questioning a person in a public place and collecting certain relevant information, such as their name, current address, and an explanation of their actions (Kuh, 1965). It should be noted that, based on the wording of this statute, police are only entitled to ask a person for this information; if the individual chooses not to comply, the police officer could detain them, but through a separate statute. A second component of street checks involves frisking or patting down an individual. The frisk component of a stop and frisk is only acceptable to conduct if the police officer has reason to believe that the individual is carrying a weapon and, therefore, poses a threat to the safety of the officer or the general public (Inbau and Thompson, 1968; Kuh, 1965). Research suggests that approximately half of all police stops of individuals result in a frisk (Ferrandino, 2012; Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al., 2013).

In 1968, the United States Supreme Court upheld the practice of street checks and frisking in the case of Terry v. Ohio. As a result of this ruling, police are allowed to conduct a stop in situations where they have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaging in, or about to engage in, criminal activity, and a frisk if reasonably necessary for the officer’s protection (Inbau and Thompson, 1968). Canadian case law has reached similar conclusions. In the 2004 case of R. v. Mann, the Supreme Court of Canada found that police were justified in stopping a person matching a suspect’s description and patting him down for their own personal safety; however, they were not justified in conducting a more in-depth search of his pockets after their pat down revealed a soft object in a pocket.

Again, for the purposes of a street check, in Canada, police only have the legal right to stop an individual to ask them basic questions and to conduct a pat down if they have reason to suspect the person may be carrying a weapon.

In a street check, a police officer will stop an individual in the street to collect basic information, such as their name, age, address, physical description, nature of association with others they are with, and the reasons for being in that area (Goldstein, 2013; Kempa, 2013; Winsa and Rankin, 2013). This information is added to the police records management system where crime analysts can review it. Importantly, approximately 10% of street checks lead to an arrest and charge, many associated to gang activity and gun crimes (Goldstein, 2013; Ferrandino, 2012; Kempa, 2013; Winsa and Rankin, 2013). Street checks also provide police with useful information about relationships between potential suspects that, when combined with technologies for network analysis, have the potential to uncover complex relationship between criminal networks. However, when used incorrectly or inappropriately, street checks have the potential to damage perceptions of police legitimacy, threaten the police-citizen relationship, and contribute to deviant identity formation (Gau and Brunson, 2010; Wiley, Slocum, & Esbensen, 2013).
Although police are only entitled to conduct a street check if they have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity, the use of checks can be controversial and unfortunately, in certain areas, the practice of street checking has led to allegations of racial profiling. In New York, a recent legal decision concluded that, in many cases, the “stop and frisk” policy was implemented in a racially discriminating way, leading to a finding that the New York Police Department infringed upon the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens, protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Goldstein, 2013; Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al., 2013). This has resulted in the recommendation to pilot a program where officers wear video cameras to record street encounters in the hopes that this would deter the practice of inappropriate street checks.

In Toronto, where allegations of racial profiling have also been levied, police are experimenting with providing individuals who are stopped for a street check a receipt after the encounter as a way to prevent the over-targeting of certain ethnicities (Kempa, 2012; Rankin, 2012).

Whereas Toronto typically conducted approximately 400,000 street checks a year (Soupcoff, 2012), it is alleged that the introduction of receipts for street checks has been a 75% reduction in the use of this strategy by the Toronto police (Winsa and Rankin, 2013). Another source of controversy in Toronto was the use of street checks as a measure of police performance as police were tasked with daily street check quotas and their involvement in street checking was assessed when considering opportunities for promotion.

It should be noted that, despite their controversial use and unpopularity with certain segments of the general public, street checks are a legal police practice and many members of the public understand and value the reason for using them (Gau and Brunson, 2010). While street checks should not be used in a discriminatory fashion, they remain an extremely powerful and useful policing strategy to detect and prevent crime. Street checks are a quick and efficient way to conduct interviews and obtain information from and about offenders in the community, and they contribute to the police organization’s overall strategy to target all offenders who pose the greatest risk to public safety.

He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Brother

The concept of mentoring for crime prevention involves an older or more experienced individual acting as a positive role model for a person considered at-risk for criminality (Arter, 2006). Mentoring programs involving police and youth at risk for crime have been used successfully for several decades (Grossman and Tierney, 1998; Jolliffe and Farrington, 2007; Tolan, Henry, Schoeny, & Bass, 2008). Typically, the mentor spends several hours a week with the mentee doing a range of activities, including completing homework, going to the movies or sports events, or attending programs. Although mentors are typically community volunteers, police can also successfully act as mentors, which has the added bonuses of an offender or at-risk individual receiving positive reinforcement from the police and helping build a more positive relationship between police and members of their community (Arter, 2006).

Of note, mentoring is just not for youth; it can also be used successfully to prevent reoffending among adult offenders (Jolliffe and Farrington, 2007). As an example of the latter, the United Kingdom introduced a unique mentoring program in which offenders, specifically those engaged in robbery and burglary, are mentored by police officers in an “Adopt an Offender” program.
In this program, offenders known to police are monitored by beat officers who make regular contact with them and ensure their attendance at programs, such as those involving treatment for drugs and alcohol, as well as coordinate their participation in other programs, education, and training to further their rehabilitation and reduce their risks of reoffending (Daily Mail, 2007). Prior to this pilot project in England, Holland’s offender-mentoring scheme ran successfully for over one decade.

**Offender management strategies**

Police mentoring of offenders is consistent with the intentions of the larger Integrated Offender Management (IOM) strategy utilized in the United Kingdom as part of the “Rehabilitate and Resettle” pillar of the Prolific and other Priority Offender program (Cinnamon and Hoskins, 2006). IOM essentially involves the provision of wrap-around services for adult offenders to reduce future reoffending through ensuring rehabilitation (Senior et al., 2011). Typically, there is a lack of coordination between criminal justice agencies, such as the police and corrections. For instance, when offenders are released from custody, police are not often notified. In many cases, this failure to communicate is legitimate as the police could easily suffer from information overload if they were notified of the release of every offender. However, it would greatly help their efforts in crime prevention and reduction if they were regularly notified regarding the upcoming release of a prolific and other priority offender, allowing them to activate strategies of support and mentorship to ensure that the ex-offender abides by any conditions and persists in their rehabilitation.

In Canada, the vast majority of federal offenders are released from custody under a supervision order, such as day parole, full parole, and statutory release (Evans, 2001). This means that the offender is already under the supervision of a parole officer who is responsible for regularly meeting with the offender and ensuring they attend their programs and abide by their conditions.

Furthermore, some offenders may be matched with community volunteers, whose mentorship is used to facilitate their reintegration into the community (Evans, 2001). Knowing this, there appears to be little reason for police to additionally engage in mentoring offenders. However, when one considers that the first three months on parole are the most crucial for successful reintegration (Evans, 2001) and that to be most successful, high-risk offenders have multiple commitments each week, including treatment attendance, meetings with parole, and training and education (Cinnamon and Hoskins, 2006), police can play a critical role in supporting high-risk offenders, such as by conducting daily or regular home visits, reminding them of upcoming appointments, and continually assessing their commitment to the IOM process, particularly when they miss a scheduled appointment (Cinnamon and Hoskins, 2006; Home Office, 2009; Senior et al., 2011). This conveys to the offender the importance of complying with rehabilitation and reintegration programs, and reminds them that someone is paying attention to them. Moreover, the involvement of police if an offender has returned to custody has the potential to improve the police-offender relationship as the police officer is viewed as legitimately attempting to help the offender, as opposed to interacting with them exclusively for a negative purpose, such as an arrest (Senior et al., 2011).

As the IOM strategy was introduced in 2009, with programs piloted shortly thereafter, there is little information yet available on the successful achievements of this strategy; however, it has the potential to not only reduce crime among high-risk offenders, but also to further enhance the partnerships between criminal justice agencies and others working with offenders (Home Office, 2009).
A similar finding was observed by Alarid, Sims, and Ruiz (2011) in their review of an “Operation Night Light” (ONL) program implemented in one American county. In the ONL program, police and probation officers work together to conduct evening home visits with young offenders on probation. During these visits, probation officers check on the youth’s commitment to their conditions and remind them and their parents of the importance of abiding by conditions, such as curfew or abstaining from drug use. While police are primarily there to provide security for the unarmed probation officers, a review of this program revealed that the program helped police interact with the offending population in a more positive manner and provided them with a better understanding of the offender’s personal situation. In addition to getting to know their at-risk population on a more personal level, including being provided with a list of youth who were currently on probation, probation and police got to know each other better, which fostered the sharing of information and respect for each other’s responsibilities in reducing reoffending. In addition, by including lower-risk probationers in the program, there is a possible added effect of deterring escalation of offending among at-risk youth (Worrall and Gaines, 2006).

Although this particular study had not yet examined the quantitative outcomes of the program, other research on this form of enhanced supervision to at-risk offenders has documented reductions in arrest for reoffending among young offenders on probation (Worrall and Gaines, 2006). In the program reviewed by Worrall and Gaines (2006), a police-probation team visited a group of youth at the start of their probation period. During this visit, the residence of the youth was searched for contraband and weapons, and the importance of abiding by conditions was discussed. Random return home visits were conducted at the discretion of the team, as were both day and night curfew/condition checks. In cases where more intervention was deemed necessary, the team could also visit the youth’s school, talk with school staff, and, where appropriate, recommend involvement in treatment or other programs that the team would also monitor and record progress.

Early intervention: mentoring youth

In Abbotsford, British Columbia, in response to the research demonstrating that early interventions are the most effective at addressing and preventing problem behaviours associated with young offending and violence, the Abbotsford Police Department developed a number of programs that target young people in the Abbotsford school system. For example, in 2008 and 2009, the South Asian community and police in Abbotsford began to recognize that there were groups of young males who exhibited behaviours that were known indicators for potential involvement in gang and violent crimes. Through a partnership with Abbotsford community services and the schools, the Westside Project emerged as a response to these community concerns. This program created a position known as the South Asian Community Resource Officer (SACRO) who acted as a mentor for youth who seemed to be at risk for future problem behaviour. This program incorporates face-to-face meetings with at-risk youth involved in deviant, delinquent, or criminal behaviour, as well as their parents, with the intention of intervening as soon as possible to prevent the continued development of negative and violent tendencies. Although this program has found mixed results, there have been some individual successes of young people who were moving down a path towards serious criminal involvement that transitioned out of these tendencies and went on to complete high school and avoided the criminal lifestyle. These approaches are certainly a shift from the Prolific Offender Management Program that targets established criminals, yet these school-based, community youth initiatives attempt to intervene early with the ultimate aim of actually targeting groups of younger and younger children to prevent the expression of aggressive behaviours altogether. A significant amount of Abbotsford’s policing effort is now being placed in this area because, at a very basic level, the strategy is similar to the prolific offender approach in relation to community and public safety. The goal with these programs is to help children and youth be successful and to help the community be healthier over time and experience a high level of public safety.
There are a number of evidence-based strategies that police should undertake to truly be an offender-focused organization. While police organizations have differing levels of resources, it is critical that police target all offenders who are identified as posing a substantial threat to public safety. This does not only mean increasing the pressure on prolific offenders, but also identifying and targeting persistent offenders. Reductions in the crime rate and increases in public safety are hindered by an inability of police organizations to effectively respond to all of the prolific and persistent offenders operating in the community. In effect, police can become engaged in a perpetual game of ‘whack a mole’ in which they have great success with a small proportion of their prolific offenders, only to ignore other offenders or to leave a vacuum that allows other offenders to graduate to prolific offender status. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, true partnerships are one way that police organizations can enhance their capacities beyond their level of resources, but to truly be offender-focused requires the ability to target all offenders who are identified by crime analysts as prolific or persistent offenders.

One of the most effective information gathering and crime prevention strategies for police is to conduct regular, deliberate street checks with offenders. Being offender-focused means using street checks as a tool to ensure compliance with court orders, but is also an effective way of collecting timely, relevant, actionable, and investigative information from offenders about their behaviour, the behaviour of their associates, general criminal activity, and emerging crime trends. The key is for the police to make their presence known and repeatedly remind offenders that they are being watched. In order to be most effective, police should consider some form of standardization of street check information collection, and an efficient way to share this information with crime analysts and have the analyst disseminate the results of their work throughout the organization.

In this way, while the use of target teams to respond to specific types of offenders and crimes remains essential, the entire police organization is reoriented to have an offender focus.

It is also important that police have a holistic approach to offender intervention. Interviews with offenders can also be used to understand what specific factors contribute the most to their persistence in crime. Police organizations should endeavor to develop offender-based strategies that focus on helping those offenders who want to change their lifestyle, while using prosecution, conviction, and custody for those unwilling to change their behaviour or leave the community. The work of prolific offender management teams should always include a serious attempt to determine those factors that contribute to the offender’s persistent involvement in illegal activities, and to approach those willing with an offer of assistance through available community resources and, when possible, mentoring. This should also involve working with partners to ensure that court ordered conditions match the individual offender’s needs, and that the assigned conditions are realistic and can be effectively monitored. In this way, being offender-focused involves the police identifying those offenders who pose the greatest threat to public safety, customizing a personalized strategy for each offender, and determining the best model for monitoring or assisting these individuals, while acting immediately on any violations of these conditions.
In order to measure the degree to which you have an offender-focused organization, there are a number of key indicators that police leaders should look for within their criminal population. The first indicator of success is that there is a growing correlation between the use of street checks and an offender’s compliance with court orders. In other words, in addition to the use of street checks as an information-gathering tool, consistent street checks of offenders with court ordered conditions should result in an increase in compliance with these orders. Offenders who know that they are being actively monitored in the community and will face meaningful consequences for breaching their conditions are more likely to comply with their conditions. As such, the strategic use of street checks with known offenders should result in more compliance.

Another clear indicator of success is an overall reduction in the number of negative police contacts with targeted individuals. In effect, having established the tactic of letting persistent and prolific offenders know that they are being monitored consistently, arresting those who violate their conditions, and assisting those who wish to be helped should result in fewer negative police contacts with these individuals. In addition to fewer negative police contacts, developing targeted interventions to assist those at-risk of offending or those wishing to live crime-free should, over time, reduce the number of crimes that offenders commit and should increase the amount of time between offences. Being truly offender-focused means that police have developed evidence-based policies, strategies, and tactics to best identify, target, and manage their most problematic population.

Are We an Offender-focused Police Organization?
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Chapter 4: Focus on Problems

A Renewed Emphasis on the Value of Focusing on Problems

In 2004, a residential marijuana grow operation in Surrey, British Columbia caused a fire that resulted in extensive property damage to the residence and two neighbouring houses. While no one was physically injured, the incident was a powerful indication of an emerging criminal and public safety problem in the city associated with the substantial increase in residential marijuana grow operations (Plecas, Malm, & Kinney, 2005). With this very real demonstration of the public safety risks associated with residential grow operations, the city of Surrey, led by Fire Chief Len Garis and Dr. Plecas, now Professor Emeritus from the University of the Fraser Valley, developed a crime reduction strategy founded on the detection and termination of these habitually concealed criminal operations. The strategy became known as the Electrical and Fire Safety Inspection (EFSI) initiative, which began its work in the spring of 2005 under the British Columbia Safety Standards Act.

EFSI is a team that comprises an electrical safety officer, a fire safety officer, and two RCMP officers. The teams visit and inspect residences that have possess indicators suggesting the possibility that the property might house a concealed marijuana grow operation that poses a risk to those living in the house, to the neighbours and to the general public. This program originally operated by responding to tips obtained from the police or the public concerning potential marijuana grows.

By focusing on public safety risks, a city-led program has been successful in detecting and closing down residential marijuana grow operations.

The EFSI team would receive an address and use BC hydro consumption data as a means to verify the likely existence of a marijuana grow operation. However, before acting, the team would review and exclude any residences where increased energy consumption could be explained by lawful activities, such as very large residences or the presence of legitimate businesses. However, when an unusually high level of energy consumption could not be easily explained, the EFSI team would attend the location.

In the fall of 2006, the scope and influence of the EFSI expanded following the enactment of new provincial legislation. Supported by the city of Surrey as a means to protect its residents, Bill 25 was created as a direct result of increasing residential marijuana growing operations-related safety concerns. This Bill defined marijuana grow operations as a public safety risk and permitted local governments’ direct access to BC Hydro data regarding residential energy consumption.
By defining marijuana grow operations as a risk to public safety and introducing new regulations, the EFSI was authorized to respond to a larger number of electrical safety hazards identified through aberrant energy consumption records. Based on BC Hydro’s newly granted authorization to share their consumption records with municipalities, there was a substantial increase in the number of residences and neighbourhoods identified as safety hazards. In response, Surrey established a second EFSI team in 2007. Surrey Fire Service Deputy Chief Dan Barnscher noted that while they once “used Hydro consumption as a verification method for the presence of a grow op, [Bill 25] expanded their method of detection by using this information before receiving any address tips from the police or the public.” Further to detecting grow ops and electrical hazards, this partnership also resulted in the increased detection of individuals stealing electricity in BC for unlawful purposes. “Without this legislation, it would have been very onerous to initiate and complete an inspection.”

Key to success

The key to EFSI’s success is based on the fundamental principle of identifying a crime problem and targeting that problem through the development of the essential partnerships; this enables the allocation of necessary resources to address that public safety problem. In this case, Surrey identified a serious crime and social problem, devised a viable strategy, included all essential stakeholders in the implementation and execution of the strategy, and developed the partnership structure to ensure that resources were available to accomplish the objective. The EFSI team operates through cooperation between city staff representatives, the Surrey Fire Department, the RCMP, BC Hydro, and the public. Each player in the EFSI program serves a critical function in the detection of Surrey’s marijuana grow operations. For example, as the city has a duty to protect its residents from crime and security problems, they have designated and authorized the EFSI teams to investigate matters that may threaten citizens’ safety. The electrical and fire safety officers are responsible for surveying the establishment and assessing whether or not there is a perceptible safety hazard, and RCMP members supervise the inspection, ensure the safety of the team members and the public, keep the peace during inspections, and enforce any official legal responses as required.

This fundamental structure, in combination with the associated legislation, is critical as it allows police officers speedier access to information that may help future investigations related to drug offences and charges. Despite the central involvement of police officers in this program, another added benefit is that less serious marijuana grow operations require fewer officers to oversee the investigation, thereby increasing policing capacities and unburdening policing resources needed for other police work and investigations. Citizens continue to be an active player in this strategy as well, as they can report the suspicious activity of neighbours that may otherwise go unnoticed.

Because the EFSI tackles concerns involving electrical and fire safety, aside from an assessment of hydro levels, the collection of traditional “evidence” is not a part of the equation. This makes swifter access to and investigation of potential hazards as a result of marihuana grow operations possible. After the EFSI team confirms with the police that the residence is not under an ongoing police investigation, they will post an inspection notice and return to the address within 48 hours to execute the inspection. Unlike a police investigation, members of the EFSI team look for bylaw violations of the electrical, fire, and building codes to ensure that homeowners respond to the city’s compliance orders and take care of any observed problems; this typically entails employing professionals to test for and repair electrical or fire safety issues, and removing any mold, chemicals, or fertilizers. When the EFSI program began, the police were able to seize and dispose of any plants and equipment without pressing charges. This is no longer common because the teams rarely discover growing equipment on site; in most cases, the illegal growers have moved their plants and apparatuses within the 48 hours between the notice and the inspection.
Leadership brings positive results

The work of the EFSI teams has resulted in an increased detection and securing of marijuana grow operations in Surrey. While the team is not responsible for dismantling grow operations per se, in the four years following the implementation of this strategy, they have discovered and responded to a large number of grow operations in Surrey (Girm, 2007). Additionally, a larger number of cases have been dealt with and cleared by the Surrey RCMP (Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, & Haarhoff, 2009). According to the most recent statistics provided by Surrey’s Fire Deputy Chief Barnscher, the number of illegal operations has dropped considerably. For example, subsequent to the enactment of the new legislation, the total number of EFSI inspections peaked in 2007, with 679 inspections leading to the discovery of 445 illegal grow ops. In 2010, EFSI conducted 305 inspections that resulted in 117 grow operations being flagged as illegal. In 2013, EFSI conducted 296 inspections with 48 being recognized as illegal operations.

Overall, since the EFSI program began in 2005, the teams have uncovered and ensured the remedies of 1,447 neighbourhood public safety issues from grow operations in Surrey residences. Additional successes include a steady decrease in the number of marijuana grow operation related fires in Surrey. In fact, Surrey went from 14 or 15 marijuana grow operation-related fires per year between 2003 and 2005 to none in 2013. Surrey residents have also responded favourably to the identification and management of grow operations in their neighbourhoods. One of the most significant benefits linked to this program is that the service is of no cost to taxpayers. The EFSI program operates on a cost recovery system, in which the homeowner must cover any fees associated with inspecting and repairing their residence from damages incurred as a result of the activities of marijuana grow operations. The investigation and remediation costs can be recovered owing to revisions to the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw, which were ratified at the same time as Bill 25 with support from the city of Surrey. Since police officers no longer have to respond to as many calls for service related to marijuana cultivation, and police investigations can get underway more rapidly if the EFSI team discovers illegal activities during their inspection, this also saves resources.

After piloting the Electrical and Fire Safety Inspection initiative in Surrey and experiencing some initial successes, staff members were invited to share their practices and provide training to other municipalities. Cities throughout the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island, British Columbia recognized the utility of a multifaceted approach to the marijuana grow operation problem and EFSI-type teams were set up in eight municipalities in British Columbia. Unfortunately, many of the programs that developed as derivatives from the Surrey EFSI did not experience the same level of success and had to be terminated due to legal problems, personnel issues, or a lack of direction and support. This is where Surrey has also been a leader, with the establishment of strong relationships between, and support from, all parties involved, particularly from city officials.

The RCMP continues to be responsible for arresting and charging those individuals involved with the cultivation of marijuana; however, the establishment of the EFSI protects city residents from the numerous safety threats presented by grow operations that can, in turn, uncover illegal activities related to marijuana production. There is a high level of accountability built in to this strategy that can be attributed to the direct involvement of Surrey’s mayor, city council, and the RCMP. The EFSI is accountable to each of these bodies and the community by ensuring that the program remains cost neutral and effective at increasing safety in the neighbourhoods.
The key to this initiative's success is based on the fundamental principle of identifying a specific crime problem, developing an appropriate response that is based on being information and intelligence led, focusing on those people contributing most to the identified problem, and allocating the necessary resources to get the job done. Moreover, strong cooperation from community stakeholders in the identification of and response to crime and public safety problems is indispensable. These stakeholders can assume some of the responsibility typically held by police departments and can actively contribute to addressing a city's crime problems. The Electrical and Fire Safety Inspection program in Surrey is an excellent example of this process.

Being Truly Problem-focused

Criminal incidents are often symptoms of larger underlying problems. Being truly problem-focused means attending to the underlying community problems that can help police adopt a more preventative approach to crime reduction. This type of policing is often referred to as problem-oriented policing, which recognizes that many police activities concern non-criminal events, such as providing general assistance to the public, mediating conflict between neighbours, or regulating traffic. Unfortunately, although Braga (2010) noted that the general steps involved in problem-oriented policing were presented several decades ago in the SARA model (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment), many policing agencies continue to operate under the traditional reactive model of policing, in that they respond to mainly criminal issues as they occur and deal with them singularly, rather than considering how these criminal incidents may be part of a larger complex network of interrelated causal issues. This is problematic because, as a recent Campbell systematic review concluded, when used properly, problem-oriented policing can have positive effects on crime reduction (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010).

Historically, while police did attend to non-criminal issues affecting public order, over time, police organizations have generally gravitated towards a crime-fighting focus (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). Unfortunately, this narrow focus has resulted in police becoming crime responders, rather than crime preventers. In effect, police react to issues when they become sufficiently problematic or criminal, instead of preventing issues from ever involving criminality. This can be achieved by addressing the underlying issues that traditionally contribute to crime. While it is likely easier for police to simply respond to calls for service in the short-term, in the long-term, this strategy creates more demand on police resources (Braga and Weisburd, 2006). In most jurisdictions, especially urban centers, police have become overwhelmed by calls for service, which has resulted in their being limited to running from call to call. The outcome of this is that police become a reactive force responding to the outcome of individual, social, economic, and community problems, rather than having the time or orientation to fully analyse and understand what is causing these criminal outcomes and adopting innovative, preventative approaches, which often require solutions and partnerships outside of the criminal justice system (Braga and Weisburd, 2006).
Case study: cell phone robberies

As an example, in 2011-2012, the Burnaby RCMP began to see a considerable and sudden increase in the number of street level cell phone robberies in which unsuspecting individuals were exiting the SkyTrain, suddenly being attacked, in some cases seriously, and having their cell phone stolen. The RCMP worked collaboratively with their crime analyst and were able to compile intelligence on these offenders; they discerned that these offences targeted victims at specific times at night and were carried out by organized groups of teenagers, some as young as 14 and 15 years old, at SkyTrain stations across the Vancouver metro region. After the youth fled the scene, they would transfer the cell phone to another individual who had essentially contracted them to commit these cell phone robberies. The offenders were making extensive use of the SkyTrain system to move between stations quickly and to allow them to commit a series of robberies across a relatively short time span. The approach was rather successful as, during a time in which the majority of other offences were decreasing across the Lower Mainland, cellphone robberies were climbing sharply. In addition to the increased street level cell phone robberies, the police also witnessed a drastic increase in the number of robberies taking place at or near cell phone stores and the number of organized robberies of cell phone stores. Masked intruders would rush into cell phone stores, usher employees to the back of the store at gun point, and, at times, assault them; they would then lock the employees in a room and escape with several boxes of cell phones. Overall, the number of cell phone robberies doubled in some Canadian cities from 2011 to 2012, and, in 2011 in the Greater Vancouver area, these numbers increased 100%. It was evident to the RCMP that these offences were escalating in number and severity.

One case that came to the attention of the RCMP Burnaby Strike Force – a unit dedicated to responding to property crimes and robberies and conducting surveillance – involved reports of an offender whose modus operandi was to ask to borrow the cell phones of unsuspecting individuals and then run from the scene as soon as he had obtained the item (RCMP, 2013a). There were some instances when these encounters became more dangerous as some thefts were not as easily executed as the offender had predicted; this led to more forceful and violent acquisitions of the phones. Once the police had identified this individual, they began surveillance on the male and discovered that he had been collaborating with other offenders who were also approaching victims several times a day and stealing their cell phones. After the suspect’s arrest, the individual confessed to the robbery and a search warrant for his residence uncovered a number of cell phones that had also been reported stolen. In May 2013, the Burnaby RCMP again responded to several cell phone robberies at the busy Burnaby Metrotown station and at other stations along the SkyTrain's Expo Line. This occurred upon the detection of a group of Surrey-based offenders who had been connected to a string of these offences (RCMP, 2013b). The theft of cell phones on the SkyTrain and at stations became routine as it offered an immediate escape for the offenders who were targeting multiple victims at various locations in one night. These individuals had become well known to the RCMP's Strike Force and were arrested following the team's investigation. In the same year, Burnaby's Strike Force additionally concluded a project that targeted several offenders who had organized themselves into a more structured group to facilitate the theft of masses of cell phones from larger businesses.
In light of this, the RCMP in Burnaby began to follow these cases over time to investigate where the stolen cell phones were going, especially those that were associated to the well-organized cell phone store robberies. They quickly learned that the majority of the phones were posted and sold on Craigslist, to unsuspecting buyers. The phones could then be re-registered and re-activated on the same or a new network, and there were essentially no policies in place to prevent this from happening. In effect, an individual could be beaten up and robbed of their cell phone one day, and then discover that their phone had been unlocked and reactivated on a new carrier the next day. Troubling, there was nothing that they or the police seemed able to do. When the RCMP took a closer look at the cell phone activity on Craigslist, they discovered that there were approximately 100 new used iPhone sale postings on the Vancouver Craigslist alone; this excluded the countless more Samsung, Blackberry, Ericsson, and other manufacturers’ cell phones, which totaled in excess of 200 new ads per day, many of which were stolen cell phones. Because of the exceptionally lucrative market for smart phones and the easy avenue for resale where suspects could steal a phone and sell it again within a few hours for a considerable profit, the police had very limited recourse. Although Burnaby’s Strike Force was mitigating a number of these offences, there remained several challenges to locating stolen phones and catching the responsible individuals. Despite their efforts, it was extremely difficult and time-consuming to trace stolen cell phones.

**Inspiration from abroad**

At this time, Inspector Tim Shields worked out of the Burnaby RCMP detachment and initiated his own research into what other police departments and countries were doing to address this emerging crime problem. He found that Australia had a working model that resulted in a promising reduction of cell phone robberies. The cell phone industry in Australia had additionally examined the rates of cell phone robberies over the course of eight years following their introduction of a cell phone database/serial number management system.

The system works by recording the serial numbers, or International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), of cell phones in an electronic database that will use this identification number to blacklist any phones that have been reported lost or stolen.

By doing so, the phones cannot be re-activated on any wireless carrier in the country reducing the incentive to steal them. The study’s results demonstrated that the reported stolen phones numbers declined by 25%. These numbers were considered even more promising when the researchers took into account the increase in ownership of cell phones, which numerically represented approximately 10 million more cell phones being activated in Australia during that time frame. Despite the significant increase in cell phones activations, they were still able to cause a 25% reduction in the incidence of stolen phones. Upon the discovery of these outcomes, it became apparent that British Columbia and Canada would greatly benefit from a similar system.

After compiling the necessary research and information, in early 2012, Inspector Shields contacted the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association (CWTA), which is the official industry association that represents wireless carriers in Canada. He highlighted the benefits of a wireless blacklist database like Australia’s, but the response from the CWTA was discouraging; the association noted that they had no plans of implementing such a system due to its projected costs. Inspector Shields continued his research into such a system and put together a research paper that proposed this type of database in Canada.
During this process, he also located the agency that oversaw the CWTA – the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). His proposal was forwarded to the CRTC who followed-up with an open letter to the Wireless Telecommunications Association, which started an open dialogue on the issue. In the interim, Inspector Shields also shared his proposal with the BC Association of Chiefs of Police requesting that they endorse the creation of a blacklist database in Canada. Coincidently, a police officer from Montréal had also proposed the same program to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP), headed, at that time, by the Vancouver Police Department’s Police Chief Jim Chu. The CACP began discussing this topic in the media and, shortly after, the CWTA announced that they would be introducing a blacklist database to be rolled out by September 2013.

In late September 2013, CACP issued a news release confirming the existence and launch of the system. With the increasing pressure from the police and an open letter from the CRTC, the CWTA could not provide a valid reason as to why there should not be a blacklist database in Canada. The association responded to the police and public pressure that was stemming from various police agencies, the media, the CRTC, as well as a federal politician from Toronto who spoke publically about the issue. Following this increased pressure, the development of the database was completed and unveiled by the projected date. Furthermore, the creation and operation of the database was and is fully funded by the telecommunications industry.

With the official implementation of the IMEI blacklist program on October 1st 2013, the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association’s cell phone blacklist keeps a record of any reported stolen cell phones’ serial numbers, or IMEI, for the mobile service provider. With this unique identification code, the service provider can block the phone thereby preventing its usage and reactivation by any other provider that has joined the blacklist program, which includes all major carriers in Canada. The program’s intent is to alert would-be criminals that these devices will not actually be of value to them given their lack of functionality once they have been added to the blacklist. The United States has also started a blacklist database that, by the end of 2014, is expected to be connected to the Canadian system to prevent the theft and selling of cell phones across the border. A similar database has emerged in some European countries and will, in time, be linked to the North American database to create a type of overarching system that will enable communication between the countries in relation to cell phone robberies and thefts. As a result of the problem-focused crime reduction strategy, which drew on major Canadian agencies, the police anticipate that they will experience declines in cell phone robberies similar to those Australia experienced.

### Always Sweat the Small Stuff

The work of several academics preempted the development of problem-oriented policing as first discussed by Goldstein in 1979. Shaw and McKay wrote about social disorganization in 1929 when they recognized that something at the neighbourhood level was contributing to levels of delinquency. Their sociological theory of crime and delinquency suggested that social disorganization, characterized by high rates of residential mobility and the proliferation of low-income residences, was primarily responsible for crime through the process of unattended delinquency. Areas characterized by high rates of social disorganization were typically “zones of transition” in which structural re-organization was occurring as the neighbourhood experienced growth and urban development characterized by those with economic means abandoning the area to newly developed neighbourhoods outside the city core.
During transition, neighbourhoods experienced a breakdown of the external and internal controls over crime and delinquency that close-knit communities provided, as well as the breakdown of public institutions and shifts in the dominant culture (Shaw and McKay, 1929).

Attending to “broken windows”

Elements of social disorganization theory were later integrated into the broken windows perspective. Kelling and Wilson (1982) wrote about the importance of attending to “broken windows” in communities that were in peril of becoming lost to crime. The broken windows theory suggested that in areas where there is a sense of apathy and learned hopelessness, criminals perceive that no one cares and that there are opportunities to commit crime either undetected or unreported by residents. In other words, in neighbourhoods characterized by indicators of social disorganization, including the presence of prostitutes, loitering youth, homeless people, or the mentally ill, there is a sense that no one cares enough to take these ‘troublemakers’ off the streets. Given this, criminals believe that no one will care if they further victimize that neighbourhood through the commission of crime.

Thus, Kelling and Wilson (1982) argued that communities where early signs of social disorganization were beginning to emerge were those most in need of police attention, as there was still an opportunity to signal to the criminal population that criminal behaviour will not be tolerated or accepted. However, for this to happen, police need to be aware of these impending signs of social disorganization. The challenge, as identified by Kelling and Wilson (1982), was that citizens rarely pick up the phone to call police when things are merely bothering them, as many citizens either feel disenfranchised from the police or feel that there is little the police can or are willing to do to help.

Given these concerns, Kelling and Wilson (1982), along with Goldstein (1979), criticized the traditional methods of allocating police to neighbourhoods, such as using crime rates, the volume of calls for service, or a cop-to-pop ratio to determine the number of officers needed for assignment in a neighbourhood. Such traditional methods would result in police being assigned retroactively to multi-problem, high-crime neighbourhoods where their only hope would be to continue responding to criminal incidents, rather than developing solutions to prevent those incidents from happening in the first place. Instead, a more effective strategy would be to place police in communities not yet overrun by crime where they can get to know the residents and become familiar with changes indicative of impending social disorganization, allowing them to more quickly develop appropriate solutions that will prevent issues from escalating to the point that they create conditions conducive to persistent victimization. This criticism of the traditional policing model highlighted the importance of looking more generally at problems, rather than at specific incidents, when determining how to allocate limited resources and implement solutions.
The problem-oriented policing model

The classic problem-oriented policing model essentially involves four key steps, as summarized by Eck and Spelman’s (1987) SARA model. To start, police scan or review an issue to determine whether it is actually a problem in need of police attention. Next, analyses of data are undertaken to more fully qualify and quantify the nature of the problem. The response stage involves the development of solutions specific to the nature of the identified problem, while the final assessment stage involves an evaluation of the solution’s efficacy in solving the problem. Thus, problem-oriented policing begins with the need to fully define the problem at hand.

Eck noted that a problem could be defined as “a reoccurring set of similar events, harmful to members of the community, that members of the public expect the local police to address” (Eck, 2006: 120). Yet, problem-oriented policing frequently fails at this early stage as police tend to give issues only a cursory analysis of the information and choosing to rely more on their personal knowledge or feeling of “what was going on” (Braga and Weisburd, 2006: 139). Further, Goldstein (1979) cautioned that grouping the “problems” dealt with by police under very specific offence categories, such as arson, prevented police from understanding all the different ways in which that offence was occurring. This is detrimental to solving and preventing further occurrences of this offence because, for example, arson caused by bored teenagers requires a different response than arson caused by someone who is mentally ill. Further, by defining problems in reference to an offence category, police are sending a message that the only issues of concern to them are offences, and not other indicators of social disorder, such as public disturbances involving prostitution, loitering teenagers, and homeless people.

This is also problematic because it suggests that the only tools at the disposal of the police are criminal laws, which may not be viewed as appropriate or adequate responses to the more frequent and common behaviours that cause citizens to fear for their safety. Thus, Goldstein (1979) argued that problem definition must be much more nuanced and examine when and where similar problems occur, how often these problems occur, who is involved in those problems, both in terms of its perpetration and the effects of those perpetrations, who is complaining about the problem, who is responsible for responding to the problem, why the problem may be occurring, and how all of this differs based on where the problems are occurring and who is reporting the problems.

Given the multi-faceted nature of these questions, Goldstein (1979) suggested that the traditional means of investigation, such as analyzing police statistics on calls for service, are not entirely useful for understanding community problems. Given this, police need a much more nuanced information and intelligence-led approach to fully understand the nature of the problem. While police understand this, very few police organizations have fully embraced the commitment to truly understanding what are the real problems and the root causes of these problems in their jurisdiction. This is not surprising; police are extremely busy, often running from call to call with little time to fully complete their investigations. However, as mentioned in earlier chapters, police should enlist the assistance of their crime analysts who are educated and trained in thinking through problems at a more complex and multi-faceted level. Again, by better integrating analysts into the police organization, police can be more successful in adopting a problem-oriented approach to crime reduction that, over time, will reduce the pressures placed on police to constantly react to incidents of crime.
This perspective led to Clarke and Eck (2003) creating a manual titled “Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps”. Their 60 steps were organized under the following eight progressive themes: (1) Prepare Yourself; (2) Learn About Problem-Oriented Policing; (3) Study Environmental Criminology; (4) Scan for Crime Problems; (5) Analyse in Depth; (6) Find a Practical Response; (7) Assess the Impact, and (8) Communicate Effectively. In brief, Clarke and Eck were arguing for crime analysts to becoming the local crime expert and to know what are and are not effective policing strategies. Clarke and Eck advised a good understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of problem-oriented policing and to use this model of policing to shape daily activities. They also advised studying the principles of environmental criminology and to anticipate how offenders would respond to crime prevention strategies built on this perspective of crime causation.

They also stressed the importance of really knowing the community’s specific issues and to study how local crime problems develop. Similarly, Clarke and Eck (2003) outlined how to research and understand crime and disorder problems, their causal factors, and their correlates. They also dedicated several steps for how to develop real solutions by providing suggestions on how to increase the costs and efforts on offenders associated with criminal activity while removing incentives and benefits. Clarke and Eck (2003) also explained the importance of evaluating responses and measuring the expected and unexpected outcomes and effects of strategies. Finally, they touted the value of clearly and powerfully presenting a summary of the crime problem and solution to the police organizations, partners, the community, and the offender population.

If All You Have is a Hammer, Every Problem Looks Like a Nail

Once police have thoroughly and investigated the nature of the problem, the next step is to explore the full range of evidence-based strategies to best deal with the problem. Over 30 years ago, Goldstein (1979) emphasized that strategies should consider many options. Importantly, the law is just one tool in the police officer’s arsenal and should always be considered among other non-legal responses (Eck, 2006). Some problems, such as child abuse or robberies, may be most appropriately responded to by arrest, prosecution, and conviction; however, others, such as noise disturbances from parties or public loitering, may best be resolved through alternative strategies, such as creating a youth centre or skate park for bored youth to attend. Many jurisdictions have used closed-circuit television (CCTV) to deter and reduce a number of problems, such as prostitution, public drinking, graffiti, or stealing vehicles. Creating ordinances or regulatory codes at the city-level, such as anti-loitering policies around shopping malls or transit stops, may provide police with new forms of authority that provide them with additional options to arresting a person to remove them from that location (Goldstein, 1979). For instance, though a partnership between its local Royal Canadian Mounted Police agency and the city bylaw officers, over the course of 18 months, the City of Surrey removed 18 illegal massage parlours associated with the sex trade and human trafficking by cancelling their business licenses. The city and the police prevented even more from opening by ensuring businesses licenses were only issued to those formally licensed by their professional association (Diakiw, 2012; Reid, 2012). Similarly, re-zoning commercial areas may help prevent proliferation of these crime-attracting organizations.
Alternatively, Goldstein (1979) identified a jurisdiction that used re-zoning to create zones specifically for adult entertainment. This allowed the police to focus necessary resources on a single neighbourhood and allowed citizens to avoid the area if they so desired.

**Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)**

This latter solution is consistent with strategies that fall under the Crime Prevention Through Environment Design (CPTED) approach to crime reduction. This strategy is most associated with situational crime prevention and routine activities theories of crime. Routine activities theory suggests that the meeting of a motivated offender, suitable target/victim, and the absence of a capable guardian result in a criminal act (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Situational crime prevention takes the position that modifying the environment is a more effective approach to crime prevention than attempting to modify an offender (Clarke, 1983). These theories operate on the assumptions presented by rational choice theory, which argues that offenders are rational actions who, in deciding whether or not to engage in a crime, consider the potential costs associated with committing an offence, such as the risk of getting caught and the penalties they may face if caught, against the anticipated benefits of engaging in the offence. According to this perspective, when a potential offender determines that the benefits of engaging in an intended crime outweigh the potential cost associated with committing the offence, crime is much more likely to occur. In accepting this explanation for much of crime, it becomes the role of the community including the police, to create physical and psychological conditions such that offenders consistently reach the conclusion that the costs outweigh the benefits of crime.

Making physical changes to ‘harden targets’ and reduce opportunities for crime to occur is a natural solution stemming from these theoretical approaches. Examples of CPTED solutions include the use of CCTV in areas where crime is likely to occur, landscaping to make buildings more visible from the street, hiring security officers to watch over buildings or businesses, building a structure to minimize potential noise issues or loitering, the strategic placement of lights in public areas, and the use of glass to make those inside buildings and businesses visible to those on the street, particularly at night. While these criminological theories fail to consider the individual motivations or predispositions of offenders towards engaging in crime that may limit the ability of some to engage in rational decision making, such as addiction, mental illness, or experiences of abject poverty, adopting solutions that stem from these theories presents a set of solutions to social disorganization that can contribute to criminal activity and thus should be considered by police when developing innovative solutions to problems involving social and physical disorder.

Although many of these problems are not considered or defined as criminal incidents and may not be adequately dealt with by a police force focused on crime-fighting, they are often symptomatic of larger criminal problems and, therefore, are extremely important for police to understand and address in order to improve citizen's quality of life, reduce fear of crime, increase public satisfaction with their police force, and reduce crime. However, it takes leadership from police administrators to transition from a police agency focused on ‘crime-fighting’ to one that is truly problem-oriented. It is critical for all police organizations to recognize that understanding the complexity of the various problems underlying criminal behaviours is important, and that this understanding must form the basis and be at the root of the strategies that police and others undertake to respond to and prevent crime.
Case study: parking lot auto thefts

For example, years ago, the Mission Memorial Hospital contacted the local RCMP requesting assistance in addressing a flood of property crimes involving motor vehicles that had been occurring in their parking lot. The crime trend had been growing for a few months and at its peak, the hospital experienced a significant spike in numbers, receiving 17 reports of automobile thefts and 28 reports of thefts from vehicles. Their employees began to complain about the incidents, and it became clear that there was a significant problem. The hospital did not want the reputation of being unsafe and wanted to address the issue before it escalated more, so they contacted the police to assist. The police assigned Constable Brian Foote because of his training and expertise in the area of crime prevention, and more specifically CPTED. Constable Foote arranged a meeting with the hospital administrator so that he could better assess the parking lot and what characteristics were making it a desirable target for these property offences.

Constable Foote realized that the police were not fully aware of the problem in that they did not have accurate data on the actual number of stolen cars or theft from auto offences. His investigation indicated that the parking lot was being targeted primarily between dusk and midnight.

In fact, hospital staff and visitors to the hospital noticed that when they returned to their vehicles, the cars had been damaged or stolen. The police also determined that a single offender could not have perpetrated all of the offences because too many cars were being damaged or stolen and the crimes appeared to be very focused. The police also reasoned that the offenders likely knew each other because of the strong similarities between the offences. To assess the area, Constable Foote investigated the parking lot and determined that there were many concerns with respect to the way the parking lot was lit at night and the general design of the parking spaces. He also discovered ill-maintained shrubbery, which created poor visibility of the parking lot from the street and the hospital buildings. In addition to these environmental concerns, the hospital’s staff members and security guards were not actively assisting in deterring would-be criminals. Constable Foote recognized that to respond most effectively to this crime problem, elements of CPTED and CAPRA would be required. In short, CPTED examines crime and the potential for criminal activities based on an environment-based problem-solving model, while CAPRA is a community policing problem solving model that includes Clients, the Acquisition/Analysis of information, Partnerships, a Response, and an Assessment of the action taken (RCMP, 2008).

Constable Foote reviewed the hospital’s security service and examined the hospital’s policies on where visitors and staff parked. He learned that the security company the hospital contracted posted security guards with an average age of 75 years old. The limitation of this was that they were not likely physically capable of completing the job as effectively as possible, they would not have been able to engage in a possible confrontation with anyone acting suspiciously, and, most importantly, they remained inside or near the emergency entrance of the hospital and were not actively walking the parking lots to provide even a minimal level of guardianship to the parking lot. Some security guards were not even completing a walk around of the building to ensure that doors were locked to prevent potential thefts from within the hospital. Upon realizing that they were not receiving the required level of service, one of the first changes made at the hospital was with the security.
The hospital delved into the costs of their security and discovered that alternative options were available, and, within a couple of weeks, they replaced the company they had with a more affordable security contract that better fit their needs.

The second biggest CPTED modification made was the redesign of the lighting. When the parking lot was developed, the luminaires installed did not effectively illuminate the space. There was little to no light spillage because the lights were directed upwards into the sky. This had the effect of limiting visibility. The luminaires that did not shine into the sky were either not working or were not suitable for the layout of the parking lot. In essence, the hospital had under-illuminated the parking lot, which was likely intentional, but contributed to criminal opportunities and even presented a serious safety concern for people walking through the parking lot. Related to this, Constable Foote also highlighted the absence of a clear path to lead people from the hospital to the parking area. Since the hospital was located next to a park, there was a shared pathway between the two; however, people could not clearly delineate which route was for the hospital and which one led to the park. Almost immediately after initially meeting with Constable Foote, the hospital had clear white marker lines painted on the pathway and hired someone to assess, replace, and adjust the lighting. Of note, the cost of these modifications was financed with the money that the hospital saved when they changed their security provider.

Additional modifications to the environment surrounding the hospital included trimming the hedges and tree canopies to increase the visibility of the parking lot. Rather than removing it completely, which is actually contrary to CPTED principles, foliage should be maintained to retain visibility either through, under, or over it. As mentioned above, prior to the change, staff that worked night shifts in the hospital did not have an overview of the parking lot. Once the shrubbery was reduced, staff behaviours changed; blinds were kept open at night so that they could see into the parking lot and the lighting improved the general visibility.

Staff could now see much better and farther than before because the new lighting did not make the space burst with light, it was simply more effective lighting. Constable Foote stressed that CPTED does not encourage the complete elimination of property aesthetics; rather, it encourages the carefully planned placement and maintenance of these adornments. The hospital also reconfigured some of their parking spaces so that they no longer blocked other parts of the lot. They placed the parking spots on a slight angle to open up visibility between the cars, thereby providing natural observation. If someone were there, they would be very visible to the people walking or driving through the lot, whereas before, people could stoop down and could be blocked from view.

Finally, under CAPRA’s principles, Constable Foote scheduled lunchtime training sessions for all hospital staff to explain to them why their cars were being targeted and how they could prevent their vehicles from being viewed as suitable targets for thieves. He prepared handouts for the staff to teach them about the importance of not leaving items visible in their cars and how to safely secure their cars. In effect, he provided them with the tools to be proactive participants in protecting their belongings. Constable Foote discussed how small behavioural changes, such as working in front of the windows, would provide additional surveillance to the parking lot. Since people become accustomed to what they can or cannot see, the staff did not make a habit of working in front of the windows and when they did, they did not look out because they were used to looking into the dark. When an area is illuminated, people are more likely to look out, and notice someone or something suspicious.
When police officers respond to incidents, they rarely tell victims what they can do and how that can reduce crime opportunities and their likelihood of being a victim. Constable Foote took the initiative to provide the hospital with an overview of the principles of crime prevention and an understanding of how offenders identify and determine crime opportunities. This education served to empower the hospital's staff and decrease some of their anxiety. The hospital also shared what steps they were taking to solve the problem so that the staff knew that the hospital was taking the problem seriously. It was the combination of the police, the hospital, and the hospital's staff's efforts that led to a cessation of this specific crime problem.

Until Constable Foote got involved, the police did not know and were not actively investigating where the stolen cars from the hospital were taken. He began to analyze where the cars were being found. He discovered that, while some of the stolen cars appeared to be travelling only short distances, the majority of the cars were being recovered far away from the hospital. The police recovered many of the stolen vehicles at SkyTrain stations and in another jurisdiction, which suggested that the offenders were using the stolen vehicles as a means of transportation. At the time, Mission, the city where the hospital was located, did not offer any public transportation out of the city after 8 o'clock at night. Constable Foote hypothesized that the offenders were arriving in Mission during the day and needed to get home, but that they were finding themselves stuck and realized that they could use the hospital as a target for cars. The offenders took the cars, drove them to a major location, and parked them on the side of the road anticipating that the police would find them the next day and return them. Aside from the window or ignition, none of the cars were damaged and they were not concealed when abandoned. With the help of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, the police determined that the hospital thefts accounted for 6% to 8% of the overall number of vehicle thefts reported in Mission.

Once Constable Foote discovered this, he approached the city council and transit to suggest they help address this problem by setting up a transportation service that operated later in the evenings that could transport people to a main transit link. Due to ridership and budgetary concerns, this did not happen until several years later, but it underscored the relationship between these types of crimes and transportation. Nonetheless, though the police never caught the offenders, about two and a half months after the hospital contacted the police and all of the pieces came together, the thefts of and from vehicles was resolved.

Although the parking lot thefts stopped, Constable Foote was concerned that these individuals would still require a means out of Mission and that this would lead to a displacement of the thefts. Because he believed that it was a group of offenders responsible, Constable Foote decided to look at displacement with the idea that the offenders would find a more desirable target since they could no longer safely steal cars from the hospital. A residential community surrounded the hospital and Constable Foote advised residents to be alert to and report any unusual comings and goings for the period following the changes at the hospital. Constable Foote also made patrol officers aware of the crime problem and asked that they patrol the area more attentively during night shifts to look for and try to prevent future offending; these patrols did not detect any increase in criminal activity. The only remaining option for potential displacement seemed to be a restaurant located within a short walking distance from the hospital. He believed that this was the next likely location for residual crimes to occur since people were parking their cars there for longer periods of time. As people usually parked in front of the restaurant at night, the police suggested that the servers seat diners at the front of the restaurant. By placing patrons at the front of the restaurant, they could naturally observe the area and would be more likely to notice any suspicious activity. The restaurant continued this practice for two months, and the police found no after effects or displacement at that site.
Constable Foote was somewhat surprised to learn the thefts came to a complete halt instead of moving to another location. Police traditionally address the issue at hand, but do not try to determine the true cause of the crime problem and how to prevent or stop it. This kind of background work, including assessing what may be contributing to a crime problem and whether police responses result in simply the displacement of the crime problem can be important to eradicating crime problems.

**Implementing CPTED principles from the ground up**

Because of his specialized CPTED training and background, Constable Foote became a member of the Mission city hall planning committee. This committee met every two weeks to oversee projects from major home redevelopments to larger-scale city developments. Any person who represented a group that could be affected by city developments was a part of this committee, including the fire department, city engineers, and environmental representatives. Constable Foote was brought in to work on anything related to developing commercial or institutional properties as the crime prevention representative. His responsibility was to assess if projects were inadvertently creating crime attractors, and to modify the design so the finished product would not decrease public safety. Working collaboratively and respectfully with the planning department and developers, knowing what to look for, and how to design crime prevention into buildings is another essential part of understanding how to properly implement CPTED. In one instance, as a part of the city hall committee, Constable Foote was asked to review the blueprints of a shopping centre design before the project began. Constable Foote also joined the city planner, the city head of engineering, and the mall corporation representative during visits to the area designated for the mall and together they reviewed potential safety and crime issues and how they could be addressed before the building began. From a cost perspective, these practices are important because having effective crime prevention designs from the onset of a project can circumvent incredibly expensive, and many times impossible, remodeling later.

The shopping centre was a true CPTED design from the ground up. The committee examined how people would move through the space by visualising the flow of traffic in and out. For example, the parking lot was first designed with very narrow parking spaces, which had worked in cities like Vancouver and Richmond where most people drive smaller vehicles, but, in Mission, many people drive larger vehicles and trucks. The team redesigned the parking spaces to be wider to allow greater access and visibility so that shoppers would be less likely to hit other cars and so that people could easily move and see between cars. The original design would have resulted in more incidents of cars bumping and scraping, as well as more crime opportunities.

One of the biggest changes Constable Foote asked for during the designing of the shopping centre was with the layout of the Save-On gas bar. When he first looked at the blueprints for this space, he immediately saw red flags for crime problems. Constable Foote recommended the developers re-align the gas pumps to make them drive on, thereby vertically facing the cashier area. This design prevents theft of gas from the pumps, as well as robberies, because the cashier can see people’s movements and see people ahead of time, rather than having obstructed visibility or a side area where a potential offender can secretly prepare and then strike. As a component of this, the design was also reconfigured so that the till inside of the gas bar was positioned at the front looking out over the parking and pump area. The increased visibility allowed the cashier to see drivers’ license plates more clearly in case there were any incidents that needed to be reported.
Save-On argued that the proposed restructuring was unnecessary because they had the latest cameras. While this was important for target hardening, Constable Foote asserted it was important to also have natural surveillance built in. After some time and consultations with the city, Save-On conceded and Constable Foote’s redesign was accepted. Although it required additional time and space, it prevented a number of more serious future problems. His work on this gas bar also affected the layout for every subsequent gas bar that was built in Mission because the city made it policy that all new gas stations had to have vertically facing drive on pumps.

There were additional smaller changes that Constable Foote achieved with the design of the mall to prevent a range of crime problems, including removing large overhangs, adding pedestrian areas, and directing the mall corporation on how to monitor and target harden some of the building’s entrances. He was fortunate to have been brought in to the project early and the city was very receptive to his ideas and suggestions. Although developers know many of the CPTED basics, Constable Foote points out that they do not understand the crime aspects of it. At times, there can be conflicts during these partnerships, but they are an important part of the process to ensure that cities are doing their best to avoid unnecessary public safety problems for their residents, businesses, and the police.

As will be discussed in much more detail in the next chapter, adopting a problem-oriented approach to policing means that police must form strategic partnerships with other agencies and organizations who have particular skill sets that can be harnessed to reduce crime and disorder problems, including mental health agencies, youth workers, fire services, schools, and bylaw officers. For instance, Eck (2006) criticized that while arresting homeless people for being drunk in public may be one response employed by police, a problem-oriented approach would instead consider the additional issues troubling the public regarding homeless people, including their poor health, unsightly appearance, and aggressiveness in panhandling. Arresting a homeless person is only a temporary solution to the larger problem of homelessness, as it does not address the underlying issues contributing to homelessness and will only result in a short-term removal of the distressing person, rather than a longer-term fix that will prevent homelessness from occurring in the community. To address this more complex problem requires partnerships, such as between police, mental health workers, addictions counsellors, and those ministries or departments of the government responsible for housing and financial assistance.

Recommendations for Being a More and Better Problem-focused Police Organization

There are a number of ways that police can become a truly problem-focused organization. While it begins with being information and intelligence led, and requires the police to have an excellent understanding of their offender population, truly being problem-focused includes a sophisticated and current comprehension of what is driving the quantity and quality of crime in a jurisdiction. This means having a detailed, current, and complete understanding of the root causes of the crime and disorder problems in a community. Frequently, this exercise results in police having to devote resources to tasks and strategies to deal with problems that do not fit the traditional definition of crime. However, in much the same way as the value of focusing on offenders, understanding what individual, social, economic, and community factors either contribute to crime or facilitate crime, and developing evidence-based approaches to respond to and prevent these factors will reduce crime and contribute to a more effective and efficient police organization.
In order to most effectively be problem-focused, police should identify those resources, stakeholders, and partners that can help identify those key issues contributing most to crime, and encourage meaningful partnerships with those who can assist in developing, implementing, and delivering solutions to reduce and prevent the most serious crime and disorder problems in a community. It is also recommended that, as was demonstrated by the Surrey EFSI example, police leaders should identify and promote legislative changes, if necessary, that can assist the police and the community to reduce problems. Sometimes, it requires some very creative thinking, exceeding organizational mandates, sharing resources and information, and taking on non-traditional roles to effectively address the root problems encouraging or contributing to crime and disorder in a community. However, there are many examples of police thinking and acting outside of the box in ways that have had tremendous success in reducing crime by focusing on problems in addition to offenders.

Police departments interested in applying CPTED principles should begin by asking what features of a specific place and its design may invite criminal behaviour. This approach can be applied to any area and should be integrated into the planning and design of any new developments, such as hospitals, shopping centres, schools, apartment buildings, coffee shops, and parks. Effective CPTED designs should focus on natural surveillance, instead of target hardening, and that the approach taken must be site specific. In effect, there is no one size fits all model. As a few general rules, designs should focus on incorporating as much natural surveillance as possible since retrofitting CPTED and modifying buildings after they are built can be challenging.

Recommendations for being more problem-focused:

- Understand what is driving the quantity and quality of crime in your jurisdiction
- Identify those who can identify the key issues contributing to crime and assist with solutions
- Promote legislative changes if necessary
- Consider CPTED principles

When possible, police should work with the blueprints for the site and provide recommendations before developments are completed or even commenced. At the police detachment or department level, a limited number of police officers should be trained and experienced in the best and most thorough practices necessary to reduce crime through environmental designs. It is important that police officers gain specialized education in this discipline, so that they have the knowledge and tools to interpret design plans, assess crime and safety hazards, and make realistic suggestions in collaboration with developers and city planners.
Are We a Problem-focused Police Organization?

To know whether you have a problem-focused police organization, it is important to evaluate the degree to which crime analysts are tasked with identifying and tracking issues and concerns that theory and research indicate contribute most to crime and disorder in the community. Conducting public surveys or holding community forums in which citizens can directly communicate to the police what they see as the biggest crime and disorder-related challenges in their neighbourhoods and determining the correlation between this information and what police are actually focused on is another good indicator. Problem-focused police organizations do not measure success exclusively by reductions in crime rates or by the number of arrests, but by reductions in community problems, such as unsafe driving, public disorder, or the visible presence of gangs. Being truly problem-focused means police have developed evidence-based policies, strategies, and tactics to best identify, target, manage, and preempt the issues that contribute most to crime and disorder.

References for Chapter 4


Chapter 5: Develop Meaningful Partnerships

A Renewed Emphasis on the Value of Focusing on Partners

In 2010, Colette Salemink died in a house fire set by her 23-year old son. Blake Salemink had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was on leave from a mental health facility, and living in the community with his mother at the time the fire was set. The tragic incident occurred five months after Blake had assaulted his mother, one week after Colette told his mental health team that she could no longer deal with him, and two days after she phoned the police reporting that Blake had threatened to kill her. As Colette did not want to see her son go to jail, she refused to provide sufficient details to the police to lay any charges. The police were also not privy to the details of his mental illness. Moreover, Blake’s mental health team was not informed of the seriousness of his threatening behaviours towards his mother.

An inquest by the BC Coroners Service revealed that the police and mental health services had significant contacts with the family, but a lack of communication between these agencies, partly due to privacy laws, inhibited either party from having a full comprehension of the seriousness of the family’s strain. The inquest following the fire resulted in a number of recommendations that related to consistent, formal information sharing and collaborations between the police and mental health service providers (BC Ministry of Justice, 2012). More specifically, it recommended that records on mental health service involvement and medications, and police calls for service or incidents with the mentally ill be shared between police, mental health agencies, and community care teams.

The Car 67 model, which places psychiatric nurses in patrol cars, is an example of a mutually beneficial partnership.

A crisis-intervention training officer testified that whenever possible, psychiatric nurses should be present in patrol cars similar to what exists in Surrey and Vancouver with Car 67 and Car 87 respectively.

Cars 67 and 87 have been quite successful in reaching out to individuals who require additional emotional and psychological support. Mental health partnerships and specialized training in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia have developed so that events like that experienced by the Salemink family can be minimized or evaded. Together with Vancouver, Kamloops, Delta, and other municipalities, Surrey has a designated RCMP mental health care team to address individuals’ mental health-related issues. Surrey’s approach to mental health clients involves a three-tiered approach. The first level of support for mentally ill individuals is a general duty crisis response model, with general duty officers responding to crisis situations as identified from 911 calls. The second level is the Car 67 program, which is composed of a psychiatric nurse and a police officer that respond to mental health calls from either general duty officers or a currently supervised client.
Finally, there is the Mental Health Liaison Officer, Constable Taylor Quee, who focuses on the long-term case management of clients who have persistent or high-risk contact with the police.

Although the police are not authorities in the area of mental health, as Constable Quee asserts, the reality is that individuals, especially those with mental illness, repeatedly experience crises. In a number of cases, before an assessment or intervention can be initiated, the police are often the default contact point. Once the issue is identified, the individual can be diverted to the mental health system and managed by mental health professionals. The goal of these programs is to respond to crises, assess whether it is a mental health or criminal situation, and then redirect people to the appropriate services.

A closer look at Car 67

From a service access standpoint, Surrey has been fortunate that the city’s RCMP and Fraser Health Authority have developed a partnership with a mental health car, Car 67. The Surrey RCMP introduced Car 67 in 2003 with a police officer and a nurse who carried out mental health follow-ups or assisted in domestic violence situations by offering support to victims. The project was piloted for a few years and was gradually modified to the current model. At any given time, the program assigns four nurses and four police constables to the Car 67 service. The constables are assigned on a rotational basis, working in the program for six months and then rotating back to their normal watches. The alternating nature of the position is intended to assist a larger number of officers in understanding how to better respond during interactions with mentally disordered individuals. By training and providing constables with the experience of working with this population, they can return to their regular shifts with a much greater practical awareness of mental health illnesses. This knowledge can then be shared with their team and integrated into their general patrols. This practice has resulted in many members gaining a much better understanding of the issues involved with those suffering from mental illness and how better to respond and assist these people.

Police officers who volunteer for the mental health car do not enter the program with a higher level of training than other officers. Instead, their central role is to provide protection to the mental health nurses. Before their first shift, the officers do receive a program orientation from the RCMP’s mental health liaison officer focusing on their role in the Car 67 program, potential safety concerns, and other issues that are specific to interactions with mental health clients that are not provided in the standard police training. The remaining training is basic on-the-job training and mentoring from the nurses. As the mental health expert, the nurse conducts the assessment of clients; in some circumstances, the client may be best assisted in a psychiatric hospital, so the nurse is responsible for presenting her perspective of whether the client meets the criteria for apprehension under section 28 of the Mental Health Act. In the case where the client meets these criteria, the police officer can apprehend them.

Given its mandate, the team can be contacted by the family, friends, neighbours, or individuals who are worried about an individual’s mental health (RCMP in Surrey, 2013). Once a referral is made, the team arrives on the scene to evaluate the individual and determine appropriate management strategies to address their emotional and mental health needs, such as mental health or substance abuse counseling.
Chapter 5: Develop Meaningful Partnerships

It is typically the nurse who assumes the main responsibility of asking the individual about medication, counseling, current and past emotional states and thoughts, while the police officer remains nearby in case the situation becomes dangerous or violent. The city of Delta has a similar outreach program, known as the Community Health Intervention Partnership (CHIP), in which a police officer is paired with a mental health and addictions worker, such as a mental health nurse or social worker, to respond to calls involving persons with mental health problems and to assist in the formulation of a strategy to assist the individual; this characteristically consists of the identification of and connection to suitable services (Fraser Health, Mental Health, and Addiction Services, 2008).

As part of the Surrey program, the mental health liaison officer can flag individuals identified as beginning to experience mental health issues so that the Car 67 nurse is better able to assess the client’s needs and the police can then apprehend the client at the first available opportunity. This is important because if police officers and nurses postpone their intervention until after a series of repetitive police contacts have occurred, the client is likely to have become progressively worse and have further deteriorated with each contact. When an individual is in an ailing or psychotic state for an extended period of time, there can be significant health implications and transporting the client to the hospital and stabilizing them can be much more challenging than had the police-nurse team responded at the earliest point of intervention.

A critical part of this program's strategy, therefore, is to get these individuals the intervention they need in a timely manner. As such, it is vital to have a mental health liaison officer type role associated with this type of program.

The mental health liaison officer position with the Surrey RCMP was created in 2011. This position was filled by Constable Taylor Quee who is responsible for several tasks associated with the management of individuals living in the community with severe mental illness.

“...I noticed that we were apprehending a lot of the same clients repeatedly. We were taking them to hospitals, they were being discharged, and we were taking them to hospital and the cycle was repeating...

Constable Quee provides training to civilian members and police officers with the Surrey RCMP on mental health awareness, safety, and interventions. She also works on systemic issues in regards to mental health-related concerns between the police department and other agencies in the community and oversees the case management of clients with mental illness(es), who are either high risk or require a lot of resources. This latter task assumes the greatest proportion of her day-to-day work. According to Constable Quee, “I noticed that we were apprehending a lot of the same clients repeatedly. We were taking them to hospitals, they were being discharged, and we were taking them to hospital and the cycle was repeating; they were in crisis a lot...two to three times a day, multiple times a week, so I went from general duty on to the community policing unit and started to look at a model for problem-solving for that specific issue.” At this point, Constable Quee piloted a mental health liaison officer position based on the research on similar models in other police forces.

An important role of the mental health liaison is to explore what interventions would be most beneficial to the individual in order to break their cycle of negative behaviour and to manage the clients more effectively in the community before the client escalates to higher risk behaviours. Clients who come to the attention of the mental health team and are involved with mental health services have a case manager, a psychiatrist, and other supports in the community, but, despite these supports, they continue to have numerous interactions with emergency services, including the police, ambulance, and hospital.
The challenge of case management

Alternatively, clients who are not involved with mental health supports are often homeless, which makes the acquisition of these supports extra challenging. Given these variations, different case management approaches are required for each client type. The mental health liaison talks to the person’s mental health care team to develop a collaborative strategy for how to support the client, and for clients who do not have a care team, Constable Quee advocates for one and connects them to any necessary services that are offered by the mental health system. Although a proportion of calls to the crisis line include a criminal component such as assaulting people, committing property crimes, or involvement with drugs, frequent police contacts with these people are purely related to mental health issues and occur when they are in a crisis situation. Unlike individuals who have family and friends to offer support during a difficult time, these individuals often do not have people in their lives to fill this role, so they frequently panic and call 911 to fulfill their social needs or to get help from the hospital.

The procedures followed in the case management of these clients vary from person to person, depending on what their needs and issues are. Most commonly, a general duty officer or a mental health professional will bring a client to Constable Quee’s attention because they have had a really high risk contact with them or because they have noted a series of police contacts without a sufficient resolution, such as the client has been apprehended multiple times in the past 30 days. When these cases are brought to her attention, Constable Quee reviews possible problem-solving strategies and tries to identify those persons who may be best served by a police-mental health case management protocol. This assessment is based on which individuals utilize the greatest level of health and police resources, which individuals present with the highest risk, and which individuals have the greatest number of most recent police contacts. To illustrate this point, in many cases, the police are called and dispatched to situations in which individuals are in crises and are either fearful for their own personal safety or appear to be threatening the safety of others. These incidents often result in multiple calls to the police each day. In some of these situations, the police are called because the individual may be experiencing fixed hallucinations in which they believe that people are coming to get them. For each call that the police receive, they must attend the scene to assess the situation and determine whether the individual is in any present danger or is a danger to others. Most commonly, the individual is safe and does not meet either of these criteria, so they can remain in the community. The mental health team will then make a referral to mental health services, which becomes more problematic if the client chooses to be non-compliant and fails to follow-up with the referral. This then sets in motion a cycle of continued mental health crises, calls to emergency services, and the need to attend and investigate each incident to establish whether there are any real and imminent risks or whether there is an underlying psychosis manifesting in hallucinations or delusions. This ultimately results in the excessive use of emergency personnel whose time could possibly be better served responding to other emergency calls.

In these types of cases, Constable Quee reviews the client’s calls over time and extracts the factors associated with the individual’s mental health. She also accounts for the time of day of the calls, the person’s level of panic, the police’s response to each incident, the client’s response to the police, and any indication that the client’s crises may be escalating. To complicate matters, it is characteristic, in many cases, that an individual will transition in and out of periods of wellness, in that they will have a period of wellness followed by a period of deterioration in their mental health. It is during each period of deterioration that the calls to and contact with the police resumes and escalates. The goal here is to establish a support system to enable the individual to achieve a state of wellness, and then to help them maintain that wellness for a longer period of time. Constable Quee then continues her role by monitoring any signs of future deterioration, at which point she is in a position to identify and re-engage that person with mental health services.
Given this, the files that Constable Quee case manages are not open-closed cases; instead, she acts as an open intensive resource actively monitoring clients based on need. Successful clients will experience a number of episodes, receive mental health supports through the collaboration between the RCMP and mental health services, and then live successfully in the community for six months to a year without a police contact. Unless there is a re-initiation of police calls for service, the mental health liaison’s position does not include further involvement with the client. As this is viewed as an indication that the client has an established care plan and an established mental health care team that is managing the file, there is no requirement for any police-based follow-ups. Alternatively, there are clients who have intermittent police contact, in which case the liaison officer remains engaged and supportive of the client. Since the position began in 2011, Constable Quee has monitored over 100 clients who were living with persistent severe mental illness in the community. Constable Quee and the Car 67 team also supervise individuals who had criminal involvement with the police due to their mental health condition. In these cases, the mental health teams are active in monitoring the clients’ compliance with Roger’s Orders, probation conditions, and forensics.

Furthermore, Constable Quee’s role includes advocacy for mentally disordered individuals. In addition to reviewing clients’ police contacts to share with the community care team, the mental health liaison officer works with healthcare professionals out of Surrey Memorial Hospital under the mental health forum. This group, comprised of a psychiatrist, a representative from BC ambulance, the patient care coordinator in the psychology department, an ER nurse, the psych liaison nurse, and the RCMP’s mental health liaison, hold monthly meetings during which they review cases and take on new clients. In preparation for these meetings, Constable Quee first ascertains individuals who meet the group’s mandate and then compiles characteristics of the client’s history; she can then present a full information package to the forum group. Habitually, the client will present as someone who would benefit from increased engagement with the system and more continuity of care between the associated services, such as BC ambulance, Surrey hospitals, and Surrey RCMP.

The team will also become engaged to reduce the crises interactions for individuals who frequently experience these contacts. Following the presentation of the client and their needs, the forum will develop a plan that corresponds with their respective care team partners. Every subsequent month, the forum group reconvenes with a compiled report of the client’s interactions with each respective group and discusses those components relevant to the group.

**Striking the right balance**

One of the challenges Car 67 officers and nurses encounter is finding the right balance between effectively supporting individuals in crises and ensuring the clients do not become overly dependent on them. In some cases, individuals have adopted unhealthy coping habits that include calls to the crisis line for support that, over time, develop into more serious calls, such as calls reporting thoughts and attempts of suicide. The interactions police have with clients can also inadvertently create greater risks to the individuals because of their desire to escalate the situation to ensure that police attend to them. To avoid this type of escalation, the police have been instructed to keep interactions as neutral as possible, especially in cases where an individual appears to require considerable attention from others, such as those with borderline personality disorder. In these types of cases, it is crucial that officers remain not only professional, but also impartial; this can be accomplished by not becoming overly involved or empathetic, while not relying exclusively on enforcement. This allows the mental health professionals to engage the individual in a therapeutic approach and police can better service the client by remaining a bystander to this behavioural modification.
In this regard, a clear message of each player’s role can be presented to the client. Without this distinction, some clients may begin to call on the police constantly because they enjoy the resulting contact. Constable Quee stated that there have been incidents where individuals expressed a desire to harm themselves and would escalate their behaviours for this purpose. Their actions would unintentionally create a serious safety threat to themselves and others because they would start carrying weapons and be threatening in public. These cases necessitate a strategic plan between Car 67, the mental health liaison, mental health professionals, and those from the forum group that can effectively educate clients of the risks their behaviours pose and suggest ways to reduce these risks. Individuals can also be alerted to the fact that their calls put community residents at risk by unnecessarily utilizing emergency resources. The mental health team, who are trained in behaviour modification and can provide patients with tools to exercise appropriate coping mechanisms, lead this discussion. The care team can help the person put the appropriate services in place to reduce the likelihood of future crises or, at least, to decrease the likelihood of police contacts even when they are in crisis. Such outcomes are a benefit to the support workers, the police, the community, and the individual.

As an example of how this process can work, the mental health officer had a client who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was homeless; this person had two to three police contacts a day because of his habit of wandering into streets and being verbally aggressive towards others. The police were repeatedly called and some instances, but not all, would result in the client’s apprehension. This individual was assessed by Car 67 and referred to mental health supports, but he was non-compliant with his medication, which led to habitual deterioration. Overall, upon entry to the mental health liaison’s caseload, he had already generated 103 police files. These files represented hundreds of hours of police work.

Due to his activities causing public disturbances and his lack of a stable living environment, this individual had limited supports and cycled through the hospitals, repetitively being treated and then discharged. Once Constable Quee made this discovery, she reported this information to the hospital forum group who then engaged him with a psychiatrist. It appeared that this recurrent cycle was occurring, in part, because the client was unable to articulate his struggles in the community to his service workers. Once a care team was established, they worked on housing and medication issues. After a few failed attempts, such as housing placements falling through and continued medication compliance problems, and police re-engagement, this individual’s long-term care became a priority. The team continued to work on stable housing and medication compliance, and eventually these supports became permanent and initiated successes for this individual. These successes were first seen with intermittent police contact, followed by months with no police contact. While there were times where the client’s contacts would begin to spike, they would be followed by longer periods of stability. Recently, this client’s contacts had been reduced to only six contacts over an eight-month period.

One of the benefits to having the Car 67 program in combination with the mental health liaison is based on its problem-oriented focus. Before the introduction of Constable Quee’s position, Car 67 would often receive calls regarding a client who was being aggressive and presenting as a danger in public.
The police would attend the location with the nurse, who would assess the individual. If they identified the person as having a mental health issue, the nurse and the constable would work together to establish criteria for apprehension under the *Mental Health Act* by determining that the individual presented an imminent risk. They could then escort the individual to the hospital and the hospital would assume custody of the client. Once the individual was certified, the individual could be treated and then discharged back into the community. Ultimately, there would be a subsequent crisis with the same individual and Car 67 would be called to respond, repeat the same procedures, and the cycle would continue. While the procedures followed were the appropriate response and effective crisis interventions in the circumstances, it was not a long-term strategy to manage these clients effectively. The mental health liaison is pertinent to addressing individuals' problems and creating a care team so that their number of future police contacts can be reduced. Car 67 provides the added benefit of enhanced follow-up with individuals in the community, leading to quicker identification of those persons who may be lacking needed supports. While traditional patrol members respond to calls that may involve mentally ill individuals, they only look at the single crisis event, which does not allow for direct follow-up or the most appropriate and beneficial assistance.

**Mutually beneficial partnership**

It is evident the partnerships that have been developed with Car 67 and the mental health liaison officer’s role are a driving force behind the success of the program. The Car 67 partnership is a mutually beneficial one, as the program was designed to help police and Fraser Health increase the effectiveness of their contacts with mental health clients and decrease the number of admissions to the emergency rooms from police. As these resources are extremely expensive, the increased use of other mental health services and follow-up in the community, in lieu of clients’ hospitalization, can be incredibly cost-effective, in addition to being the most appropriate and effective response. The goal is also to have Car 67 respond and intervene early, before an apprehension is needed, thereby allowing the client’s case manager to engage in the follow-up with their client to avoid the type of mental health deterioration that requires apprehension. In effect, the Car 67 program is a partnered approach to crime reduction that is problem-focused, while also being offender-focused, information-led, and cost-effective.

The development of the mental health liaison officer position involved considerable effort to establish the foundational relationships for the role. Despite the effort required, the position was received well and supported by Fraser Health. Constable Quee explains that this is all possible because the individuals involved in these strategies work in helping professions and really want to help their clients. The clients that appear under their mandate are some of the most vulnerable and the highest risk, and so they are also the individuals who require the greatest health care and mental health supports. This partnership enables open communication between the RCMP Liaison Officer and the healthcare professionals so that the most amount of information can be provided on multiple domains concerning the clients who are being case managed.

Given estimates that 20% to 30% of police contacts involve persons with mental illness (VPD, 2013), many cities and communities would benefit from the services of a partnered police-mental health nurse mental health car or an established police mental health liaison position. In those jurisdictions without the numbers to support their own mental health care team, they could follow a similarly designed regional model. Based on her experience, Constable Quee believes that detachments should first determine “what the need of the area is – because every detachment’s need is going to be different – and what the goal of the position is. Are you trying to reduce calls for service in relation to mental health, are you trying to provide more effective outreach, are you trying to have somebody manage the high risk calls? What you are trying to accomplish is key because you can’t do it all. That’s why Surrey is great because we have Car 67 and we have [the mental health liaison officer’s] role.”
While some police organizations try to address all of these issues with only the liaison officer role, they inevitably begin to do some of the things that Car 67 does. Without a committed partnership between key stakeholders, this quickly becomes unmanageable. Each of these positions requires considerable collaborative efforts, networking, knowledge, and time to have the intended positive effect. Surrey’s success lies in the fact that each partner has a very specific goal and mandate. While Car 67 assists the police in their efforts for crisis intervention with mental health clients, the liaison officer develops and implements long-term strategies to deal with clients who have a series of repeat or high risk police contacts by engaging them and preventing these contacts from reoccurring.

**Vancouver’s collaborative approach**

The Vancouver Police Department has also transformed how they identify and respond to mental health cases. The department learned that individuals that they had apprehended in 2012 under the *Mental Health Act* were not only at an increased risk for committing criminal acts, but that these people were 15 times more likely to be the victim of a crime and 23 times more likely to be the victim of violent crime. Beyond the use of the Car 87 program, the Vancouver Police Department has more recently initiated Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) Teams. These teams are collaborations between multiple agencies including the police, health, social workers, and community housing to create a full wraparound for the most severely mentally ill that the police come into contact with. These partnerships achieve greater results based on data sharing agreements that have been established between Coastal Health and the Vancouver Police Department under the Freedom of Information Act’s public safety section. Individuals are connected to housing supports, counseling services, addictions treatment, psychologists and psychiatrists, and monitored medication regimens. The Vancouver Police Department has supported over 200 individuals since the introduction of the ACT teams in 2012. In March 2014, they expanded the program from three ACT teams to five teams.

The most recent development for the Vancouver Police Department in this area has been their Assertive Outreach Team (AOT) that was fully launched in April 2014. A unique feature of police services that are offered only in Vancouver, the department has taken four police officers from different areas and assigned them to the AOT mental health unit.

These officers work out of a Vancouver Coastal Health (VCH) office with six VCH staff to monitor individuals who come into contact with mental health professionals or the police. One of the focuses of the Assertive Outreach Team is to assist in an individual’s transition from St. Paul’s new Acute Behavioural Stabilization Unit, a unit with nine beds dedicated to emergency psychiatric patients, back into the community. Generally, their objective is to identify persons whose mental health appears to be decompensating and connect them with suitable assistance to prevent further deterioration. Members of the team sit down with one another and review all of the names identified as needing this type of assistance, relying on the extensive police data and health files of people that have incurred a high number of mental health incidents in recent months. The members can share names of individuals who have been identified by their agency to see if the other agency has also recognized this individual’s decompensation. The mental health professionals can then determine whether this person must be streamlined into treatment or whether other connections and plans must be made in order to provide assistance.

The teams are comprised of a police officer and a psychiatric nurse who can visit up to 20 people per day. Unlike Car 87, these teams proactively supervise individuals who are decompensating in the community to ensure that they are taking their medication. If the team determines that they are not currently on any medication, they will take them to a doctor who can start them on a medication regime, if necessary. In cases where the individual has already received medication, but has not yet taken it, the psychiatric nurse can administer the prescribed medication on the spot to get the person back on track.
The team also monitors whether individuals have been attending their appointments with mental health teams and reminds them that if they continue to miss their appointments, the police-nurse team will continue to follow-up with them until they do. The team then maintains communication with that person's mental health team to confirm their attendance at their scheduled appointments.

Once individuals appear to be following their medication and counseling plans, the team can take a step back and move on to the next case. Although this service extends beyond the capacities of Car 87, one of their roles is similar in that if an individual is really decompensating, the police officer can apprehend them under sections 28 of the Mental Health Act and get the person to the hospital before the situation escalates. The ACT teams are flexible as they can monitor individuals in the community as often or as seldom as needed, depending on their frequency and type of contact with the police and the mental health authorities.

Like many of the partnerships discussed in this chapter, these teams have come a long way from the practices that were in place as recently as 10 to 15 years ago when the police and mental health officials did not have open lines of communication. At the time of this writing, the Vancouver Police Department is providing high-risk residents with mental health services at three distinct levels: through Car 87, the ACT, and the AOT teams. Car 67 provides a 24/7 reactive model under which a psychiatric nurse can share his/her expertise with police during active incidents and police calls. On the other hand, AOT and ACT are proactive with AOT being offered to people who are starting a downward spiral, but have yet to become involved in activities that are too out of the ordinary and the team can intervene to prevent this from occurring.

ACT is utilized for the most highly intensive mental health files that necessitate intensive monitoring of their circumstances involving housing, counseling, and medication. Each of these systems are about making the right connections, supporting people in the community, and guiding them in dealing with their ongoing issues. As Vancouver Police Department Deputy Chief Adam Palmer said, “Our prisons are already populated with people who are mentally ill. We don’t want to put more in there. Let’s help them in the community.”

These preemptive, partnered strategies are tracked on a dashboard that the Vancouver Police Department has developed in conjunction with Coastal Health on both the health and the law enforcement side. The ACT also relies on an early warning system that is tied back to the data and assists in the timely identification of high risk, emotionally disturbed persons, so that the members can prevent any potentially aggressive incidents between these individuals and the police, or others. The Vancouver Police Board and the Vancouver Coastal Health Board have an annual meeting during which they review the performance and specific strategies being used to address their strategic goals. Members of the teams meet on a daily basis, and the managers from both the police and Vancouver Coastal Health meet weekly to discuss the high level strategies for the next year and what they want to accomplish.
The key to police mental health teams are based on the fundamental principles of bringing together and making the best use of community and government stakeholders to more effectively address an identified crime and disorder problem. Incorporating an information-led, offender, and problem approach and harnessing the resources, knowledge, experience, and expertise of relevant stakeholders, the police were able to take a specific population that was a substantial drain on their resources, and develop a range of strategies and procedures that provided both an immediate and long-term solution to a serious crime, disorder, and social problem. Moreover, strong cooperation from community stakeholders in the identification of and response to this population was crucial. While police could have selected to respond to those with mental health problems as they have in the past, which would have resulted in a cycle of response that is quickly becoming unsustainable, never mind wholly ineffective, taking a partnered approach allowed the police to work with organizations with specific skills and mandates to share responsibility for addressing the needs of this group of people. This has benefited those who suffer from mental illness in that they are more likely to come into contact with police officers that have some knowledge and experience with mental illness and have access to mental health services. In addition, this approach has reduced the drain on police resources, allowed those with specific skills to work with these clients, and made communities safer. Surrey and Vancouver's approaches are excellent examples of how the police can more effectively and efficiently reduce crime and increase public safety by taking a partnered approach.

For many crime reduction strategies, success depends on the establishment and maintenance of effective partnerships between the police and other agencies and individuals. It is essential that police do not work in isolation when trying to resolve crime and disorder problems. Moreover, it has become unsustainable for police to be the “go-to” organization for all social issues, regardless of whether the issue is a criminal justice issue or not. In effect, many of the current activities that police routinely engaged in, such as responding to false alarms, filling out paperwork, and managing the mentally ill or homeless can be more effectively and efficiently dealt with by other agencies or individuals. It is also likely that many of the criminal justice matters that police respond to, such as family violence, youth offending, and prolific offending can be addressed better by police when prevention initiatives and response strategies are developed and implemented in partnership with other organizations. Establishing partnerships reflects the understanding that preventing crime is not only a police issue, but also the responsibility of the entire community, and that many crime-related issues cannot be solved through enforcement measures exclusively (Axford and Ruddell, 2010; Joyce, Ramsey, & Stewart, 2013; Lansdowne and Gwinn, 2013; Terpstra, 2011; Trinkle and Miller, 2013).
Chilliwack’s withdrawal management unit

As an example, from 2005 until 2009, the Fraser Health Authority operated a withdrawal management unit in the Chilliwack General Hospital. The unit comprised 10 beds and serviced individuals from the entire Fraser region in British Columbia who were trying to wean off substances under careful supervision. Although the unit has since closed, while it was opened, Sherry Mumford, the Fraser Health Director of Clinical Programs, hired Tom McMahon as a healthcare worker on the unit. He worked side-by-side with the nurses and other healthcare workers to assist people who participated in the medical detox. Tom had extensive experience with detox services and this type of population, and, after some time, he recognized that a few beds on the unit were frequently unoccupied. Although there was a waitlist for the unit, there was also a high rate of no-shows that resulted in empty beds that could be utilized by other individuals who required a placement. As a resident of Chilliwack, Tom noticed a substantial number of homeless people concentrated in the downtown core who were drinking and using substances and would benefit from a bed on the unit. Sherry and Tom began discussions concerning the availability of these beds and the barriers facing these individuals in gaining access to the service. During one of their conversations, Tom offered to go out on the streets of Chilliwack and talk to some of these people who perhaps really needed to be in a detox bed. He was able to quickly and positively engage with a number of these individuals, encourage them to try the program, and soon returned with a few who were interested. Upon this realization, an idea for a new outreach position for Chilliwack emerged. Shortly after Sherry proposed the position and secured funding, Tom was officially hired as an addictions outreach worker for Fraser Health in December 2007.

The closing of the withdrawal management unit occurred in December 2009 because of provincial funding cuts. As a result, Sherry was tasked with finding an affordable alternative to this service. She proposed a mobile service model called the Riverstone Program and, towards the end of 2010, the Riverstone home and mobile teams emerged. While its main office is located in the Chilliwack General Hospital, these teams provide detox services using a mobile delivery model servicing persons across the Fraser region. The intent of Riverstone is to provide services to individuals who have substance abuse and addiction issues, but who do not require an inpatient model. Fraser Health provides inpatient services at their Creekside Withdrawal Management Centre located in Surrey; however, the majority of clients with substance related needs do not require this full-time withdrawal environment. While Creekside has a waitlist of approximately 200 people at any given time, Sherry points out that about 80% of those do not necessitate constant care during their withdrawal process. Instead, they would benefit more from a program like the mobile Riverstone model. For individuals who do not have a safe bed or home where the mobile team can come to deliver the physician directed detox regime, Fraser Health also has access to licensed, short-term (7-30 days) support recovery beds located at Kinghaven and Peardonville House, which are partnered with the Riverstone program. These short-term beds are situated in a motel in Abbotsford and can service two men and two women at a time by sending the Riverstone teams to the motel to provide their detox supports. Tom’s outreach position has also continued, but he works exclusively with the marginalized population in Chilliwack. Many of his clients are connected to Riverstone, Creekside, and other local services that may further assist the individual in meeting their needs.

Fraser Health’s Riverstone mobile detox teams work under the direction of a physician who requests that the program’s staff visit clients over the course of their detox; this may translate into visits three times a day for a set period of time to take the client’s vital signs and ensure that they are taking their prescribed medications. Tom’s outreach position alternatively is to locate substance addicted and often homeless individuals and connect them to resources like Riverstone. He engages with individuals on the streets of Chilliwack, preserving a focus on those with addictions.

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Instead of providing detox services, he links people to the Riverstone program, as well as to a number of other social and medical services based on individual issues and needs. Following the closure of the withdrawal unit and before this mobile team was formed, Tom’s outreach work continued and his caseload has increased considerably. This addictions outreach position is now an important part of the Riverstone team.

One of the keys to the success of this position is Tom’s ability to connect with these individuals in their neighbourhoods, and develop rapport and trust with his clients. In the position, he has been afforded a certain degree of flexibility that enables the development of a closer rapport that can better position him to offer valuable services. It also allows him to provide basic support by talking to these individuals to gain a sense of their personal wishes. Although Tom follows specific protocols, he is not “rule bound”. This flexibility has been critical to the success of the outreach worker. He has been responsible for building chains of resources and partnerships, and while his primary area is Chilliwack, he has become familiar with the entire Fraser region and its services. This is critical because the individuals who spend time on the streets in downtown Chilliwack and in other cities are not necessarily originally from these areas; it is simply where they are now. While the outreach position may be transferable to other jurisdictions, it is important to employ an individual who has the skills to truly connect with the people receiving support.

**RCMP partnership**

Over time, Tom developed strong networks with different agencies, including the Chilliwack RCMP, community services, social workers, probation services, and the hospital. The role of the Chilliwack RCMP with the addictions outreach worker has been a mutually beneficial one. The partnership began in January of 2008, almost as soon as the outreach position did, and developed very quickly.

The initial introduction between the police and the outreach worker occurred one afternoon when Tom was at the harm reduction needle exchange van in Chilliwack, where he would often visit in an effort to make connections with people who were actively using drugs. At the same time, the Chilliwack RCMP’s Sergeant was in the downtown area performing a walk-around and he came over to introduce himself. After Tom shared the details of what his role was, discussions around helping those with substance abuse needs soon followed and the partnership was established. The Community Policing Sergeant at the time was very supportive of the outreach assistance offered for the identified population and fully embraced the harm reduction model. During this time, the police made many referrals to Tom and initiated the process of connecting people to services, rather than placing them in jail.

Approximately one year from the time the position was established, there was a restructuring of the police department and the Community Policing Sergeant was transferred to another department. As a result, the mandate of the police department also changed and, in 2010 and 2011, the addictions outreach worker’s communication with the police was reduced. Although the newer Sergeant was familiar with the outreach position, the focus during that time had been modified. Tom continued his work in the outreach position, but he lost the strong connection with the police detachment. In May 2013, the department experienced yet another shift and a new Sergeant was appointed. Since this time, the police-outreach interaction has re-commenced and resumed its status as one of the department’s priorities. Interestingly, during the period of reduced contact with the RCMP, Tom’s position became more well known in the community, and referrals from hospital social workers and others dramatically increased. It has taken some time to re-new the relationship with the RCMP; however, as the current Sergeant has voiced a strong interest in embracing this collaboration, it appears that the future of the partnership is solid.
As a component of this, the addictions outreach worker has resumed his attendance at the RCMP’s watch briefings, which allows open communication between each side about their clientele. The police and Tom have already started to perform walkarounds in downtown.

The Chilliwack RCMP also has a member who is assigned to work with what they have identified as ‘social’ chronic offenders. These offenders have had at least five contacts with the police, typically for being intoxicated in public; however, some also exhibit signs of mental health issues with an addiction on the side. The addictions outreach worker receives a considerable number of calls from this RCMP member about people who may be drunk in public and who have repeated calls for service. He then steps in and makes a plan to assist those who appear to be open to services. In some cases, the police have contacted Tom in the early morning hours to meet with people who were placed in police cells until they sobered up. The police identify that these individuals are homeless, and so before they release them, they contact Tom. Upon meeting them, Tom describes his position and outlines the options that are available to the client. These types of engagements can be incredibly valuable for clients’ openness to services. There was one case example from the time of the original community Sergeant when Tom was on his way to a meeting when he received a phone call notifying him that a bed had become available at Creekside for one of his clients. Unfortunately, the client did not own a phone. As Tom recognized that he only had a short amount of time to locate and deliver this individual to the service before the bed was re-assigned, he phoned the Sergeant. The Sergeant was also familiar with this individual because of his frequent contact with the RCMP. Tom informed the Sergeant where this person would be at nine o’clock and asked him to meet the client to tell him about the opening. Not only did the Sergeant agree to do this, but he also extended his involvement by offering to drive the client to the resource. Both Tom and the Sergeant went above and beyond their duties, especially considering that the bed was available in an outside community.

There have been other cases where Tom has driven his clients to Creekside or to other resources. Although this type of service is not in the police or outreach worker’s mandates, it exemplifies the strong connection that exists between outreach and the police, and how such a relationship can help to provide the best possible supports for this population. It also illustrates the flexibility in the partnership to wrap around the needs of the client, which is how the outreach role can be so effective.

In January 2014, the outreach worker was tracking 25 individual clients, and had engaged with approximately 35 individuals on the street, distributing his card and explaining his position. Although the outreach position is designed for adults, there is no specifically designated age group. Many clients do not fit the stereotypical image of the types of people that would be seeking such services; in some cases, the outreach worker has supported very elderly clients who lived in seniors’ homes. Tom never officially steps away from or ends the relationship with his clients. The clients always know that they can contact him, even if he has not heard from them for a few months or several years. Tom sees these approaches as being a major benefit of the program. Clients are not discharged after a set period of time and it is not based on the idea that after a year of engagement, they are “fixed.”

Of note, the outreach position has resulted in reductions in these individuals’ contacts with the police. There have been a few cases of social chronic offenders who had had over 100 contacts with the police over six months, received support from Tom, and have not had any police contacts for several years.
The success of the Riverstone program has also been assessed. The Fraser Health Director of Clinical Programs examined the effect that the program had on the district’s healthcare system by examining two years before Riverstone opened, counting how many times clients were placed in an acute medical bed, how many times they went to the ER, and how many times they were placed in an inpatient bed. She also looked at the two years after Riverstone opened. Based on 14 cases, she found that, on average, there was a 56% reduction in these healthcare contacts.

Partnerships vary from simple information sharing agreements between two different agencies to more complex inter-agency collaborations involving the blending of responsibilities across traditional sectors (Kim, Matz, Gerber, Beto, & Lambert, 2013b; Nash, 1999). Regardless of their purpose or structure, partnerships by the police are valuable because they provide for a more efficient use of limited resources, they avoid the duplication of efforts, they improve relationships with the community, increase the understanding of what other criminal justice and non-criminal justice agencies do, and programs that are informed by community knowledge and partner information and experience. Overall, well-designed and truly meaningful partnerships contribute to substantial reductions in crime and social disorder (Gann, Blevins, & Anderson, 2012; Jurik, Blumenthal, Smith, & Portillos, 2000; Kim, Gerber, Beto, & Lambert, 2013a; Kim et al., 2013b; Lewis, 2013; Murphy and Lutze, 2009; Parent and Snyder, 1999; Santos and Santos, 2012; Worrall and Gaines, 2006). However, to offer value, they must be done correctly. Although informal partnerships that are limited in scope and duration are relatively common (Kim et al., 2013a, 2013b), Trinkle and Miller (2013) noted that a written agreement was critical for partnerships to be successful, particularly in the long-term as informal partnerships often cease when one or more of the involved parties moves on (Kim, Gerber, & Beto, 2010). A well-written agreement clearly lays out the responsibilities of each partner, emphasizes the intended outcomes, reinforces the shared values and vision, and offers transparency to the public.

Establishing such an agreement in advance of formalizing the partnership can ensure clarity on the methods to be used in achieving the common goal and the respective roles of each partner, which will help to avoid mission distortion or mission creep (Murphy, 2005).

Mission distortion is when the method of achieving the mission of one agency begins to shift towards that of its partner, such as when probation officers shift towards a more police-based enforcement-oriented approach than the traditional rehabilitative-focused approach to dealing with clients (Kim et al., 2010; Matz, DeMichele, & Lowe, 2012; Murphy and Lutze, 2009). This is a more likely outcome of an inter-agency partnership where the partnering agencies become interdependent than a multi-agency partnership, where each agency retains its own ideology and methods (Coliandris and Rogers, 2008). Yet, this issue has been noted in several studies on multi-agency police-probation/parole partnerships, for instance where probation officers have conducted searches of clients as a way for police to avoid needing reasonable suspicion and a warrant (Matz et al., 2012; Murphy and Lutze, 2009). Whereas mission distortion can involve one agency’s methods overwhelming that of the others in the partnership, mission creep challenges the successful implementation of a partnership by placing excessive responsibility on one or more of the partners (Murphy, 2005).
While it is important for partners to be flexible in their new roles, it is vital for partner buy-in that their particular role does not become too distinct from their traditional responsibilities and that they are not simply added to their old responsibilities. Thus, in a formal agreement, clearly establishing the specific roles and responsibilities of each partner, and the methods by which common outcomes will be achieved and evaluated, will increase the potential success of a partnership.

**Partners in crime reduction**

For the purposes of crime reduction, there are a variety of partnerships that police should build (Parent and Snyder, 1999). Partnerships can be at the general level with a mandate to improve police efficiency or to address community social disorder concerns with the broad goal of reducing crime. These partnerships can be strictly between police agencies, such as the contributions of the RCMP and municipal police agencies to the Integrated Homicide Investigation Taskforce in British Columbia, or it may involve a variety of other criminal justice and non-criminal justice agencies, such as those providing social services to specific clients. In fact, as outlined in the previous chapter, many criminal justice issues stem from problematic social conditions, including lack of housing, poor skills training, and addiction. Given this, preventing future offending involves the work of many non-criminal justice agencies, particularly those that can offer offenders or those at risk of offending access to services conducive to successful reintegration, such as employment training, education, housing, addictions counseling, mental health services, and physical health care (Axford and Ruddell, 2010). To encourage community buy-in to such types of partnerships, Trinkle and Miller (2013) advised establishing an Advisory Committee represented by a wide variety of partners. This committee can then solicit public opinion to guide police priorities, educate the public through hosting and coordinating events, such as educational seminars, forums, or activities, and create a volunteer base to be used for various crime prevention and response activities, including the mentorship of at risk or criminal youth, community projects, recreational activities, and citizen patrols (Trinkle and Miller, 2013).

Partnerships can and should also involve academics (Jurik et al., 2000). In particular, university-police partnerships have the benefit of providing academics with police level data that they can analyse in order to make objective, evidence-based recommendations for police to build their crime reduction strategies upon, while providing police with benefits related to operational improvements, including the more efficient and effective use of limited police resources (Engel and Whalen, 2010; Joyce et al., 2013). An excellent example of this is the RCMP-University Research Chairs established at the University of the Fraser Valley and Simon Fraser University, which are designed to conduct police-focused research for the benefit of all police organizations in British Columbia and Canada more generally.

Engaging in an academic-police partnership allows academics to be much better informed about police operations, policies, data, and constraints, while the police gain access to analyses, evaluations, and recommendations that are directly relevant to their work (Engel and Whalen, 2010). Importantly, an official research partnership also reduces the likelihood that the request for analysis will come following the implementation of a new policing scheme. While this kind of post-implementation analysis can still yield useful information for police about the effectiveness of a strategy, involving researchers from the outset of strategy design and implementation will provide a much stronger and higher quality level of analysis (Joyce et al., 2013). A university-police agency relationship also has educational benefits. Undergraduate and graduate students gain important practical experiences that supplement their standard academic training through working directly with police files and shadowing police activities, including patrol, investigations, and meetings. Again, police officers benefit from connections to a university that may result in further educational opportunities, such as graduate work (Engel and Whalen, 2010; Jurik et al., 2000; Hek, 2012).
Partnerships can also be more specific, focusing on certain types of offenders or crimes, such as partnerships developed to respond to young offenders (e.g., Peaslee, 2009) or the police-probation/parole strategies used in the United Kingdom to reduce re-offending among prolific property offenders discussed in a previous chapter. Many partnerships have been established specifically to address the crime of family violence, which is not surprising when one considers that family violence issues tend to involve multiple jurisdictions beyond the police, courts, and corrections, including mental health/addictions services, physical health services, child protection/welfare services, and housing services. Significantly, partnerships in the United States integrating a variety of stakeholders working collaboratively to prevent intergenerational transmission of family violence practices are beginning to demonstrate substantial effects on reducing family violence related crimes, including intimate partner homicides (Lansdowne and Gwinn, 2013). These partnerships frequently fall under the Family Justice Center approach, where law enforcement, legal representatives, and various stakeholders from social services are co-located in a unit specifically designed to respond to situations of family violence. Approximately 80 such centres are located across the United States; 30 are police led with the remainder being led by other partners (Lansdowne and Gwinn, 2013).

These centres provide a one-stop shop where victims of family based violence can go for help accessing safe housing, legal representation, or restraining orders; many of these centres have child-friendly rooms where children can relax and play while their parent accesses services (Lansdowne and Gwinn, 2013). In addition to contributing to reductions in rates and severity of family violence, these centres are improving the knowledge and relationships between the various stakeholders (Lansdowne and Gwinn, 2013). However, in order for these kinds of partnerships to work successfully, the right people need to be involved from the start.

The RCMP’s “K” Division in Alberta relies on partnerships with their community agencies to best manage their habitual offenders and crime reduction strategies. Their habitual offender management program provides departments with guidelines and resources on how to manage repeat offenders, including using the RCMP’s records management system, logging curfews, home visits, and street checks. Once departments have selected their criteria for identifying their habitual offenders and compiled a list of those individuals, they also offer offenders services from their partner agencies. Since the RCMP operates across the entire province, the services they offer vary depending on the community; some towns have counseling resources to address alcohol and addiction issues, while others have services that assist with housing or employment issues. Although smaller communities have access to fewer resources, the Alberta RCMP has developed broad policies so that habitual offender management programs can be tailored to the resources that are available in the area. This makes the approach possible in large municipalities and smaller detachments. The RCMP’s partnerships may be as simple as working with probation officers or social workers to use as referrals for their habitual offenders. Such collaborations can assist police agencies identify methods of providing appropriate resources to individual offenders with the intention of modifying their behaviour.
Habitual offenders are told that they have two options: the first is that the police are going to offer services to assist them make positive changes; or second, if they do not wish to take advantage of this support, they will remain on the habitual offender list and the police will continue to vigorously enforce their court ordered conditions.

**Brooks’ domestic violence team**

One partnership that has developed as a valuable crime reduction partnership is the Domestic Violence Intervention Team (DVIT) in Brooks, Alberta. The DVIT was developed to respond to repeated calls for service for domestic issues and disputes. The program began in October 2012 and provides ongoing support to these families from a team made up of an RCMP officer, Victim Services, and Domestic Violence Outreach Workers. This team responds to every domestic violence call regardless of whether charges were laid. When the domestic violence intervention team is brought in, an RCMP officer attends the residence and, upon obtaining consent, enters the home to talk to the family. The police then return to the residence within 24 to 48 hours with an outreach social worker to provide follow-up. At this time, the social worker can better evaluate the family’s needs and connect them to local supports. The DVIT provides intake, abuse assessment, danger assessment, safety planning, and case planning services for the victims and any children involved. They immediately connect both the offender and any victims to services in the community, and continue their involvement with the families and offenders as case managers. The types of supports that the team offers offenders are determined on an individual basis. This assistance could include reviewing No Contact Orders, locating housing for offenders who have been removed from the home, connecting offenders to counseling and addiction resources, connecting victims to the local women’s shelter, being a liaison between the families and the Ministry of Children and Family Services, and coordinating visits with children, if necessary. The RCMP has also collaborated with the court system that has resulted in a more rapid response and resolution for the offender, victim, and children during the legal process.

The Domestic Violence Intervention Team assists residents who have been involved in domestic violence cases either transition out of their relationship and move on, or help partners and families stay together and develop healthy relationships. Inspector Don McKenna, the Officer in Charge of Community Policing in Alberta, noted that the Brooks Domestic Violence Intervention Team is “crime reduction at its best”. The goals of the DVIT are to reduce repeat domestic offences and to increase family safety. Through their provision of community supports and services, the team has been instrumental in assisting victims gain the strength needed to leave abusive relationships. The program has not increased the financial costs to the Brooks’ detachment, as they were able to restructure already existing resources and obtain provincial funding grants to facilitate the partnerships with community agencies. Ultimately, the program has resulted in reduced costs for the detachment given the crime reductions that have followed. They built on the shared interests of the groups involved, including reducing crime and developing a shared vision. Since many of the community agencies involved in the program dealt with the same families, the DVIT opened the doors to allow these groups to share information with one another to develop a more strategic response. The Brooks RCMP detachment commander also serves on the intervention team’s board of directors and works closely with the local services to leverage their partnerships.

The response to this team has been extremely positive. While one potential challenge to developing crime reduction partnerships between the police and local agencies can be information sharing, Brooks has been fortunate in that they have obtained consent and cooperation from all individuals and agencies involved. In the first nine months following the implementation of the domestic violence intervention team, the team engaged with more than 50 families. They have seen a decrease in domestic violence reoffending and an increase in community support for these offenders and families. The Brooks RCMP has evolved from their traditional practice of purely investigating, laying charges, and moving on to the next case, to an approach that involves local partners.
They are seeking ways to more effectively help habitual and problem offenders address their personal challenges and change their behaviours for the long-term.

In another successful example, in 2010, the Surrey RCMP partnered with members of the Surrey Fire Services (SFS) to distribute educational materials to residents in high-risk neighbourhoods in an attempt to deal with the number of fires and break and enters in the City of Surrey. The initiative developed as a result of the RCMP identifying a hot spot for opportunistic break and enters due to people leaving doors or windows open or unattended. Surrey Fire Services also determined that the same neighbourhood had a disproportionate number of cooking fires. As part of a joint response, education packages containing crime, fire-safety, and smoke-alarm information were created for distribution as part of the Safer Summer campaign. This strategy was supported by research indicating that distribution materials to people's residences is an effective method for increasing public awareness around specific issues of local concern.

This initiative involved approximately 80 RCMP and SFS members, including auxiliary police officers and volunteer firefighters, and off-duty RCMP officers and career firefighters. Participants were split into teams of two RCMP and two firefighters and provided with a list of addresses. The firefighter and RCMP member would attend each address, provide residents with a brief explanation of the Safer Summer campaign and leave an information package.

If no one was home, the packages were left at the residence. In total, over the four hours worked, the teams had knocked on approximately 2,200 doors, making direct contact with residents in about 60% of the residences visited.

The post-initiative evaluation by the RCMP indicated that the campaign might have contributed to an overall 64% reduction in break-and-enters in the targeted area; a decrease of 30 incidents. In addition, the overall number of opportunistic break-and-enters decreased to 8 from 30, or a 78% reduction over three years. In their evaluation, the SFS concluded that, after analyzing data for the two years before and one year following the campaign, there was a 19% reduction in the annual rate of residential fires in the target area from 1.60 per 1,000 residences to 1.30 per 1,000 residences. There was also an increase in the number of days between fires from one fire every 128.3 days to one fire every 104.1 days following the campaign. Beyond the reduction in crime and fires, the campaign further strengthened the excellent relationship between Surrey's fire and police services. As stated by Len Garis, the City of Surrey's Fire Chief, “this was a community problem, and Surrey's community services came together to combat that problem. By partnering and sharing resources, we can work more effectively and strategically. Ultimately, our community is the winner here”.
To initiate and sustain partnerships, it is crucial that the right people be involved in the coordinating efforts. Too often partnerships founder because those discussing the nature and extent of the proposed partnership are not those who can actually make the important decisions. It is essential that the appropriate decision makers be involved from each agency at the earliest stages of partnership development. Given that leadership shapes an organization's culture through its effects on members' attitudes, opinions, and methods (Coliandris and Rogers, 2008), by including leaders from the onset of the partnership development stage, each organization, as a whole, is more likely to buy-in to the idea of a partnership. This corporate buy-in is key to making any partnership more likely to succeed (Santos and Santos, 2012). Involving leaders at the early stages also helps to reduce the potential challenge of organizational lag, where one or more of the organizations in the partnership fail to support its development or implementation. By neglecting to provide sufficient resources, including funding, staff, or training, or by resisting reworking of staff responsibilities, such as adjusting work hours or the way in which tasks are assigned, the lack of buy-in can spell the end of a partnership before it even gets off the ground (Kim et al., 2010; Murphy, 2005).

Involving leaders and other decision makers at the early stages of the partnership, when agreements are being made about how each organization can and will contribute, also sets the tone for the staff who will be required to participate in the partnership. The approval of leaders indicates to all others in the organization that their agency values the diverse perspectives other organizations can offer and it encourages them to be flexible in their position. This is critical because partnerships sometimes require people to take on responsibilities not typically associated with their traditional role, such as when police partner with probation officers to conduct home checks of offenders on probation.

In this type of partnership, police typically take a back seat role to probation, as they are there primarily to ensure the safety of the probation officer and the public, rather than to investigate or collect evidence of wrongdoing. Moreover, police officers participate in home checks during regular work hours when they would otherwise be patrolling or engaged in other police duties (Alarid et al., 2011). In order for this type of partnership to be effective, it is important for general duty officers to understand that their police leaders have made the decision to engage in this partnership, and it is important for these leaders to communicate the value, benefit, and importance of this activity to its membership. In effect, by involving leaders and decision makers at the early stages of partnership development, the message is conveyed to those who will carry out the partnership that it is in their and their organization's best interests to fully support it.

**New Westminster's park safety project**

An excellent example of a partnership with excellent results comes from the New Westminster Police Department. In 2008, the New Westminster Police Department recognized that they were receiving a lot of calls for service from concerned and frustrated residents whose neighbourhoods were being disrupted and damaged by a large number of young people entering and exiting the local parks late at night.
These concerns were becoming particularly prominent in the spring and summer months when teenagers were on summer break from school and looking for a place to socialize during the evenings. The primary issues that the New Westminster Police and Parks, Culture, and Recreation Departments identified were noise, vandalism, graffiti, other related destructive activities, illegal alcohol consumption, and general nuisance behaviours. Upon the identification of these community and park-related concerns, the New Westminster Police Department and Parks Department began a crime reduction initiative to intervene and reduce the nuisance and criminal behaviours appearing seasonally in the city’s parks. By this time, concerns had arisen in relation to threats to the safety of individuals and families who wanted to use the parks for positive activities, threats to the upkeep and protection of the parks, as well as the safety and quality of life of residents who lived in the surrounding areas of the parks. Although there were bylaws already in place that prohibited loitering in the parks after dusk and conducting oneself in a disorderly or offensive matter in the parks, it was apparent that these laws alone were not having the desired effect.

After the increased resident concerns had been acknowledged, the subsequent task of the New Westminster Police Department was to determine the sources of these public concerns. The assigned departmental team began to examine PRIME data, but they quickly recognized that this would require a greater effort than they had previously envisioned. There were a large series of reports that appeared to exhibit similar complaints regarding disturbances, yet the dispersed nature of the files made them difficult to organize and arrange into patterns or common themes; they were each connected to disparate addresses within a sizeable area. From a crime reduction strategy point of view, this presented several unforeseen challenges and obstacles for the department. Still, the police continued their efforts with the assistance of their crime analyst and gradually began to distinguish that these inconsistently coded reports were actually all connected to public parks in New Westminster. With the identification of this underlying theme, the police department could more readily begin to assess the root causes of the problems in the parks. An additional challenge for the police was that the mere identification of the problem did not elucidate the complexity and extent of the issues in the parks. The police had identified the problem areas and quickly recognized that the problem population was local groups of teenagers who had been using the parks as a hangout spot. Still, the police did not fully comprehend just how large the number of teenagers who used the parks as their weekend meeting spot was. They learned that students had been using the parks for a fairly long period of time as a sort of rite of passage through the high school years. For this reason, contrary to what the police officers had thought, it soon became apparent that the students were not simply going to relocate after a single warning.

While 2008 was largely devoted to identifying and understanding the problem, 2009 was dedicated to implementing specific measures to address the disturbances and destructive behaviours in the parks. Given the size and the nature of the problem, the approaches undertaken by the police and parks required the commitment and efforts of multiple community partners. Although it was the police that received the complaints, the police department had the foresight to understand that the concerns were predominantly a community issue that would be best addressed through a collaborative strategy. Titled the New Westminster Parks Safety Project, the initiative began with a partnership between the New Westminster Police Department, New Westminster Parks Department, and New Westminster School Board District.
With the support of these groups, the project began by educating the public, particularly high school students and their parents, on the ongoing concerns with the behaviours occurring in and around the park by youth. Media releases that described the project were provided to the public, and the police department’s school liaison officer went into the high schools to distribute notification letters for students in grades 10 to 12 to take home to their parents. The letters contained information outlining the types of issues that had come to the community’s attention, the responses that would be executed if the issues persisted, such as issuing municipal tickets for being in the park after dusk, charges under the BC Liquor Control and Licensing Act for alcohol consumption, and potential criminal charges for more serious offences, and that the overarching goal of the project was to provide safe park environments for everyone. The liaison officers also held a school assembly as a supplementary component to ensure that teenagers received and understood the presented information, regardless of whether they chose to read the information and share it with their parents. Following the preventative and educational components of the project, the police quickly began to adhere to their claims with a “zero-tolerance” approach. They ensured that their message was clear and that the public and the teenagers understood that they were serious about tackling this issue.

By 2009, the police and parks board had reached out to the related stakeholders in the community and all of the necessary partnerships were established. The New Westminster Police Department’s Operational Support Unit provided police officers on bicycles who, in cooperation with the Parks Department, patrolled the parks during the peak night hours and enforced warnings and tickets when a transgression occurred. Volunteers were also assigned to patrol the areas after dusk. The operational unit’s team leader would provide regular patrol members with information on any ongoing issues or specific areas of concentration so that they too could provide some support to enforcing the crime reduction strategies. To assist with the necessary information and education on the associated city bylaws, the City of New Westminster Bylaws, Permits, & Regulations Department was also an important stakeholder that supported the efforts and strategies of the project. The New Westminster’s Engineering Operations Department was also a critical partner in assisting with the integration and installation of more signs and crime deterring designs in the parks, such as landscaping by removing shrubbery, cutting back tree branches, and installing specific anti-loitering sound emitting devices to discourage any lingering groups. This approach to crime prevention is known as CPTED or Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. As some of the parks in New Westminster accommodate large sporting arenas and event establishments, the city’s local sporting associations were also helpful in encouraging the public to exit the parks at the end of any organized event.

The New Westminster Police Department’s Crime Prevention Services Coordinator Shelley Cole indicated that alcohol consumption was not the main or only concern that fuelled the New Westminster Park Safety Project; however, underage drinking was also a concern for the police and the community. Therefore, a part of the Parks Safety Project was to incorporate the Liquor Control Branch who assisted with engaging the local liquor retailers and combining forces to determine how young people were obtaining alcohol and to try to mitigate the occurrence of this. After this connection was made, a discussion began on how retailers were checking their customers’ ages and what they were doing to detect bootlegging activities. The liquor outlets began to aid in educating and implementing improved plans to prevent youth from obtaining alcohol.
All alcohol retailers were identified in New Westminster and joined the effort by hanging signs in their stores and windows, training employees in these efforts, and also communicating with the police concerning potential alcohol purchasing by and for minors. A local signage shop donated the signs that were distributed and hung in every liquor outlet across the city.

The Parks Department and the entire community were two of the greatest stakeholders in this project, and so it was pivotal that they were actively involved in the parks crime reduction strategy. In addition to the abovementioned approaches, the parks introduced nighttime activities targeted towards families during the peak loitering times to encourage community engagement and appropriate use of the park spaces. These activities were funded by community-based organizations and local groups who donated financial support to these pursuits and included organized movie nights in the parks between nine o’clock in the evening until midnight. These activities discouraged teenagers from loitering in the parks by making these locations undesirable for those young people who did not want to be in the public view. Lastly, there were also Block Watch Programs and resident association partnerships that were formed and strengthened to encourage people to continue to call and report any issues that became apparent in their neighbourhoods.

In 2010 and 2011, the project was up and running successfully, which continued into 2013. While many of these approaches could potentially move the nuisance problems to other areas within the city, fortunately, this was not the case. The Parks Safety Project focused on targeting all New Westminster parks with the initiatives, and this was helpful in preventing displacement. Shelley Cole maintains that the project has been successful in two important ways. First, the number of complaint calls from residents surrounding the parks in New Westminster has declined. In the first year, this reduction represented a 6% drop, but, in the subsequent year, there was a 24% decrease in calls for service. Furthermore, residents in the surrounding areas expressed their satisfaction with the project, and their support and gratitude to the New Westminster Police Department.

As a result of the police and community partnerships, 2013 did not require the same effort from the project’s stakeholders that was needed from 2009 to 2012. Shelley Cole expressed that their detachment is now “committed to the continued monitoring of the parks to prevent problems of this nature in the future.” This project is certainly an exemplar model of police and community partnerships, especially when budgets are limited. There was no financial support available for this project and so these broad and deep partnerships were even more critical. By identifying and contacting all of the agencies with an interest in the program, each stakeholder could identify what tools and resources they could provide to contribute to the benefit to their organization and the community.

**Dealing with impaired drivers**

In another important example, prior to 2010, the police in British Columbia were restricted in their response to impaired drivers due to the narrow legislation surrounding these offences. In response to this limited ability to provide what they deemed to be an appropriate response to a potentially dangerous type of offence, the police agencies in British Columbia approached the provincial government to articulate that the legislation in place was preventing them from being truly effective in regards to impaired driving in the province. Before 2010, the police were limited to two options: the first option was a full criminal code prosecution that required a tremendous amount of time and resources from the police officer responsible for pulling the driver over; the second option was an on-the-spot 24-hour driving suspension. In light of these circumstances, the police would try to avoid the first option because it would take, on average, five hours to process an impaired driver, followed by extensive court delays; alternatively, the 24-hour suspension was comparable to a ticket, yet it was not accompanied by a fine or any lasting ramifications. The previous impaired driving legislation therefore did not carry a lasting deterrent value for impaired drivers.
In response to the police’s appeals, the provincial government created a working group comprised primarily of police officers, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, and legal representatives. Together, they developed new impaired driving legislation, named the Immediate Roadside Prohibition (IRP). Under the IRP legislation, new sanctions were created to enhance the police’s response to impaired driving. Upon the determination that a driver is impaired, the appropriate sanctions are determined based on the driver’s blood alcohol content; the minimum available sanction is a 3-day immediate suspension with a 3-day car impoundment and the maximum sanction is a 90-day suspension with a 30-day car impound. For drivers who have had a previous impaired driving infraction, the second offence sanction is a 7-day suspension and a 7-day vehicle impoundment. These sanctions can increase based on the individual’s history of impaired driving and their level of impairment to a 30-day prohibition followed by the maximum 90-day prohibition; the new sanctions are also accompanied with a minimum $200 fine to a maximum $500 fine. In extreme cases, drivers charged with impaired driving also have to pay to have an interlock device installed in their vehicle’s ignition system designed to prevent drivers from starting the car while there is alcohol on their breath. These changes evidently represented significant changes from what existed before 2010.

To augment the effect of the amended laws, there was also a combined effort put forth between the RCMP and other surrounding police departments, the provincial government, and the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) aimed at reducing impaired driving in BC. Collaboratively, each agency contributed in some way to this strategic crime-reduction plan, by either assisting with the changes to the legislation or by supporting a forceful marketing campaign aimed at educating and alerting the public and potential offenders about their enhanced efforts to tackle this issue. While the RCMP and police participated in the working group during the creation of the new legislation, it was the marketing and educational component, in particular, by the provincial government and ICBC that produced the successful results seen today in relation to the incidence of impaired driving.

The various agencies that came together to address impaired driving in British Columbia all contributed something to this strategic crime-reduction plan, either by assisting with legislative changes or supporting the marketing campaign.

Through advertising campaigns and public announcements, the provincial government made it clear to the public that there was a tough new impaired driving legislation; it reinforced that individuals who drove while impaired would be caught and prohibited from driving for an upwards of three months. The police then displayed their support for the changes in a news conference where the legislation was formally presented and during which all of the regions’ chiefs of police were present.

RCMP Inspector Tim Shields says that the development and enforcement of the IRP legislation aimed at reducing crime and changing public behaviour and was so effective because of targeted police enforcement and a media and marketing plan. Beyond their active role in modifying the legislation into the IRP, the police were responsible for the specific targeting of this problem and the assured enforcement of these new sanctions. ICBC and the government were alternatively responsible for the media marketing that informed the target groups of the new legislation and the sanctions that would be imposed for violators. After the British Columbia government replaced the impaired driving laws with bolder legislation, the police were directed to set up roadblocks to indicate to the public that they were serious about enforcing the new legislation.
At the same time, the provincial government and ICBC invested money in a campaign and broadcasted this information to residents of British Columbia; they marketed the new law using radio and television advertisements and social media over the course of seven months in 2010 and 2011, and also engaged in public discussions to educate the public on what the new legislation entailed and what it would mean from a police enforcement side.

To further emphasize the powerful role that the public and the media can play in bringing attention to an issue, the public’s awareness of the legislative changes also came from other important groups. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Middelaers, the parents of an impaired driving victim, were also avid supporters and marketers of the revised legislation. Alexa Middelaer was a little girl from North Delta who was killed by an impaired driver while standing on the side of the road with her aunt in 2008. Her mother and father decided to transform the death of their daughter into a way to advocate for changes to impaired driving laws in BC. MADD and the Middelaers were often in the media to show their full support for harsher impaired driving legislation, especially around 2010/2011 when the IRP legislation was being debated. They both were extremely important partners in the marketing of the legislation and made the issue of impaired driving viral. The fusion of enthusiasts resulted in public and social media debates on the new laws, enhanced the legislation’s deterrent value, and reduced the number of deaths. Each of these groups put a personal face on the issue and acted as champions for the cause.

In addition to speaking out in the media on numerous occasions, in 2008, the Middelaers started Alexa’s Team, a distinction awarded to BC police officers who have processed 12 or more impaired drivers in one year under a criminal code charge or the IRP administrative legislation. Officers awarded the Alexa’s Team distinction receive a pin and a certificate at an annual ceremony. Although the material reward appears to be minimal, many police officers are motivated by this distinction and hope to become a part of Alexa’s Team because of the sense of accomplishment it can instill.

This ultimately is an unofficial accountability measure that can enhance the level of output by individual police officers, and help to preserve the attention to the issue of impaired driving and the police’s efforts to reduce these offences.

This effort led to considerable successes in reducing impaired driving related accidents and, more importantly, fatalities in BC. By the time the new legislation was introduced in 2010, the provincial government had been conducting independent surveys every two years for about a decade on driving behaviours. The most recent survey before the new legislation came into force was conducted in 2008 that was used as a baseline measure moving forward. The surveys sampled 2,500 drivers in five communities across British Columbia over a two year period. The study in 2012 that followed the enactment of the new legislation reported the findings from researchers’ interviews from drivers in five cities who were stopped by the police roadblocks. The findings demonstrated that two years following the new legislation, there was a change in behaviour of drivers in that they were 30% less likely to get into their cars while impaired. This was the result of their awareness of the changes to the legislation and their belief that the police would catch them and impose the new, more severe consequences. As well, over those two years, there was a 46% decline in impaired driving deaths, which numerically represented 62 deaths per year related to impaired driving, compared with the previous 114 deaths per year measured over a five year average. This could also be looked at as 104 lives saved over the two years. Inspector Shields emphasized that it was not simply the creation of the new law, but its public promotion. He stressed that it was the combination of targeted police enforcement and media marketing that resulted in significant changes in behaviour over just two years.

Over a period of two years, there was a 46% decline in impaired driving – the equivalent of 104 lives saved
To complement the behavioral changes, approximately 83% of participants in the survey said they were aware of the legislation due to the media and marketing program that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia and the government of British Columbia organized and implemented. The researchers stated that their findings were “evidence of a profound and universal change in drinking and driving in British Columbia following the [new legislation] in …2010” (Beasley and Beirness, 2012: 33).

Like any new piece of legislation that attaches more serious sanctions, the IRP encountered controversy as a result of defence lawyers’ concerns over the lack of due process integrated into the new procedures. Police officers were now able to immediately determine that drivers were guilty of a driving offence. This led to a brief suspension and then changes in the legislation, so that the law could be strengthened; the legislation now allows suspected impaired drivers to provide a breathe sample and, in the case that they fail, they have another opportunity to provide a second breathe sample into a different device to ensure that the first reading was accurate. In this type of situation, the lower blood alcohol level reading is the one used. Although there continues to be some objections and challenges to the legislation, the IRP laws are still in effect. The controversy actually served as further media coverage of the legislation and its sanctions.

The police’s pressure on government brought about toughened laws, widespread media coverage, and government announcements about the IRP that facilitated and supported this new legislation. Along with the increased police powers, presence, and enforcement, these measures offered a real threat of sanctions for impaired drivers. The media advanced the public’s awareness of the changes to the law and their appreciation of the police’s seriousness about implementing them. This subsequently guided driving-based behavioral changes and a reduced number of accident-related deaths. Inspector Shields stated that it “created a deterrent, because it was going public, telling the target group that there is a certainty of punishment if you choose to offend”. Although it is less severe than charging and prosecuting violators under the Criminal Code, the IRP presents a higher level of certainty of punishment that has been proven to be effective. Quoting Wright (2010), Inspector Shields stated that “research in criminology conducted over numerous decades concludes that increasing the certainty of punishment produces a strong deterrent effect, stronger even than increasing the severity of punishment”.

An End to “Finders Keepers”

A major hindrance to effective crime fighting has traditionally been the resistance of organizations to share information (e.g., Parent and Snyder, 1999). Resistance to information sharing comes from several sources, including the fear of violating legislation designed to protect citizen privacy, a sense that information is power, and technological challenges in data sharing (Plecas, McCormick, Levine, Neal, & Cohen, 2011).

Yet, operating in isolation or without complete information prevents each individual agency from fully knowing who they are dealing with, what their needs are, and how best to respond to the individuals’ unique concerns.

Short-term information-sharing agreements appear to be a particularly useful strategy for police agencies participating in partnership work.
Information sharing agreements provide guiding policy for those working within the partnership to know what information they can and cannot share with others, and the proper protocols to ensure information is shared in a way that best upholds the privacy of those whose information is being shared. The value of a short-term agreement is that it can be crafted to specifically address the interests of a particular agency, rather than involve a larger document encompassing multiple agencies that either needs to be watered down to apply to all or made so complex that information is not shared for fear of doing so incorrectly. In addition, these short-term agreements are easy to dissolve once the problem has been solved.

However, as previously noted, it is not sufficient to have an information sharing agreement in place. For information sharing to occur and partnerships to succeed, it is vital that the leadership of each organization communicates to their employees that the partnership is a valued one and can bring benefits to their agency (Alarid et al., 2011). When leaders fail to convey that partnerships are important, their staff likewise will not recognize the value of other’s input, which can destroy the partnership before it even truly begins. Thus, the tone of each agency must be that other agencies have something of value to offer. Moreover, it is important to recognize and let partners know how their efforts have contributed to solving the problem.

Giving Credit Where Credit is Due

It is vital that police formally recognize the contributions made by others towards their crime reduction efforts. Again, police are beginning to realize and acknowledge that they alone cannot solve all crime and social disorder problems, and that to be most efficient and effective they must work in partnership with others. However, designing and implementing a partnership is not sufficient. For a partnership to last, and for all those involved to willingly act towards upholding it, it is important that their efforts be clearly recognized and appreciated. As an example of the value of simple appreciation for other people’s efforts, two of the authors were involved in a research project with a local RCMP detachment where School of Criminology and Criminal Justice students from the University of the Fraser Valley worked directly with general duty members to collect the project data. Prior to the initiation of the data collection, the Officer in Charge of the Detachment invited the 25 students to a meeting at their main detachment where he spoke with them personally about his appreciation for their involvement in the research study.

Following the completion of the project, he hosted a wrap-up event for the students at the main detachment where he again spoke to the students about their work on the project, thanked each one individually, and provided them with a signed letter of appreciation. The combined efforts of the Officer in Charge and his members to welcome the students and appreciate their work directly contributed to the positive work experience the students reported at the end of the project. As a result of their experiences with this study, several of the students developed an interest in applying for the RCMP. By simply acknowledging the efforts made by others, police leaders can have a strong influence over the ongoing success of partnerships because the partners will be made to feel that their effort were worthwhile.
There are many things police organizations can do to become more partner-focused without suffering mission creep or losing touch with their primary responsibilities. Before exploring ways in which police can initiate, develop, and sustain partnerships, it is important to recognize there is an essential difference between establishing meaningful partnerships and becoming integrated with other agencies. While there may be certain crime types or criminal events that are cross jurisdictional or require a level of expertise or resources not commonly available in every jurisdiction that benefit from an integrated unit approach, such as homicide or organized crime, there are many crime and disorder problems that can be best addressed through the formalization of partnerships that are developed to respond to a specific problem and can be ended after the problem has been addressed. In other words, partnerships need not and should not be considered synonymous with integration.

To begin, once a specific crime or disorder problem has come to the attention of the police and it has been determined that the most effective solutions require the involvement of others, those responsible for developing and implementing the solution should identify all potential stakeholders, including external agencies, and the individuals within the police and other agencies that could contribute to the solution. While this requires the identification of those who will do the work, including volunteers, it is also important that the representatives of the stakeholders and the police are individuals with decision-making authority. Next, it is important to establish what partners will do to provide the best measurable contribution to preventing and eliminating the problem. This suggests that only those people and agencies that can make a positive contribution should be part of the partnership. Moreover, rather than asking people or agencies to do things they are either not best suited to do or are outside of their primary mission, every member of the group should only be tasked with doing what they do best.

In effect, there should not necessarily be an equal sharing of activities or responsibilities. Instead, each partner, while understanding how each part fits with the whole, should be focused on maximizing their contribution to dealing with the issue by playing exclusively to their strengths. Importantly, this suggests that, in some cases, a stakeholder, rather than the police, may be the most appropriate lead in addressing the problem.

It is crucial for police organizations to maintain connections with resource providers and other stakeholders. Without this, interruptions or communication breakdowns can lead to lost time required for developing and rebuilding these relationships. Having conversations with the clientele and really getting to know them can meet a greater range of needs more effectively. Confidentiality is one area that can make the lines within the partnership appear somewhat unclear.
Given this, it is important to address this issue at the very beginning of the partnership. It is important to respect that a “one size fits all” approach will not work. Some partnerships will require an understanding that information will only be shared on a need-to-know basis, while other partnerships may involve the creation of shared databases or attending each other’s briefing meetings.

Given that partners are only partners because they have something to offer, and they should only be asked to contribute in ways in which they have the expertise, it is important and appropriate to hold all partners accountable for their contributions. This can be done through formal evaluations of the strategies put in place and during meetings of the group in which progress, successes, and challenges are openly discussed. Related to this, it is important to formally and publically recognize the contributions that stakeholders and volunteers have made to the success of the project and to ensure that all participants are treated with respect and know that their unique contributions are valued. Police partnerships that have these elements have had remarkable success in reducing crime by harnessing the skills and relationships that strategic partnerships can offer.

From within police organizations, it is necessary to consider establishing a community mobilizer position. The role of a community mobilizer is to understand the various stakeholders within the community and the assistance stakeholders can provide to preventing and responding to crime and disorder problems; to encourage those with the necessary expertise, experience, and credibility to partner with the police; and to serve as the bridge between stakeholders and the police organization.

As mentioned above, there are many community challenges that are best responded to by others outside the police, even when the police have a key role to play. A community mobilizer can liaise with partners to ensure that the police understand and recognize the contributions that stakeholders offer, while providing partners with the necessary access and information from the police to effect positive change. In this way, the community mobilizer position serves to identify partners, establish the partnership, guarantee the commitment and role for the police, and monitor the partnership. Several police organizations have this type of position, if not by name. For example, in Cranbrooke British Columbia, the drug awareness officer understood that there were likely people in the community who were better positioned to educate students about the myths and dangers associated with the use of illicit drugs. By reaching out to the media and the school district, the partners were able to develop a community and school-based drug awareness campaign that was successful and recognized that perhaps having a police officer talk to students in a classroom was not the most effective strategy. In effect, in jurisdictions that have taken the idea of a community mobilizer seriously, the police have recognize that there are certain crime and disorder problems that should have stakeholders take the lead with police support, such as drug use in young people or gang recruitment in schools. Community mobilizers have then identified relevant partners, established the roles that they and the police would play, and ensured the assistance and participation of the police as needed. These partnerships have had many positive results, not just for the target population, but also for the enhancement of community/police relationships.
The measure of success in partnerships is not based on their number, but on the degree to which they are effective and efficient in implementing and executing a solution to a specific crime or disorder problem. In other words, it is not the number of partnerships that is important, but the effect that the partnership has in achieving a reduction in crime or disorder. Moreover, successful partnerships leave all members feeling that they played a critical role in achieving what the partnership set out to accomplish. Successful partnerships also breed further partnerships, so a clear measure of success is the degree to which other agencies, individuals, and volunteers want to participate with the police on crime and disorder issues. Another good indicator of success, from the perspective of the police, is that they are asked to join other agencies in helping them address their challenges. The degree to which the police are viewed as genuine, open, and helpful partners will be reflected in the ways in which the police are asked to contribute to assisting partners with their identified problems.

Another measure of success is having a community mobilizer position within the police who is extremely knowledgeable about the community and is recognized by stakeholders as being valuable in linking people and organizations together and in finding partnered solutions to crime and disorder challenges. Finally, and perhaps the most obvious indicator that the police organization is partner-focused is that it is not working on problems in isolation, but, where appropriate, others are able and willing to work with the police. Being a truly partner-focused police organization means recognizing that some problems are best resolved in cooperation with others, and that we have developed the necessary relationships to work with others in developing, implementing, and sustaining crime reduction strategies to best respond to crime and disorder in the community.
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I
n June 2013, the West Vancouver Police Department was alerted to a succession of break and enters on construction sites in the city. Their investigation indicated that a group of offenders would drive through West Vancouver neighbourhoods to locate current construction sites. The offenders simultaneously relied on websites to obtain lists of ongoing renovations in areas that met their criteria, such as properties off the main roads, those in secluded areas, and those with no neighbours. They also looked for construction sites in the later stages of restoration so that there was a greater likelihood of finding more valuable items on site to steal. The offenders used GPS technology to locate these sites late at night to begin their thefts. After two incidents caught the attention of the police department, a more concentrated investigation ensued. In collaboration with their crime analyst, the West Vancouver Police Department devised a series of crime maps, established offence time frames, and dispatched patrol officers to monitor the identified areas during peak offending times. During the early stages of their investigation, the police obtained a report concerning a suspicious vehicle that had been linked to the construction sites where a series of break and enters had occurred. The police proceeded to collect information to assist in making connections to this break and enter trend. The police discovered that a female had rented the vehicle and loaned it to another individual to drive.

With the information obtained from this woman, the police were eventually able to identify the male who had borrowed the vehicle, and they discovered that he had a lengthy criminal history involving property crimes. This individual became one of West Vancouver Police Department’s management priorities given his clear association to this developing crime trend.

As argued in a previous chapter, Inspector Shane Barber from the West Vancouver Police Department noted that identifying trends is very important for police organizations. This is particularly true of the West Vancouver Police Department because the city does not experience high levels of crime committed by its own residents. Instead, the police are habitually tasked with policing “commuter criminals” or offenders who do not reside in West Vancouver, but come to the area looking for rewarding crime opportunities. To manage this general crime trend, the West Vancouver Police Department holds weekly meetings to identify and discuss emerging crime problems and establish plans to suppress these as quickly as possible.
When the police detect an offender who is operating in their area, they work with their officers and analyst to review reports, formulate their intelligence, and make certain that they have linked their information to the most likely individual. Officers conducting street checks and having repeated contacts with the person achieve this. In determining the identity of the suspect, the police also review the type of offences that the individual has been involved in. Often, they will determine that these are the same types of crimes as those they have been connected to in West Vancouver. Based on all of this information, the West Vancouver Police Department decides whether investing the manpower and committing to conducting surveillance on these individuals will result in considerable value for their crime reduction goals. Once they have established this level of confidence, they follow-up by checking this person and known associates and friends.

While any crime might be a unique, one-time incident, in order to be more proactive, officers monitor each comparable incident to see if the offence is an isolated event or if it is likely part of a larger trend. Importantly, a trend does not comprise a specific number of offences, and the West Vancouver Police Department monitors every single incident and examines every layer of any crime-related occurrence. In this way, the West Vancouver Police Department is able to stay ahead of any crime problems. As offenders enter the city, the police team has the resources to watch their criminal activities unfold. With each new incident, the police conduct a thorough investigation with the help of a crime analyst and an intelligence officer and can obtain more detailed information in relation to patterns within the incidents and the persons involved. Once one or more individuals have been linked to the events, the police initiate surveillance on those persons.

**“Extra mile” policing**

Similar to other detachments in British Columbia, the West Vancouver Police Department allocates a substantial amount of manpower and resources to targeting prolific offenders in their area, a strategy that began in 2009. A major component of this crime reduction strategy is to compile a list of priority offenders and to use the strategy of “extra-mile policing” on these offenders. The department’s Target Team, comprised of non-uniformed officers who investigate various crimes, administers this strategy, which employs proactive policing measures, such as home visits with prolific offenders and suspected gang members. As noted, West Vancouver is somewhat unique because of the dearth of major crime hotspots and high crime areas, and because a large proportion of their offences are committed by individuals from neighbouring areas, such as Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. Therefore, a key aspect of the “extra-mile policing” strategy is to follow offenders to wherever they live. Former West Vancouver Police Chief Peter Lepine noted that these practices, particularly surveillance, can be an enormous investment for police detachments; nevertheless, “[p]reventing crime is far cheaper than having to investigate crime” (as cited in Coyne, 2012). The West Vancouver Police Department applied these tactics to the construction site break and enters.

If the police department has the available resources to send their surveillance team to other jurisdictions, they will commit to this strengthened approach to more effectively deter criminals. Inspector Barber concedes that surveillance is expensive and requires a considerable investment of time and energy, so it is critical that the department first reviews each case to determine whether surveillance would be advantageous to the investigation. When the West Vancouver Police Department decides to monitor an offender or group of offenders, they apply a 24-hour approach that can result in hours of overtime for Target Team officers.
Therefore, according to Inspector Barber, the police department “make[s] a valued judgment as to whether we’re going to commit surveillance on these guys for a week, or are we going to go over and knock on their door and create an issue for them.” Alternatively, there are some cases where there are other ongoing investigations that require the work of the surveillance team and so the West Vancouver Police Department will determine the level of the threat imposed by an offender. If they determine that targeting the individual should not be delayed, they will assign two general duty officers to go out and knock on his door and the door of his friends in lieu of surveillance. This still achieves the goal of notifying offenders that they are on the police’s radar for their involvement in criminal activities. In both the cases of surveillance or general home visits, the West Vancouver Police Department will travel almost anywhere in the Greater Vancouver region to monitor these priority offenders.

The members of the West Vancouver Police Department attribute their level of crime reduction to this strategy of persistence. Because it can be very challenging to catch offenders in the commission of a crime, in a large number of cases, the West Vancouver Police expedites their efforts by monitoring their priority offenders until they commit any new offence in any jurisdiction within range of their “extra-mile policing”. They then arrest the individual and work with probation services to place conditions on the offender. This approach enables relentless follow-up of the conditions imposed on offenders, such as following a curfew or presenting themselves at specific times, and the use of breaches if offenders do not abide by these orders. This strong supervision of probation conditions is another important feature of the West Vancouver Police Department’s strategy because it provides a guarantee to offenders that the police are watching and will act on any probation violation.

The second component of their approach is collecting intelligence on their priority offenders’ closest circle of friends. As most offenders associate or commit crimes with other offenders, the West Vancouver Police also target these people.

One successful strategy for prolific offenders includes surveilling them or knocking on their doors wherever they live – even if that is in another city – and compiling information on everyone they are connected with.

Because many of these associates are connected to the criminal justice system, the West Vancouver Police Department can monitor the conditions that were put in place in another jurisdiction. Given this, the West Vancouver Police Department officers will visit the person’s home regardless of where they live, knock on their door, and identify themselves. The officers then tell the individual that because they associate with an offender who committed an offence in West Vancouver, they are advised to stay away from West Vancouver, and to share this message with all of their friends and associates. From this recognized group, the police know that they will catch at least one of these persons on some type of violation or new offence. In fact, there have been several cases where the West Vancouver Police Department targeted individuals outside of their jurisdiction for prohibited driving because their names were associated with one of their priority offenders. Upon being pulled over, these associates asked why the West Vancouver Police was the agency arresting them. In these situations, the police reiterated that it was because of their associates who had connections to West Vancouver. During these kinds of encounters, members of the Target Teams emphasize that they will continue to follow these procedures until the related activities stop. According to the West Vancouver Police Department, in the majority of cases, within one or two weeks, that crime almost always stops occurring in their region. They believe this occurs because the message from the West Vancouver Police Department is clear, shared with others, and is enforced, which instills a feeling of uneasiness in offenders as they begin to believe they are always being watched and will be arrested if they enter West Vancouver.
The key features of this approach are to identify the correct individual(s), to target them and their associates for any offences or breaches in any surrounding municipality, and to employ a little extra work to detract these criminals. Because every new crime has an impact on crime rates, particularly in West Vancouver, the police argue that it is detrimental to wait for the next crime to occur since that creates increased problems and threats to public safety. The West Vancouver Police Department does not encounter many challenges to breaching offenders who have been placed on strict conditions, since most of these offenders are incredibly active. Once the police start breaching offenders, the criminals realize that it is not worth their time or effort to commit offences in West Vancouver. Moreover, the police allocate significant resources to identify and distinguish all those who are connected to every individual on their priority offender list, from parents and siblings to friends, who may all know somebody else. The West Vancouver Police Department invests the time and energy until they know exactly where to find these people, the names of people who are committing offences with them, what they have been involved in most recently, and how the officers can interrupt their lives and criminal activities. The offenders and associates quickly understand that it is not a coincidence that the police are coming into contact with them.

Similar to the approach applied by the Abbotsford Police Department, Inspector Barber noted that by simply enforcing prohibited driving charges and probation conditions, the West Vancouver Police Department can alter people’s behaviours, as well as those associated to them. One person may have a friend in Richmond, who has not been in West Vancouver, but because of the connection and the police’s knowledge of this, the police will visit that person and the message begins to spread. “It hits them where they live”, says Inspector Barber, “because if you spend a lot of time, …surveying these people until we catch them doing a theft from auto, what’s the difference between a theft from auto, driving while prohibited, or a breach of a condition; it’s all impacting their freedom of movement. So, that’s our philosophy; we don’t wait for the big one, we just disrupt…[but] not beyond what we have the authority to do.” Due to the offending histories or current probation conditions attached to these offenders, the police’s authority extends far enough to have a substantial effect. Also, by interceding as soon as possible, the West Vancouver Police Department mitigates the potential effect a crime trend can have on their city. Inspector Barber believes that West Vancouver’s crime rates would be double or triple what they currently are without the application of this philosophy. Finally, given the extensive network of relationships that exists between these persons, other offenders, and their acquaintances, the value of these strategies extends beyond the geographic and jurisdictional boundaries of West Vancouver.

The first step in the West Vancouver Police Department’s investigation of the aforementioned break and enters on construction sites in the city was to visit the last known address of the female suspect – the individual who had rented the vehicle. As a result, it was revealed that there were a number of persons who were associating with each other and who were involved in a wide range of crimes. The police first were able to name the male who had been associated with the rental vehicle, at which point they opened a file on him and assigned him to their priority offender list. With this designation, the surveillance unit began close supervision of the male suspect.
Moreover, the police had responded to a number of similar incidents and, from their surveillance, determined that these events could all be tied back to one particular group. As a component of the surveillance, the West Vancouver Police Department's Target Team started to follow not only the identified suspects, but also their known associates. The police acted by interrupting the day-to-day movements of these persons by stopping them for smaller offences, such as prohibited driving charges. From these initial one or two suspects, the police eventually identified eight targets that were added to their priority list. The police also learned from the identified eight targets that there were actually three distinct offender groups and that these groups had addresses outside of West Vancouver. Because of these intersections, the police shared all of the intelligence they collected with different municipalities who patrolled the cities where these individuals lived.

By taking into account the extreme mobility of these offenders, especially in and out of West Vancouver, the West Vancouver Police Department targeted and patrolled each individual within the department’s policing zone, but also in the areas that the offenders lived and were most active in, regardless of where this was. The police were very serious in their surveillance of these persons and sent the very clear message that their Target Team would pursue any individuals who wished to engage in criminal behaviours in West Vancouver. When members from the team appeared on the doorsteps of known associates, they provided the individual with the reason why they were there, that they knew they were involved in certain activities, and that they would be watching and responding to any transgressions. Inspector Barber stated that as soon as their surveillance units started tracking these individuals, the entire break and enter trend stopped. Subsequent to this success, they have continued this strategy with those on their priority offender lists.

As mentioned above, it can be instrumental to target the entire group of associates in and out of one’s specific jurisdiction because, in some cases, the individuals who are detected by the police may not be the orchestrator of the crimes they have been charged with.

Inspector Barber noted that the male driver of the truck linked to the construction site break-ins, who was identified by the initial female suspect, was not necessarily the leader of the operation. Instead, the crimes may have been planned by any one of the many identified individuals or groups. This makes extending policing efforts beyond one or two individuals and beyond one jurisdiction critical. Inspector Barber stated that it was important to broaden their surveillance tactics and to spread their message to everyone. “Through that one person, he gets the message that they dealt with him, but if you do two or three people and then another group associated to them, the message is, why bother? If we’re dealing with an address in Coquitlam, and he has friends in Richmond and we show up at their place..., tell them that the reason we’re here is this guy brought us to you, they don’t need the grief.”

The West Vancouver Police Department’s crime reduction approach is preemptive and results in a number of benefits for the police and their community. The Target Team’s listed priority offenders may be charged with multiple break and enters or thefts from autos in one municipality, yet they have the resources and energy to engage in a number of crimes in other jurisdictions. The West Vancouver Police Department’s objective is to remove these associated groups from their city and to take them off their radar, at least for some time, with the ultimate goal of discouraging their return to West Vancouver and further contact with the police. Although new offender groups will appear, the West Vancouver Police Department recognizes that by dealing with these alliances, they have responded to larger numbers of offenders owing to the many connections offenders have to one another. In fact, the police indicated that offenders are not often aware of how associated they are to other criminals.
The targeting of these individuals can even lead to the discovery of other offending patterns that have not yet been linked to any particular group. In the case of the West Vancouver construction site break and enters, there had been a number of houses that were undergoing extensive restoration projects that were not the average home renovations. The supplies and appliances that were being utilized in these projects were valued at tens of thousands of dollars, making them a desirable target for property offenders. It was apparent that the theft of supplies and tools from these renovation projects was certainly the modus operandi of these offenders, but what was especially interesting was that these offenders were also involved in a string of bicycle thefts. Once the West Vancouver Police Department began their work on these trends, both the construction site break and enters and bicycle thefts came to a stop. The police use the cessation of these activities as confirmation that they have successfully identified the responsible parties and have addressed that specific crime trend. Inspector Barber acknowledged that these types of trends emerge two or three times a year in their jurisdiction and with each new trend, they revisit their prior investigations on the groups of previously targeted offenders, examining who has recently been released from jail, where these people are living, and what activities they have been involved with formerly. Once they have assimilated all this information, the police go out and communicate their simple message: that they are present and observing.

“Extra-mile policing” also incorporates collaborations with other police organizations. The West Vancouver Target Team has pursued and surveyed groups of individuals from surrounding cities and discovered that their criminal associations were much more far-reaching than the police had initially understood. This information is shared with the respective city’s police so that they can expand their own investigations on these individuals and groups to determine the extent of their criminal activities. The open communication affords the police the greatest leverage to manage crime problems more effectively.

While the West Vancouver Police Department’s strategy requires considerable police resources during the investigation and the surveying of these offenders and their associates, it is one that the team has experienced considerable success with and has shared with other police organizations trying to respond to similar crime issues. Their efforts deter criminals by making West Vancouver no longer an attractive criminal option. Inspector Barber stated, “It’s not worth it for them to come here and do that because we will invest the time and the resources [targeting them].” He also addressed the possible concern of the displacement of crime as a result of these approaches and acknowledged that, in some cases, including the construction site break and enters, that may be an unintended consequence. However, the department examined this possible outcome and found that the strategy led to many of the targeted individuals having fewer negative police contacts overall.

Quantifying the results

In 2012, the West Vancouver Police Department was interested in quantifying their crime reduction efforts. Inspector Barber collaborated with UFV’s RCMP Research Chair in Crime Reduction to assess the degree of change in the number of negative police contacts offenders had with the police after the implementation of “extra-mile policing”. In addition to looking at their own decreases in police contacts, they also collected data from 34 other agencies from surrounding municipalities that were targeted by “extra-mile policing”. Inspector Barber gathered data from two years prior to the “extra-mile” strategy to two years after. He measured offenders’ actual police contact with the West Vancouver Police Department, so that any observed changes could be linked to offenders’ knowledge of the officers surveying multi-jurisdictions. The PRIME data review revealed that, two years preceding the cut-off date, there were 82 West Vancouver Police Department negative contacts, and 1,043 negative contacts with all agencies included in the analysis, including the West Vancouver Police Department. The post strategy negative contacts numbered 27 with the West Vancouver Police Department and 539 with the outside jurisdictions.
Once the post strategy numbers were prorated for the cases that did not have data available until the cut-off date, there were approximately 34 and 753 post negative police contacts respectively. These numbers represented a 59% reduction in negative police contacts for the West Vancouver Police Department and a 28% decrease for all agencies included in the review. Although these numbers could present some limitations due to the prorating, there were still perceptible reductions in police contacts in light of the fact that the police were working more diligently to make increased contact with offenders. The outcomes may also have been the result of other variables’ interaction with their efforts; however, the percentages were significant in supporting “extra-mile policing’s” influence on offenders behaviours.

This review supported the value of the West Vancouver Police Department’s policing efforts. Routine reviews of the West Vancouver Police Department’s PRIME statistics also indicated that they were able to keep their crime rates at a minimum level and maintain this over a five-year period. The department found that, while there has been a decrease in crime rates across Canada, the drop in West Vancouver has been faster and steeper than in other areas in British Columbia. Although their numbers are small and they are not able to catch all offenders who come to West Vancouver, their data is encouraging and highlights the importance of their continued “extra-mile policing” and surveillance strategies. While other smaller police departments could model their approaches after the West Vancouver Police Department, the surveillance units are what facilitate the teams in identifying all of the linked offenders and allow them to knock on offenders’ doors and disrupt their activities. The crime analyst works with the Target Teams to link information and develop the intelligence that enables these efforts and the most accurate targeting of prolific offenders.

Inspector Barber attributes West Vancouver Police Department’s successes to their unique positioning and resulting ability to extend their policing to neighbouring jurisdictions; this greatly assists in accomplishing their crime reduction goals by discouraging offenders from returning to their city. While perhaps not every component of this approach would be possible in other police departments and communities as it can be costly, there are elements that would be. West Vancouver is a small city best known for its affluent neighbourhoods and limited crime problems. Given this, maintaining a low crime rate and crime severity rating when crime is already extremely low can be difficult. Their “extra-mile policing” strategy is a key method of addressing emerging crimes as soon as they begin to surface and, therefore, maintaining their low crime rate.

The Lesson

The West Vancouver Police Department provides a valuable example of how police can proactively keep serious criminals out of their neighbourhoods by developing preemptive solutions to crime problems. This is accomplished by determining what strategies would likely work best for the existing crime trends and criminal population operating in the jurisdiction and modeling crime reduction plans on this data. Preemptive policing does not have a specific formula that can be applied in every police organization to respond to any crime or disorder problem. Instead, it requires the identification of the specific crime or disorder problem, establishing goals related to this, and developing strategies to achieve the goals. Police organizations also should not be afraid to think outside the box or outside their designated jurisdiction. Effective preemptive approaches require being a step or two ahead of the criminals and the crime problems that may emerge. Once emerging crime trends can be identified, police can work more effectively as a team to strategize solutions, which as demonstrated in the previous chapter, may include other police organizations and agencies.
Being Truly Preemptive

Truly efficient policing integrates the notion of preemptive action, where policing strategies are based on preventing crime from occurring, rather than exclusively responding to it. To effectively prevent short and long-term crime and disorder issues in a community requires a two-fold approach. The first approach, discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, focuses on the notions of broken windows theory, community policing, and problem-oriented policing. In effect, this requires sincerely involving the community in identifying issues of concern that lead to or contribute to the development and growth of crime and disorder, and thoroughly investigating the source of the disorder as a prelude to establishing and implementing appropriate strategies. The second approach, which is the focus of this chapter, involves police engaging in aggressive strategies to proactively target situations conducive to criminal behaviour.

For example, the Vancouver Police Department engages in several preemptive policing strategies to prevent the development of long-term crime problems. One of these approaches includes targeting at-risk youth and families in the community. Rather than focusing exclusively on youth who have formally come into conflict with the law, the Vancouver Police Department has expanded its youth services so that they can connect with young people who may be in situations that create a high likelihood for serious future problems. They identify youth who are coming into contact with the police for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the youth may have been arrested for shoplifting; other youth may have had contacts with the police after repeatedly running away from home, and, in still other cases, the youth may live in a location where multiple domestic disputes have occurred. The police have compiled a list of their top 20 youth, regardless of their age, who have had the most police contacts and then intervene with a range of supports. By extending their services beyond the traditional role of responding to calls for service and investigative services, the VPD can determine the underlying problems that have led to their contacts with these youth. The police then collaborate with the young person, the family, the school liaison officer, social workers, and the Ministry of Children and Family Development to build important partnerships to help these youth. The nature of the cases can vary from youth and families who only require a small amount of social help to those who have extensive personal and familial issues, such as poor attendance and performance in school or substance use problems. In any case, if the Vancouver Police Department has been involved with the youth frequently, they attempt to pair the youth and their family with the right resources. Through this meshing of knowledge and skills of the appropriate authorities, the police and social workers can achieve greater success than they would be able to achieve while working independently or by simply restricting their activities to responding to the youth's offending.
Just in Time Policing

Predictive policing is an emerging police model where police engage in a variety of proactive police strategies based on data indicating a heightened likelihood that either an offender will engage in an offence or a location is likely to be the scene of a crime. At its root, predictive policing uses historical crime and offender data to create mathematical expectations about where crime is likely to occur and who is likely to perpetrate it. To many, this approach sounds like the style of policing made famous in the book and film “Minority Report”, whereby police engaged in the proactive arrest of citizens before they committed a crime in order to prevent the occurrence of the crime (Eichenberg, 2012). While the book and film are set in the future, police have been engaging in predictive policing for generations by using their instincts and familiarity with causal crime factors to predict when certain crimes were most likely to occur. More recently, police are using more sophisticated computer programs and crime analysts to identify offender and crime patterns and implementing strategies to intervene prior to an offence being committed. For example, understanding the propensity of personal and property crime to occur during major events in which there are a large number of people who are intoxicated, police schedule extra officers on shift during these situations. They also set up road checks in areas where they have come to expect high rates of impaired drivers, particularly during certain times of the year, such as holidays, New Year’s Eve, and after major sporting events. The logic underlying such placement strategies is specific deterrence; in effect, offenders will be discouraged from committing crime given the high risk of being caught by police (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Chermak, McGarrell, & Weiss, 2001). Although these strategies can be effective in areas not already characterized by high crime rates (Barthe and Sitt, 2011), they are most beneficial in high-crime areas or when targeted to specific known chronic offenders (Braga and Weisburd, 2012).

In terms of the latter strategy, police know to expect increases in certain crimes, such as auto theft, when particular offenders are released back into a community. Using the prolific offender strategies discussed in previous chapters is a form of preemptive policing.

With the increasing pace of technological development and innovation, new software is constantly being designed to help police engage in informed predictive policing. Different from preemptive arrests, this form of preemptive policing is based on a historical analysis of crime trends and it targets geographic locations instead of individuals (Braga et al.,). Crime analysts can use these resources to estimate the types of crimes most likely to occur, and when and where they are most likely to occur (Sherman, 1989; 1995). Predictive policing technology was implemented in Alhambra in 2012 where officers received maps twice a day with historical and current crime data to allow members to engage in informed proactive policing (Vuong, 2013). Although the program has not been in place long enough for a formal evaluation to occur, Alhambra police believe it has produced ten-fold decreases in residential and auto theft, while thefts from cars have been reduced twenty-fold (Vuong, 2013). Similar technology is also already in use by the Surrey Fire Service. Their Move-Up-Module program allows analysts to use historical statistics on the location and extent of fires in their neighbourhoods to predict where the next fires are likely to occur.
This allows them to assign a range of fire engines to nearby stations in case a fire does occur, while still ensuring that those fire engines are available to respond to fires in other neighbourhoods not predicted by the model. Moreover, by knowing when fires are least likely to occur during the day, they can plan other firefighter activities, such as building inspections or home visits, during these low risk of fire times.

Use of such technology allows police to be more effective in their crime prevention strategies as they can attend the areas where crime is most likely to occur, while still ensuring adequate service to those areas predicted to be lower risk for crime (Vuong, 2013). This information allows the police to engage in information-based, preemptive policing strategies, such as proactive, directed patrolling. Proactive patrolling occurs when an officer is not already responding to a call for service or engaged in some other police function (Famega, Frank, & Mazerolle, 2005).

During this ‘discretionary’ duty time, police can self-initiate activities, such as patrolling neighbourhoods for criminal activity on car or by foot or, better still, they can be directed to patrol particular areas using the information provided through predictive policing technologies. The latter is important as research suggests proactively patrolling specific locations known for criminal activity is a more effective method of patrol than randomly or generally patrolling a neighbourhood (Koper, 1995; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995).

According to Sherman (1990), patrolling can reduce crime in three important ways: police presence; the use of the media; and the enforcement of sanctions. With respect to police presence, more police typically means a greater likely of apprehension for offenders. The assumption is that the visible presence of the police deters offenders from criminal activity (Braga et al., 1999; Chermak et al., 2001; Sampson and Cohen, 1988), particularly when officers are on foot interacting with community members, noting the early signs of social disorder, and conducting street checks (Groff, Johnson, Ratcliffe, & Wood, 2013; Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood, 2011; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Koper’s (1995) research found that when an officer patrols, the greatest benefits are found when they remain in an area for between 11 and 15 minutes. After 15 minutes, an officer’s presence no longer produces additional gains in crime and disorder prevention as the community becomes accustomed to the police presence and simply carries on; any less than 11 minutes and gains in crime and disorder prevention are limited as the officer’s presence is too fleeting to have a positive effect. For Koper (1995), the best method involves an unpredictable schedule with the random presence of an officer in a hot spot for about 13 minutes. The notion here is that if offenders cannot predict the presence of an officer, they will be deterred from engaging in an offence. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that there are many types of crime that cannot be deterred or prevented through the presence of police officers in the community.
BC’s Bait Car Program

Through the use of the media, police can, at times, increase the effectiveness of proactive patrols without actually increasing their presence (Sherman, 1990). By using the media to advertise where police might or will be, offenders may be deterred from committing certain types of crime in those areas. This is the strategy used by British Columbia’s Integrated Municipal Provincial Auto Crime Team’s (IMPACT) Bait Car program. Motor vehicle theft, like many offences, is higher in the western provinces of Canada than in the eastern provinces. British Columbia and Manitoba, in particular, have stood out as having the highest rates of this type of offending. British Columbia reached its peak rate of motor vehicle theft in 2003, as did the Greater Vancouver region. Based on information obtained from surveillance, the police learned that these offenders were not first time, second time, or even third time offenders, but individuals who were prolific motor vehicle thieves. They also recognized that the majority of individuals responsible for committing these crimes were addicted to crack cocaine or crystal methamphetamine and stole vehicles to support their addictions. The cars were not stolen for their cash value; they were instead utilized as a means of transportation to facilitate the commission of other crimes that could generate money quickly, such as break and enter, thefts, robberies, trafficking, and mail theft and fraud. For this reason, the police recognized that the only way to stop these types of crimes from occurring so frequently was to arrest these individuals and ensure that they would be in jail for a sufficient period of time. Unfortunately, the judges and Crown councils in British Columbia were not prosecuting these offences as seriously as the police and the public believed was necessary.

As a result, in 2004, IMPACT, comprised of 22 Greater Vancouver police investigators, initiated what is now famously known as the Bait Car program. This program strategically parked police-owned vehicles throughout Greater Vancouver equipped with audio, visual, and GPS devices so that if the car was stolen, which was the intention, the police could track the movements of the offender in the vehicle and also monitor any activities that took place within the vehicle. The police again applied this idea of targeted police enforcement on a specific crime problem identified as leading to serious public safety concerns to address car thieves. IMPACT’s two-pronged approach comprises their Bait Car program and plain clothed investigators who conduct daily surveillance on known car thieves to catch and arrest these offenders and bring them to court as swiftly as possible.

Comparable to the impaired driving legislation, this approach was combined with a media marketing plan that included a documentary film to inform children in schools of the risks associated with stealing vehicles, a bait car website that was used to inform offenders and potential offenders of the strong response initiated against them, and a series of humorous, dramatic, and scary bait car TV commercials supported by free media that were broadcasted on local stations so that the public, including offenders, were aware of the police’s new strategy. Inspector Tim Shields asserted that targeting the offenders themselves, with pictures and videos of car thieves posted on the bait car website, was extremely important because the offenders were visiting the website and recognizing that police were serious about addressing the car theft problem. By 2012, based on the high intensity of the educational/awareness campaigns and IMPACT’s auto theft reduction efforts, motor vehicle theft decreased in British Columbia by 73% over eight years following the highest rate in 2003. Inspector Shields acknowledged that this drop could also have been partially the result of more cars manufactured with an electronic anti-theft device installed; however, he noted that a part of the auto theft media marketing strategy was designed to place subtle pressure on the federal government. Here, the objective was to encourage the creation of a new law requiring the mandatory installation of these electronic immobilizer anti-theft devices in all new cars and trucks sold in Canada. This came into effect in 2005 and Inspector Shields believes that this was, at least in part, due to the amount of negative media attention directed towards auto theft and the police’s efforts to manage this specific crime problem.
IMPACT was responsible for developing and sustaining all of the auto theft reduction strategies and relied on the website that targeted the offenders, the documentary films in the schools, and the media campaign for the public; however, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia was another critical partner in the Bait Car program as they provided the funding to cover the costs of supplying billboards and smaller signs across the Lower Mainland to be placed in mall parking lots and other high-risk areas for vehicle theft. Each sign projected messages that informed and reminded the public and would-be thieves that Bait Cars were everywhere and that if you or someone tries to steal one, the response would be jail. They also ran advertisements on popular radio stations throughout the Lower Mainland that were specifically directed towards car thieves reminding them about the Bait Cars. Again, this combined effort, with a strong focus on the media marketing campaigns that warned criminals and educated the public on the seriousness of the problem, how they could help to reduce the problem, and to be more diligent with their cars all contributed to the tremendous results experienced by the program.

The police also informed the legal system of the problems associated with these offenders and alerted Crown counsel and the judiciary to the serious nature of the problem, namely that car thieves were being arrested, but then almost immediately released from jails and the courts where these offenders would instantaneously resume their theft of motor vehicles. Some offenders would be so bold as to arrive and leave court in stolen vehicles. As a result of the police’s repeated cautions and the campaign marketing the seriousness of these crimes, the courts started to respond to auto theft more seriously. In addition to the reduction in motor vehicle thefts themselves, Inspector Shields also stated that there was a “clear enhancement of prison terms and less car thieves being let out and released once we started the media and marketing campaign”. He also indicated that a major success of this program was the police’s rebranding of auto theft from a property crime, which would be seen as similar to shoplifting or fraud, to a violent crime.

A review of the number of injuries and deaths associated with motor vehicle theft was almost as alarming as the thefts themselves. In some cases, these offenders suspected that the police were following them and would flee the scene at extremely high speeds increasing the risk of injury or death to themselves, the police, and the public. In cases in which the police had not yet identified these individuals, they were typically reckless drivers who would regularly be involved in serious collisions; these individuals generally drove with a higher speed, crossed double solid lines, drove over sidewalks, and simply posed a serious risk to the public. For example, in 2005, 13 people were killed in stolen car related crashes, yet very few people were aware of this issue. In this sense, the media campaigns were what Inspector Shields called a “wake-up call” for the public, as well as prosecutors and the judiciary.

Based on his conversations with prosecutors, Inspector Shields contends that once motor vehicle thefts received the considerable media attention they did in 2004 to 2006, prosecutors began to collectively view such cases more seriously than they had previously. The courts and prosecutors started to invest increased time and effort in the preparation of these cases for trial; prosecutors began to recommend remand for the most serious of these offenders following their arrest and leading up to their trial, instead of releasing them after one night in jail; judges started imposing longer sentences on auto thieves. Police officers also noticed this dramatic shift and an enhanced response to these persistent offenders. This was a valuable shift, as, prior to this time, offenders did not take the provincial court system very seriously since they knew they could be released shortly after their arrest.
Inspector Shields stated that given the nature of these types of offenders and the factors that led to their offending behaviours, the primary solution for many of these offenders was to spend a lengthier time in custody so that efforts could be made to connect them to monitored and continued substance abuse treatment and counselling in the institution. The auto theft documentary entitled “Stolen Lives” detailed the lives of five car thieves; the offenders who made substantial and sustained changes in their lives were those who eventually received lengthier prison sentences, such as two to three years in custody, which provided an opportunity for them to participate with drug treatment programing and escape the cycle of addiction.

For the police, the reasons underlying their efforts were clear; their objective was to reduce auto theft related crimes and accidents, thereby enhancing public safety. The incentive for their partner organizations was just as straightforward. The criminal justice system wanted to see the numbers of motor vehicle theft and related charges decline, which would also result in reduced criminal justice spending and time needed to process all of these repeated cases. The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia had been spending close to $100 million a year on auto theft insurance claims, and so they realized that if they could be a part of reducing the incidents of thefts of motor vehicles, then they could also assist the public, and more importantly, save money. Inspector Shields revealed that, in 2004, during the first year and start-up of the Bait Car program, the advertising portion cost approximately $400,000 and, by 2012, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia spent a few million dollars, but “the return on their investment was tenfold because we drove down auto theft by 73%”.

The reductions in motor vehicle thefts in British Columbia and in particular the Lower Mainland were a direct result of the Bait Car program, the police’s targeted enforcement of car thieves, and the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia’s media marketing plan.

Not only did the Bait Car program and combined strategy reduce motor vehicle thefts and thefts of property from motor vehicles, but the police also saw that other crimes, particularly property crimes declined almost simultaneously (Plecas, Armstrong, Haarhoff, McCormick, & Cohen 2011). Inspector Shields noted “auto theft is the one common crime that all these property offenders have because they need transportation to get them to the site location of the crime.” The targeting, arrest, and stricter sentencing of these offenders resulted in a strong deterrent for auto theft, as well as property crime in general. Moreover, IMPACT maximizes the media’s deterrent effect on motor vehicle related crimes by advertising in and on the news where they will be setting up their Bait Car program. Without specifically stating how many officers or bait cars will be in the area, the team deters would-be auto theft offenders by using the media to promote the presence of bait cars in a community and suggesting to offenders that there is an increased likelihood of being caught. Thus, their successes in reducing theft of and from motor vehicles has been at least partly attributed to the “myth of full enforcement” promoted by the media (Plecas et al., 2011).
**Proactive policing strategies**

Proactive patrolling can also enhance crime prevention by increasing the likelihood of sanctions for offenders (Sherman, 1990). By patrolling an area and using other proactive policing strategies, such as street checks or crackdowns, police can reduce the criminal behaviour of individuals by arresting them. One type of proactive patrolling that contributes to crime prevention through increasing police presence and the risk of being sanctioned is increased traffic violation enforcement (Chermak et al., 2001). In an early experiment by Sherman and colleagues in Kansas, increased traffic enforcement led to increased detection of illegal firearms and corresponding drops in violent crimes, including homicides and drive-by shootings (Sherman, Shaw, & Rogan, 1995). Several American jurisdictions, including Fresno, Arizona, are combining maps of known motor vehicle collisions and traffic violations with crime maps to place aggressive traffic enforcement teams that have reduced both preventable injuries from car crashes and crime rates.

Proactive policing strategies have been further enhanced with the use of licence-plate recognition technology to increase the effectiveness of patrols. Licence-plate recognition technology allows police to be proactive by generating their own files for investigation through a form of “hot spot” policing. By knowing, for example, where unlicensed, prohibited, or uninsured drivers, or stolen vehicles have historically occurred, police can proactively patrol those traffic routes using technology that automatically scans the licence plates of vehicles and compares that information to a database of known problem vehicles (Armstrong, Czeck, Franklin, & Plecas, 2010; Cohen, Plecas, & McCormick, 2007; Koper, Taylor, & Woods, 2013).

Analyses of licence-plate recognition software implementation suggests that this technology contributes to greater and longer-lasting reductions in certain types of offences, including vehicle theft and person-related offences than do uninformed (i.e., random) vehicle stops, especially if use of the technology is rotated frequently and unpredictably on a short-term basis through a variety of hot spots (e.g., Koper et al., 2013; Sherman, 1990).

Although proactive policing strategies, such as proactive patrolling hot spots using licence-plate recognition technology, can be very effective in detecting and deterring crime, typical urban police forces are usually too overwhelmed responding to calls for service and completing the corresponding paperwork that they are rarely able to engage effective in proactive patrol strategies (Plecas, McCormick, & Cohen, 2010, 2011; Rhodes and Johnson, 2008). When they do have an opportunity for discretionary time, they more commonly engage in general patrolling or backing up other officers at calls for service (Famega et al., 2005). Yet, engaging in proactive patrol that is directed by an analysis of historical and recent crime trends would contribute more to the prevention of the crime problems that take up so much of a police officer’s shift (e.g., Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006).

Proactive policing strategies, especially problem oriented policing-based approaches, work particularly well in “hot spot” policing, where crime prevention approaches are directed towards small clusters of properties with higher crime rates (Braga, 2001, 2005, 2007; Braga and Bond, 2008; Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2012; Braga et al., 1999; Koper, Taylor, & Roush, 2013; Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Sherman et al., 1989; Telep and Weisburd, 2012). However, proactive policing strategies can and also should be used to identify areas where future crime threats are likely to appear in order to head off crime before it can become firmly entrenched.
Being in tune with your criminal population and your community means that police should have the ability to identify potential future crime threats and design strategies intended to prevent or reduce their effect. Furthermore, crime analysts who engage in problem-oriented policing using the strategies suggested by Clarke and Eck (2003) will be familiar with the typical conditions conducive to crime, such as buildings providing adult entertainment, including bars and nightclubs, as well as locations offering public transportation. Knowing that the introduction of a new transit stop will increase the risk for violent crimes, including assaults and robberies, means police can engage in preemptive strategies, including random proactive patrols in the area. However, knowing what conditions are conducive to crime also permits police forces to participate in strategies to design out crime. This means changing the conditions typically conducive to crime by changing the environment of the area. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this strategy is known as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design or CPTED, and research has established that it is a particularly effective way to reduce and prevent crime with minimal displacement to other jurisdictions (Braga and Bond, 2008; Guerette and Bowers, 2009; Telep and Weisburd, 2012).

Preparing for the SkyTrain

As an example of this preemptive approach, in the Lower Mainland, the SkyTrain was built in 1985 and opened in January 1986 to connect Vancouver, Burnaby, and New Westminster for the 1986 World Exposition on Transportation and Communication (better known as Expo ’86) (Translink, n.d.). As the SkyTrain only had one stop in New Westminster at that time, it served as a transfer station for individuals travelling to neighbouring communities. With the influx of commuters associated with this new hub, the New Westminster station became a destination station for people to engage in criminal activities, such as drug dealing and prostitution.

The area surrounding the station at that time had been neglected and so there were numerous buildings and areas that were older and attracted these undesirable types of activities. While the New Westminster SkyTrain station has been considerably redeveloped and the crime problems are much better managed today, the SkyTrain system is currently undergoing expansive development and will extend its services to Port Moody, Coquitlam, and Port Coquitlam in 2016. Port Moody is very familiar with the issues that materialized in New Westminster immediately following the introduction of the train, and so, the Port Moody Police Department is actively seeking strategies to effectively address the potentially harsh impact this development may introduce once it is completed.

The Port Moody Police Department has an Analytical Tactical Action Committee that includes the departments’ sergeants, inspectors, crime analyst, specialized teams, and other members to discuss their tactical efforts. These discussions include recognizing the targets and problem issues for the city and then prioritizing which items require the most immediate attention. These meetings, similar to those that are held at detachments across British Columbia and elsewhere, serve to establish specific strategies and how to employ them to best address their ongoing concerns. The police also rely on CompStat, which is carried out approximately once a month and helps to direct the department’s resources and provide a level of accountability. In this way, CompStat is their strategic crime reduction tool. Each year, the department sets organizational priorities based on the tactical meeting and the CompStat process, which both support the achievement of the police’s specific outcomes and goals. The department has also adopted preemptive approaches to prepare for the impending changes that will materialize with the SkyTrain line. The Port Moody Police Department has been engaged with BC Transit and researchers at Simon Fraser University to examine the potential implications of the SkyTrain on their region.

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They have begun to assess whether the development is going to necessitate an increase in police officers and how to realign their resources to manage the expected increase in crime. The New Westminster Police Department struggled for approximately one year to gain control over their influx of more transitory populations. In trying to learn from the example, the Port Moody Police Department is continuing to implement their existing processes in combination with other tools they currently have in place, in addition to outlining plans to combine these approaches with more concentrated strategies, so that they can be more prepared.

Alex Tyakoff, the Strategic Crime Analyst at the Port Moody Police Department, stated that the quiet community of Port Moody is already somewhat dynamic in that they encounter occasional offenders who drift into their jurisdiction from its neighbour, Coquitlam. While the town has become home to prolific offenders who moved into the area for the same desirability that attracts others, their nomadic nature makes them different from the prolific offenders in Vancouver, Abbotsford, Kelowna, or even West Vancouver. While the department does not experience historic patterns or trends like some other municipalities, they expect that this will change once the SkyTrain begins operation. In preparation, the Port Moody Police Department’s Flex Team responds to and patrols prolific offenders through direct and aggressive tactics that encourage these people to relocate to another city.

Another important change that the Port Moody Police Department may implement is the relocation of their community policing station closer to the SkyTrain station. While community policing has not proven to be effective from a targeting perspective – for this the police rely on intelligence-led policing and their Analytical Tactical Action Committee meetings – it has been effective in strengthening community relationships. This could potentially assist in further reinforcing community engagement and partnerships that, in turn, may contribute to improved collaborative responses to the anticipated changing crime problems.

Tyakoff describes Port Moody as a “microcosm of West Vancouver” and so they may also benefit from following West Vancouver’s preemptive “extra-mile” approach when the SkyTrain is introduced. Although Port Moody is continually addressing crime problems, offenders are already quite mobile and typically do not stay in the area long. Once the SkyTrain expansion is complete, general traffic, as well as street level robberies, homelessness, vacancies, and prostitution will likely increase. According to Tyakoff, there will likely also be a steadier flow of offenders who are associated with criminal organizations. By already beginning to obtain a more strategic overview, looking at the root causes of crime, and executing research on the SkyTrain, the department is looking to long-term, crime reduction strategies that will assist Port Moody in avoiding some of the crime issues that have traditionally followed the introduction of SkyTrain stations. As Tyakoff noted, “In my mind, and in an agency like this, we are all about the next project. So, it’s strategic and it is tactical. This is why we have the two processes. A lot of agencies just have the one… and I think that is really important.”

The SkyTrain will undoubtedly require adjustments for the Port Moody Police Department and the Police Chief is preparing his officers and other department members for its arrival. The Port Moody Police Department has thus far been able to embrace the philosophy that there is “no call too small,” which will likely change with the introduction of the SkyTrain. The police are preparing for this by working alongside a safety committee, BC Transit, the police inspector and crime analyst, and even the Coquitlam Fire Department to provide input into the development of the new Sky_Train Stations.
CPTED practices are also being implemented and comprise the main state of design; a number of lessons have also been shared from New Westminster’s and Burnaby’s experiences and, by relying on best practices, the teams are working to strengthen the physical designs of the stations to reduce crime and disorder problems. Although Transit Police Officers are effective at patrolling the train stations, several communities will experience the impact of this transformation when crime begins to inevitably spread a few blocks beyond the SkyTrain station. By taking a preemptive strategizing approach, it is anticipated that the Port Moody Police will be in a better position than some of their neighbours were in preventing and responding to these changes.

Applying the “80-20 rule” to habitual offender management

In another example that combines many of the themes presented in previous chapters, the Beaumont RCMP Detachment in Alberta applies the “80-20 rule” to what they now call their habitual offender management program. This program originally included a list of prolific offenders that the police identified for ongoing home checks; these names were tracked on a whiteboard in the detachment, and without any oversight, it offered little incentive for officers to conduct these checks. In September 2012, Sergeant Kevin Kunetzki arrived at the Beaumont Detachment and assessed their approach to prolific offenders and decided to reframe their program to resemble what Dr. Darryl Plecas referred to as “enforcement-oriented crime prevention”. This approach began by aligning the detachment’s goals with their strategic priorities. Beaumont’s enforcement-oriented crime prevention includes two primary components; monitor the community’s repeat offenders with home checks, and tie home checks into the department’s strategic priorities. These strategic priorities are based on what the community identified as important crime reduction priorities. When the RCMP consulted with the town, they learned that the three most important policing priorities were youth development, domestic violence, and drugs.

Sergeant Kunetzki decided that, through an enforcement-oriented/prolific offender program, these strategic priorities could be linked to the officers’ home checks. Within the revised habitual offender management program framework, the Beaumont Police not only visited people because they had an extensive criminal history, but they also checked on people who had court-ordered conditions that could be enforced, such as condition violations or being criminally involved in one of the identified priorities. The goal of this combined approach was to take advantage of enforcing any court ordered conditions. This introduced a proactive component to their policing measures because these offenders were identified as high risk and, based on this, the police could perform follow-up checks to assist these individuals abide by their conditions and the law.

The proactive and habitual offender checks are conducted by eight of the detachment’s 11 general duty officers and the specific number of checks is determined on a case-by-case analysis by the coordinator of each situation. In cases where checks are going really well and offenders are complying with all of their conditions, they may be removed from the program early. During these checks, the police knock on offenders’ doors and engage in conversations with the offenders to verify that they are following the conditions that are in place, including curfews, ‘no contact’ orders, abstaining from substances, and protection orders. These practices are now also documented using the RCMP’s file management system, PROS. This assists in managing and tracking offenders, and evaluating the police’s success in completing their checks. Anyone in the RCMP has access to this system and to the related statistics if they have the necessary codes. When officers come to work, their shift tasks now include three or more checks that they have to do that month. In recognizing the value of breaking down their priorities further, the police continue to conduct habitual offender checks on individuals identified as repeat offenders, and have initiated proactive checks targeting other high risk individuals, families, and homes.
The proactive checks are geared towards individuals who may not be repeat offenders, but who have been involved in an offence or a situation identified by the police to be high risk, specifically associated with domestic violence, drugs, or are deemed to be an at-risk youth. Under this model, people who have committed multiple drug offences may be added to their prolific offender list, but they could also be included in this approach if they have been identified as someone who can be deemed to be high risk or in a high-risk situation.

At the beginning of each month, the program coordinator uses criteria to identify offenders who fit within the detachment’s strategic priorities and would benefit from supervision in the program. Once this is done, the officer adds the offender to the program list and members are then assigned a specified number of checks for that month. To make these checks feasible, the coordinator establishes achievable goals for each officer to incorporate within their other general duty responsibilities. Officers are not expected to complete these checks on a nightly basis, and instead each member is assigned three or four checks per month. In doing this, the coordinator and supervisors can be sure that the checks will be executed because it is a specific, manageable workload that can be balanced within officers’ normal workload. The general duty members who are involved in this crime prevention approach can take ownership by making sure that their monthly checks are completed. The strategy also reduces the likelihood that officers will provide justifications for not completing their checks. With regular oversight from the detachment’s supervisors and the program coordinator, members who have not completed all of their checks can be consulted to determine a solution.

What is also encouraging about this new approach is its accountability. Police have traditionally neglected a certain degree of answerability, but it is an area that they have been working to strengthen. The Beaumont Police have added accountability for both police officers and the detachment to their practices by tying the checks into their file management system. This means that there is an actual file on the police’s computers detailing the checks they need to complete; the file cannot be removed until the officer executes that check. Best practices in policing cannot exist without accountability for the officers, their programs, and the departments. In having the files in the PROS system, officers can be clear on what their responsibilities are, and supervisors can track their performance to ensure that the programs are functioning as anticipated and that the department is doing everything that it can to address crime in their communities. Another feature of this proactive and accountable approach is that supervisors can review which checks have been done, whether the checks have resulted in any charges, and how many checks have been done in total. Before the enforcement-oriented crime prevention strategy was linked to the file management system, the department did not have the tools to measure or accounting for the effect these strategies had. The habitual offender management program combined with the enforcement-oriented approach was first initiated in Beaumont at the end of December 2012. By the end of 2013, after one full year of the program commencing, the Beaumont Police Detachment completed 166 proactive prolific offender checks in the community, which has a population of only 15,000 residents. Instead of waiting for the phone to ring and responding to crime, their officers went and knocked on offenders’ doors and the majority of these checks were directly linked to the detachment’s strategic priorities.
The detachment has evaluated their crime rates since the implementation of their enforcement-oriented crime prevention targeting prolific offenders, domestic violence, drug offences, and youth. To evaluate the outcomes of their strategic approaches, the police determined they had 150 domestic incidents in 2012, which fell to 108 domestic incidents in 2013. Assaults and break and enters also decreased by 20% and 50% respectively. In contrast, drug offences increased, which the detachment attributed to increased enforcement of those offences. An additional officer was assigned to target drug offences full-time and the detachment conducted numerous high volume vehicle stops or traffic blitzes that also led to the discovery of drugs. As drug offences are most often identified through these types of proactive enforcement practices, these are probable explanations for this increase. Although break and enters and theft of motor vehicles declined, overall, property crimes did not experience a decrease, though the increase was not considerable. Sergeant Kunetzki emphasized that crimes against persons experienced the most discernable reductions in 2013, an important finding given the detachment's priorities that focused on people-related crimes. Furthermore, in 2013, the Beaumont RCMP also doubled their crime prevention efforts. In effect, they doubled their proactive enforcement initiatives. In addition to their prolific and enforcement-oriented checks, these numbers included traffic blitzes, proactive presentations with youth, and other initiatives that the police engage in as a component of their strategy to reduce and prevent crime. Officers have received further anecdotal evidence in feedback from offenders who have noticed the police are regularly checking on them. Through these checks, trust can develop and the offenders can see that the police are taking crime prevention seriously.

Expanding to address problem hotspots

The Beaumont RCMP will continue to extend their strategic and proactive crime reduction efforts under their plan to introduce a habitual location management program. This approach involves targeting specific areas where the police have received repeat calls for service. Although the strategy itself is not entirely new and other communities have used this approach in the past, there has not typically been a built in accountability structure. The police may be informed of a location where there have been numerous complaints and officers are told to do extra patrols in that area, yet there is no one assigned to oversee and manage this practice. Based on the crime triangle that asserts that crime can be attributed to repeat offenders, problem locations, and reoccurring victims, the Beaumont detachment created their habitual offender files and will soon move to include the generation of proactive files for problem hotspots or areas in the community where the police have been repeatedly called to deal with incidents. These proactive files will also be maintained on PROS, and officers will be assigned four or five locations that they will be responsible for checking at specific times on specific days of the week. Sergeant Kunetzki continues to meet with members of the town to identify problem locations, so that when the summer commences, they will already have location files assigned to their members. Evidently, Beaumont is taking the next step to proactively managing their crime problems by directing officers to now look at both the offender and the place.

Although the police in Beaumont have significantly increased their crime reduction efforts, these developments have not increased costs to the department. Sergeant Kunetzki says that when police properly engage in proactive approaches, they are able to reduce crimes thereby changing what officers and departments focus on. Rather than waiting for crimes to occur or for a trend to develop, the Beaumont RCMP is “changing the way that we think. The old process is to wait for the phone to ring, which is the traditional policing model, and we’ll respond in our police car and deal with the matter... We want to be proactive and preventative thereby actually reducing the number of calls for service”. The results of this approach can then cascade; once there are fewer assaults to investigate, there are fewer aggravated assaults, fewer murders, and so the financial impact should be that it costs police agencies less to reach their crime reduction goals.
The expansion of the prolific offender management program to the enhanced enforcement-oriented crime prevention program occurred so that police could address a number of crime problems by focusing on individuals in the community who have enforceable conditions. In this way, the program targets habitual offenders, while also being proactive in reducing continued high-risk offences and situations. Enforcement-oriented policing checks on habitual and high-risk offenders can ensure that offenders comply with court-ordered conditions and avoid further involvement with crime. The work that is being done by the RCMP in Beaumont speaks to their commitment to following evidence-based policing practices, and the affect that a senior management team committed to proactive and preventative policing models can have on a community. The original prolific offender program was not strategically tied to the detachments crime reduction priorities and it did not track officers’ progress with their checks. This newer model includes both of these critical elements. A key part to Beaumont’s new approach is including accountability by tracking their offender checks in PROS, rather than having names on a whiteboard or tracking it on a spreadsheet. The police also let offenders know that they are checking on them, which appears to have contributed to the success of the program.

Designing Out Crime

As mentioned above, CPTED is a problem-oriented policing strategy that uses knowledge about what causes crime to modify the environmental conditions conducive to crime. However, whereas many of the strategies and recommendations in previous chapters focused primarily on the social aspects of crime prevention, CPTED strategies are physical forms of place-oriented crime prevention in that they target the location of crime and the characteristics of these location conducive to crime, including poorly lit areas or lack of guardianship or supervision (Braga, 2001; Spelman, 1993). This strategy is based on the research indicating that, much like prolific offenders, there are prolific locations or a small number of places that generate the majority of calls for police service. This realisation has resulted in proactive policing strategies, such as hot spot patrolling (Sherman et al., 1989). A key difference with CPTED is that rather than focusing on proactive policing of these locations, the prevention of crime occurs by hardening the potential targets, or reducing the conditions that make a location appealing to criminals (Braga and Bond, 2008; Braga et al., 1999).

As discussed in Chapter 4, crime prevention through environmental design is based on the theory of environmental criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991) that integrates rational choice and routine activities theory. Briefly, rational choice theory suggests that offenders will consider the relative benefits and costs of committing a crime, including material gains versus the potential for apprehension, prior to engaging in that crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1987). In other words, it is based on the idea that offenders are rationale calculators who engage in crime when the benefits of doing so outweigh the potential costs of being detected. Routine activity theory proposes that crimes occur when motivated offenders meet in space and time with a suitable target without the presence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1989). In effect, routine activity theory is the opposite of the old adage that a victim was just at the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead, routine activity suggests that victims were exactly in the right place at the right time to be victimized.
For example, two people walking together down a brightly lit street are not suitable victims, in part, because there is guardianship, namely being together and being in a well-lit area. However, when one of the people turns to head down adarken ally alone to their car, they become a suitable victim with a lack of guardianship. In this way, routine activity theory argues that it is in the everyday activities that ordinary people engage in that makes them more or less suitable for victimization. Environmental criminology specifically aims to increase the guardianship of targets and increase the perceived costs associated with engaging in a crime. It does so not by focusing on the offender, but by focusing on the geography of crime.

Environmental criminology suggests that elements that make a location conducive to crime include homes that are absent during the day, transit stops that are unmonitored by any form of security or proper lighting, neighbourhoods lacking in mechanisms of informal social control, or abandoned housing (Braga, 2005; Spelman, 1993). In essence, these elements are crime attractors, and reducing their presence through target hardening should reduce an offender’s motivations to commit crime there. Thus, crime prevention through environmental design may involve adding proper street lighting to unlit transit stops or particular roadways, securing abandoned housing, using alarms in houses empty during the day, or implementing video surveillance, such as closed circuit television. In reality, it involves any physical attempt to modify a location or place conducive to crime (e.g., Braga and Bond, 2008; Spelman, 1993; Sundberg, 2013).

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Recommendations for Being a More and Better Preemptive Police Organization

Given that being a preemptive police organization provides crime reduction, public safety, and resource allocation improvements, there are several things that police should do in order to achieve these expected benefits. Police organizations should be partnering with their community leaders, business leaders, local mobilizers, and city planners to ‘design out’ opportunities for crime. This means that police should be providing their expertise in the nature of criminal events and work with partners to change the physical and natural environment to reduce opportunities for crime and their rate of success. This may include introducing or expanding the use of internal and external, fixed and mobile CCTV cameras, increasing the lighting in public spaces, changing the way public spaces are landscaped to make walking distances short and the people in public spaces more visible to each other, and eliminating or reducing the number of ‘dark’ or blind spots at locations where people are at greater risk for victimization, such as public transportation stations, parking lots, and shopping malls. While many police organizations have officers dedicated to crime prevention, and may even have some responsible for CPTED initiatives, strengthening the partnership between police and the community on developing, implementing, and evaluating CPTED projects is important.
In order to be preemptive, it is important for the police to be reflective about crime and disorder in their jurisdiction. This means that police, when responding to a call for service, should be thinking about how can they contribute to ensuring that this does not happen again.

To do so, it is vital that police have a current and detailed understanding of the conditions that contribute to and create crime problems in their communities, what are the crime patterns in similar neighbouring communities, and what are the current crime threats to ensure that issues do not have an opportunity to develop into crime problems. This will allow for the development of strategies and policies that focus on individuals and issues before they become crime problems for the police and the community. Again, these strategies should not exclusively be focused on dealing with a current crime trend, but designed to achieve the longer-term benefits of general and specific deterrence, increased public safety, and a reduction in crime.

Being preemptive demands being information and intelligence-led, and focusing on offenders and problems, in practical terms, this suggests shifting towards a greater emphasis on pro-active patrols, rather than general patrols. Where police officers patrol, who they conduct street checks with, and what they are looking for while on patrol should be dictated by a deep understanding of current crime trends and crime threats, who is most likely to be involved, where these criminal events are most likely to occur, and when are they most likely to occur. It also means that, whenever possible, police should let offenders and potential offenders know that they are known to police and are being monitored in order to deter them from committing offences. Moreover, police should be committed to using analysts and the community to obtain as much information as possible and use the available technology to assist in the interpretation and integration of this data to interrupt and eliminate the traditional contributors to crime and disorder and to alter the calculation that offenders make about the risks and rewards associated with engaging in crime.

Are We a Preemptive Police Organization?

Being preemptive means having the ability to get in front of crime and disorder problems in such a way that police officers are not typically running call to call. Being able to reduce this traditional reality for police is an excellent indicator of success. Truly being preemptive means developing and implementing police practices to ensure the prevention of crime and disorder in both the short term and the long term. The degree to which your police organization is able to move away from primarily being a responsive police organization is another key measure of achievement. Using historical and current crime data to predict whom, when, and where criminal events or trends will occur, and having the ability to prevent it from happening through deterrence or enforcement is success.

While the world depicted in the book and film Minority Report is science fiction, there are strategies and technologies currently available to police organizations to assist them in being more predictive, and more scientific and evidence-based in their deployment of officers and their patrolling behaviour. Being truly preemptive means that police have implemented evidence-based policies, strategies, and tactics to best predict and intervene with the people and problems that contribute most to crime and disorder.
References for Chapter 6


In the fall of 2013, a particular area in Vancouver experienced a rise in predatory sexual assaults, which was identified through the Vancouver Police Department's 28-day citywide CompStat comparisons of police reports to the previous 28-day time frame. Many of these incidents could be traced back to the availability of Flunitrazepam, more commonly known as Rohypnol or the 'date-rape drug'. Vancouver Police Department analysts, using crime data and mapping software, identified the emerging crime problem and its hot spot. Importantly, the trend developed gradually over a six-month period and was not perceptible from basic police work. Through the summer and into the fall, the numbers and nature of the offences had become quite concerning. Upon this discovery, the sex crime analyst compiled information outlining the extent of the offending so that she, the inspector, and their team could determine the amount of resources necessary to address these offences. Officers were then posted to the areas to provide an increased presence and allow for quicker response times. At the next CompStat meeting, the managerial team would revisit this particular crime problem to assess their progress.

In terms of process, the Vancouver Police Department’s intelligence-led approaches include their analysts who organize the information, identify the gaps and problem areas, and essentially refine the allocation of police’s resources.

When policing strategies are executed properly and upper management supports progressing policing practices, improved accountability typically follows. The analysts provide this information to the commander, who allocates the necessary resources and directs and supervises the work of the officers. The officers are then responsible for addressing the offences before they become more serious crime trends. Like many of the preemptive approaches discussed in the previous chapter, the Vancouver Police Department believes that police should identify crime and disorder problems before they become crime trends. As such, at each CompStat discussion, accountability is a focal point in the review of whether teams have successfully met their crime reduction goals. This is determined by either preventing offending patterns from escalating or applying strategic, intelligence-led processes to stop targeted offending behaviours. This places a certain level of accountability on the officers responsible for each assigned issue and motivates them to follow direction, be sufficiently knowledgeable of the offences or patterns based on the information the analysts’ provided, and to interrupt further offending in the specified area. This accountability permeates the entire police department. Still, the Vancouver Police Department operates differently than some other police departments.
Unlike these departments, members of the Vancouver Police Department would not lose their jobs because of a single subpar performance represented in a CompStat report. Constable Prox states that officers and civilian members are held accountable and may, in the worst case scenario, receive a public admonishment if certain plans have not been executed properly, but the management is careful not to make its application of performance measures an adversarial experience for the department.

**Answering to the public**

While CompStat plays a role in the accountability of the police, the public's role in creating a strong sense of responsibility is not discounted. The Vancouver Police Department has a high level of answerability to the public, as the Vancouver Police Board, comprised of civilian representatives, governs them. The members include the mayor, council, and elected officials. In representing Vancouver citizens, the board's presence increases the transparency of the police's practices and outcomes. As a feature of this accountability, the Vancouver Police Department have been committed to presenting quarterly reports to the Executive and Police Board containing a review of their seven specified Key Performance Indicators. These indicators are Property Crime Rates, Violent Crime Rates, Clearance Rates for Criminal Investigations, Priority 1 Response Times, Traffic-Related Injuries and Deaths, Budget Variance, and Annual Citizen Satisfaction Levels (Organizational Planning Unit, 2012). These reports are important resources that are examined during the review of the Vancouver Police Department's progress and long term goal achievement as outlined in their four-year strategic plans.

Constable Ryan Prox commented on the Vancouver Police Department's proposal to introduce a public website – as a component of the GeoDash software – that will allow the police to be more interactive with the city's residents. In the winter of 2014, the public will gain access to live crime statistics online that will be accessible on smartphones or computers.

Once unveiled, this public website will present the latest crime maps delineating where crime is occurring within a close range of one's immediate location. This technology will also invite the general public to identify where specific crimes have occurred, and the public will have an opportunity to personalize the utility of this program by requesting that alerts on specific types of crimes be sent to them. The cutting-edge system will be a reciprocal service in that it will encourage citizens to communicate with the Vancouver Police Department and report any suspicious activities they may have witnessed. The inclusion of the public in the newly designed GeoDash program will only expand their role in maintaining the police's accountability. It will also better inform the public on the actual level of crime taking place in their neighbourhoods and allow the public to monitor the success that the police have had in responding to crime and disorder issues.

When policing strategies are executed properly and upper management supports progressing policing practices, improved accountability typically follows. The Kamloops RCMP noted perceptible improvements in officer's morale and a reduction in the public's complaints once crime reduction strategies were carefully implemented. This can generate motivation within all levels of the department so that everyone can perform their job effectively. When departments work together and members see the results of their work, a motivational environment is created and can lead to reductions in crime; this was the case in Kamloops. Consequently, the public's perception of the police improved, which was particularly important for both the police and Kamloops' residents, and assisted in maintaining accountability. Also improving the accountability of police is their continuing affiliation with researchers and academics. Although these relationships have not always developed naturally, they have improved considerably in recent years. These collaborations have paved the way for dialogues, education, and research on the usefulness of various best practices for their department.
The Kamloops RCMP were able to employ new strategies in their work, such as employing crime analysis and examining crime measures, in large part, due to their work with researchers at the University of the Fraser Valley. This partnership provided an external assessment of police accountability and yielded greater confidence in the crime reduction strategies being implemented.

A message that was echoed by many policing experts and emphasized by former Kamloops RCMP Superintendent Jim Begley is that sustainability and accountability are achieved by clear communication and rigorous program development. Agencies often implement programs with good intentions, but in the absence of integrated impact evaluations, the effects of their efforts cannot be truly measured. The police detachments and departments that experience the greatest success introduce programs, pilot them, and determine their success using measurable results from data collected during the trial period. Following this process, a follow-up evaluation measures the programs’ effect over time. By collaboratively examining the data and long-term changes, the police can discern whether their efforts have made a difference. For example, the Kamloops RCMP had individuals on their prolific offender management list that progressively reformed their behaviours as a result of the police’s unwavering commitment to their supervision. While observing the numbers of property offence types was a critical piece in holding officers and management accountable, more subtle changes in the offenders were sometimes not obvious through just an analysis of the crime statistics. This underscores the importance of assessing overall lasting changes. The Kamloops RCMP and other agencies also collected information on broader measures than those produced by PRIME and other police data systems. They recorded and classified crimes as either reported or actual, accounted for these differences, and also looked at calls for service. This allowed those in upper management to have a much more nuanced understanding of what the statistics actually meant, which contributed to their ability to report on exactly what the department was doing, supporting each piece with accurate and more explicit performance measures.

A message echoed by many policing experts is that sustainability and accountability are achieved by clear communication and rigorous program development.

The Port Moody Police Department also recognizes that accountability is key to the successful operation of a police agency, big or small. Their weekly Analytical Tactical Action Committee meetings and monthly CompStat meetings provide an opportunity for their analyst to ensure that all of the department’s members accomplish their assigned tasks. The Port Moody Police Department’s crime analyst is held accountable to provide the latest information to officers, the Chief is accountable for police support in the community, and police officers are accountable to each of these groups, as well as the public, in ensuring that they are effectively responding to crime problems in the community. In this way, accountability advances policing efforts and encourages commitment among officers. The CompStat process is important in measuring the achievement of crime reduction goals, and the Port Moody Police Department, like other police departments and detachments, sets thresholds for acceptable crime reduction outcomes. Based on these thresholds, the department uses CompStat outputs to review each team’s work and to hold them accountable for positive results. Like the Vancouver Police Department, the inclusion of analysts in this process and as part of the policing meetings also assists in strengthening the relationship between the police and their civilian members and improves accountability within the department.
The Lesson

Police leaders throughout British Columbia have come to realize that setting specific crime reduction targets, providing the necessary resources to achieve success, measuring and evaluating success, and holding leaders and officers accountable for success can result in short and long term reductions in crime, effective strategic planning, and internal and external accountability. As police departments and detachments in British Columbia are being held to a higher degree of accountably and transparency by their boards and the public, effective and efficient police organizations are those that have developed and implemented validated, evidence-based performance measures focused on the broad goals of crime prevention, crime reduction, and public safety. In effect, being performance-based ensures not only that the police are doing the right things, but also that they are doing them the right way.

Being Truly Performance-based

Since 2008, many North American cities have experienced significant economic downturn, leading to demands for organizations to achieve better performance with fewer resources. Policing is no exception to this trend. As city budgets are being cut widely, many police organizations are being forced to get creative and develop new strategies to prevent crime. The strategies discussed in this guide provide numerous examples of smart policing that have had incredible effects on reducing crime rates. This chapter focuses on the aftermath of a new initiative, when police are asked to demonstrate success. This chapter presents the foundation of adopting a performance-based approach to policing, where the organization itself is held accountable to its operational goals through analysis of its staff activities and its strategies through the use of validated performance indicators.

Performance indicators are measures that can be used to assess police inputs, such as actions and activities, as well as the outcomes of strategies, such as reductions in the crime rate or length of time in responding to calls for service, as a reflection of progress towards objectives or goals (Vera Institute, 2003). Importantly, their regular and continued use can identify, in a timely fashion, whether police are doing well and where specifically they may be doing poorly and in need of a revised strategy or greater accountability (United Nations, 2011). Performance indicators can also be used to compare police performance at an individual, unit, or department/detachment level with the intended effect of enhancing performance by revealing shortcomings or provoking competition.

While performance indicators have traditionally been quantitative, there is a current trend towards developing qualitative assessment tools more in tune with the concepts discussed in this guide, including indicators measuring engagement in and effects of problem oriented policing and its related components, such as community policing, hot spots policing, and broken windows policing. Thus, the use of multiple forms of indicators, such as administrative data, crime data, public opinion surveys, stakeholder interviews, and third party reports is recommended (United Nations, 2011; Vera Institute, 2003). While performance indicators have been used over multiple generations of policing, in the current economic climate, there is a growing trend towards developing and utilizing indicators to assess the performance of various crime reduction strategies to encourage police to engage in evidence-based policing, which should result in more cost effective and efficient styles of policing and correspondingly, enhanced public safety.
A recent trend in criminal justice is towards evidence-based strategies and solutions for crime prevention (Cherney, 2009; Drake, Aos, & Miller, 2009; Sanderson, 2002; Schoenfeld, 2012). This approach is where criminal justice agencies introduce strategies and tactics to prevent and reduce crime based on an empirical analysis of “what works” (e.g., Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, & Bushway, 1998; Welsh and Farrington, 2005). Thus, they are theory and research-based strategies, the theory providing the explanation for why something should happen the way it does, such as explaining why addressing smaller societal problems leads to crime prevention, and the research providing the evidence for whether that theory does hold true in a particular situation, such as do strategies based on problem oriented policing in fact reduce incidents of crime.

Clearly, “what works” is very much contingent on community-level variables. What works in one jurisdiction will not always transfer to another. Take, for example, Sherman’s work on domestic violence several decades ago (Sherman and Berk, 1992). Sherman and Berk’s findings that arresting domestic violence offenders at the scene of the incident had a substantial effect on reducing domestic violence recidivism quickly led to the widespread adoption of mandatory arrest policies across North American municipalities. Yet, the anticipated reductions in domestic violence were not always seen and, in some communities, arresting domestic violence offenders actually contributed to increases in domestic violence recidivism. Subsequent analyses determined that the effect of arrest on domestic violence recidivism was influenced or mediated by rates of employment in that municipality. Basically, arrest of an offender was much more likely to contribute to reductions in offending in areas of high employment, presumably because of the deterrent effects of shaming and potential job loss. In areas with high rates of unemployment, offenders did not experience this same level of “informal social control” and arrest had less of an impact on their recidivism.

Importantly, the bulk of policing inefficiencies may be due to a small number of failed or misapplied strategies or activities. Similarly, the failure to achieve dramatic crime reduction outcomes may be the result of one or two ineffective or inefficient crime reduction strategies. Focusing on identifying, changing, or removing policies, strategies, or programs that are not working and expanding those particular things that are contributing to success will allow police to be more effective and efficient and achieve more substantial crime reductions.

The message is clear; it is incredibly important to evaluate crime prevention strategies not only to determine what works, but also to understand why it works. Knowing these two pieces of information will assist police organizations in selecting or developing strategies most likely to be effective in their particular jurisdiction. Moreover, once a strategy has been adopted, police must engage in constant evaluation to determine whether it is the right strategy: to measure its direct and indirect effects on crime; to assess any unanticipated consequences, such as displacement of crime and disorder to neighbouring jurisdictions; and to determine if changes are necessary to maintain success and to deliver it more efficiently and effectively.

This is one area in which partnerships can be of great importance to the police. While police should have their own crime analysts that can provide ongoing feedback regarding the immediate and long-term effects of a new strategy, it is vital for police to develop a working relationship with academics who can provide them with an independent objective assessment of their strategy. Moreover, having this partnership in place prior to the development of the strategy can help police be more successful in identifying the right strategy for their particular jurisdiction based on the underlying theory of crime causation. In other words, partnerships between academics and police will go a long way towards police being evidence and performance-led.
Academics can assist police by conducting methodologically strong evaluations of their strategies and publishing the results to inform other organizations of their success. However, as noted above, this does not mean that police themselves cannot engage in ongoing performance evaluation of their strategies. In fact, the new paradigm of policing has shifted towards greater accountability of police leaders in implementing successful crime reduction strategies. This accountability is being managed through monthly or weekly meetings with police leaders and mayors or other city staff where police must explain and defend their recent attempts at crime reduction (e.g., Chilvers and Weatherburn, 2004; Crank, Kadleck, & Koski, 2010). Thus, police must have access to information that informs them where their major crime problems are, why those crime problems are occurring, and the effectiveness of the strategies they are introducing to reduce them. One of the ways in which police have been assisted in this process is through the use of CompStat. Importantly, CompStat is primarily a performance management system used by middle-level managers to monitor the activities of line officers in their crime prevention and reduction activities. In this way, it provides for both external and internal measures of accountability.

As an example, in 2004, Deputy Police Chief Adam Palmer, who was a police sergeant at the time, of the Vancouver Police Department, contracted a professor from Simon Fraser University to conduct an extensive operational review of the department. In the three years following this review and its findings, the Vancouver Police Department underwent widespread changes to enhance their performance and accountability. This also led to considerable improvements to the collection, management, and analysis of data based on daily downloads from all of BC’s policing services through PRIME, their data management system. Since this time, the Vancouver Police Department has become one of the leaders in the country on how to effectively and efficiently do business. The department has implemented and is continually improving upon a number of their tools designed to track the performance of their police officers, civilian members, and their crime reduction strategies.

### Tracking officer performance

One of the tools used to measure officers’ performance is the Patrol Activity Report or the PAR, which the Vancouver Police Department introduced in 2007. The latest version of the PAR has evolved from its original version that required intensive manual input to an automated system developed by the IT department. Although the compilation of data for the PAR is an ongoing process and, if needed, supervisors could pull the results at any time, the routine review of the reports occurs every 32 days to coincide with the end of Vancouver Police Department officers’ shift rotation cycle. The report compiles data from Vancouver Police Department’s CRIME system to quantify the number of calls each officer responds to, as either the primary officer or a backup officer; the number of reports they write, as the primary officer or as a contributing officer; how many cars they pull over; how many people they check; the number of tickets they write; the number of intelligence reports they submit; the number of street checks they complete; and the number of errors they make, such as in a report to the prosecutor, a coding error, or omitted information.

As some mistakes are unavoidable, the Vancouver Police Department does not use all incidents as a strike against an officer; however, they are interested in any officers who continually make mistakes and those who never make mistakes. The PAR also collects and organizes information related to the specific teams that officers work in, the number of officers that are present for their shifts, how much overtime is needed, and the number of times teams have to borrow from other districts to reach their minimums. In tracking each of these activities, the PAR is a critical tool in assessing police officers’ performance.

At the end of the 32-day cycle, managers at various levels can obtain a relevant snapshot of the past month’s activities. Based on this information, managers can follow trends and try to ascertain whether there is a problem with the team unit or whether there may be an individual level issue with one or a few officers.
Deputy Palmer points out that it is not helpful to look at one month in isolation; managers have to monitor the findings of these reports over a longer time frame to have a complete picture and understand the true nature of the issue. On any given month, teams may have officers who are out with an injury, they may have officers on long-term sick leave, or an officer’s wife may have just had a baby. As a result, some members may not have been there for the full number of days in the PAR’s 32-day window. Over time, patterns do develop and there are always certain teams that are high performing, and teams that are often low performing. In effect, the reports provide a standardized assessment of the team. Sergeants can uncover potential issues at the meso-level of team composition and harmonization, down to the micro-level of which specific officers are performing well and those who are not performing as well. The inspector can then determine with the officer whether they require mentoring or further training, if they have developed personal issues, or what else may be contributing to their recent performance.

The PAR process allows inspectors to identify emerging problems and to become more knowledgeable about the officers they supervise. For teams or individuals who are high performing, the department understands the importance of providing encouragement and motivation to enhance morale. Some of the districts are given verbal praise and pep talks, while other teams have plaques that they hang on the wall to recognize their performance. Teams that are performing well in some areas, but not in others are given praise for their achievements, but are also reminded of those areas where they need some improvement. With individual level problems, sergeants talk to officers one-on-one to assess whether there is a human resource issue, a competency-related issue, or if they have personal issues. They then provide the appropriate resources to assist the officer. While it is important for the management teams at Vancouver Police Department to monitor these reports, the PAR is not designed to be a disciplinary tool or a tool used to embarrass officers; instead, it is utilized as a coaching and guidance tool that managers can review and rely on to initiate a conversation with their officers. It opens a dialogue to discuss any areas that have been cited as problem areas.

Deputy Palmer says this is an important process as police have traditionally relied on gut feelings and intuition, but that sometimes the data can present a different picture. The PAR assists the Vancouver Police Department in maintaining a level of oversight on their teams’ performance, both in terms of their strengths and their weaknesses.

Another tool the Vancouver Police Department uses that compliments the PAR is an early warning system used by their Professional Standards Section (PSS) and Human Resource (HR) Section. Like the PAR, this system is not designed to be disciplinary, but allows the department to be proactive about potential future problems. This system collects data on 10 different areas related to the number of sick hours an officer takes, the amount of overtime they work, the number of professional standard complaints they receive from the public, the outcome of those complaints, how often an officer has incidents involving use of force, how many times an officer is involved in an assault, and how many car accidents an officer has been in. While each of these incidents in isolation may not be a serious concern, officers who start to receive high ratings in two or three categories are quickly identified and their file is scanned to see what may be triggering the increase.

It is critical that the appropriate people review the results of the early warning system as these measures only present one view of an officer’s performance. It acts as a basis for the professional standards, HR, and training departments to conduct a monthly review of any cases that rise to the top of the warning system, and to assess an officer’s current professional and personal circumstances.
Since officers regularly deal with the public and carry weapons, police departments need to be sure that their officers are doing well physically, mentally, and emotionally. The Vancouver Police Department recognizes that, like anyone, police officers experience fluctuations in their lives, and it is the task of the department to support their officers and keep them on the right track. They ensure that officers have access to appropriate professional help by connecting them with a psychologist, specialized counselling or treatment, or whatever may assist with the problem. In some cases, providing support could be as simple as relocating an officer to another section in the department. The Vancouver Police Department recognizes the long-term commitment their officers and staff make and they ensure that they respond to issues in a way that makes everyone feel like the situation was handled appropriately and supportively.

**Performance of Staff**

Police leaders have a particularly important role to play in crime reduction as they are tasked with supervising the work of others and making revisions to their activities when individuals are underperforming. Importantly, one of the strategies implemented in New York in the 1990s was the shifting of operation management from traditional policing structure, such as top-down management where executives make operational decisions, to independent decisions made by mid-level police leaders based on an analysis of the particular needs of their own precinct (Albrecht, 2011). As police leaders are held directly accountable for their operations, this has driven the need to be more fully aware of what exactly line officers are doing on the ground, a necessity that led towards the development of CompStat in the United States, Best Value in the United Kingdom, and Operational Performance Reviews in Australia (Long and Silverman, 2010; de Maillard and Savage, 2012; Mazerolle, McBroom, & Rombouts, 2011).

Systems like CompStat (Compare Statistics; Eterno and Silverman, 2010) provide organizations with the ability to engage in real-time performance management (Chilvers and Weatherburn, 2004; and Silverman, 2010; Moore, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003). CompStat not only contains relevant current and historical geographical crime statistics and trends for a particular jurisdiction, allowing for problem oriented approaches and proactive policing strategies focused on specific areas, offences, and offenders, but it also provides administrative information useful to police leaders in their resource management and development of strategies, including staffing levels, overtime information, sick rates, and officer activity (Albrecht, 2011; Eterno and Silverman, 2010; Firman, 2003; Jang, Hoover, & Joo, 2010; Weisburd et al., 2003). Using CompStat also allows managers and supervisors to follow progress towards goals, for instance, by providing weekly or twice monthly summations of crime reduction activities, such as number of street checks and arrests in a particular area broken down by individual officer, all of which can be used to compare unit or department efficiencies with similar units and departments (de Maillard and Savage, 2012; Moore, 2003). Thus, it is primarily a performance measurement system as it holds individual officers and specific units/departments accountable for their activities and outcomes and, importantly, CompStat is often implemented in a way that means this information is shared on a regular basis in meetings open to the public (Firman, 2003; Moore, 2003; Moore and Braga, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2004). Given this, CompStat has placed incredible pressure and direct responsibility on mid-level police managers to come up with new crime reduction ideas and demonstrate results (Long and Silverman, 2005; de Maillard and Savage, 2012; Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2004).
Such performance standards meant that “those who [did] not measure up [were] reassigned to other positions” (Long and Silverman, 2005: 48) and, in New York, over one-third of precinct commanders who were in place when CompStat was first introduced were replaced within the first two years (Moore, 2003).

The use of CompStat has contributed to dramatic reductions in crime. In the first year following its initial introduction in New York, crime rates dropped 12% compared to a national drop of only 2% (Eterno and Silverman, 2010). In their evaluation of CompStat in Fort Worth, Texas, a decade later, Jang and colleagues (2010) also documented decreases in property-related crimes that they attributed to police focusing attention on problem areas, peoples, and forms of offending identified through the analysis of crime data and holding police accountable for reductions. In Australia, Mazerolle and colleagues’ (2011) research found varying reductions in crime across 29 different police districts. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell which aspect of CompStat contributes most significantly to these crime reductions, as CompStat encompasses a variety of police approaches, such as problem oriented policing, broken windows policing, and hot spots policing, in addition to performance management (Moore, 2003). At the very least, these results indicate that CompStat offers police organizations an ability to be flexible in its policing strategies as the information it contains on police and strategy performance is up to date, which allows for quick reassessments or reworking of unsuccessful strategies (Weisburd et al., 2003).

While CompStat provides police managers with reports on individual officer activity, much of modern police work is not measured well by traditional accountability indicators, including response time, crimes solved, or number of arrests and citations, because more effective police strategies today focus on problem-oriented policing strategies, including community policing (Gorby, 2013; de Maillard and Savage, 2012; Moore and Braga, 2003; Shilston, 2011; Vera Institute, 2003).

For instance, instead of only responding to calls for service, police are now expected to be working in and with communities, identifying their perceptions of crime and disorder, and working to develop and implement solutions to those problems (Gorby, 2013; Walsh and Vito, 2004). As police are expected to make independent decisions and use their discretion, measures like number of arrests will unintentionally reflect poorly on their activities (Gorby, 2013). Improved relationships between police and the public may lead to greater willingness on the part of the public to report victimization, thus leading to higher crime rates that, without context, would suggest that police are doing a poor job at crime prevention.

Thus, traditional performance measures must be updated to more accurately reflect modern police work, such as the building of relationships with citizens and community service providers, developing an informant network, and diverting minor offenders away from the criminal justice system. In effect, performance measures based on these type of activities may include peer reviews of an employee’s problem-solving skills, self-evaluations or reflections on the use of communication to build community relationships, the degree to which consultation with the general public or other agencies has occurred, community safety surveys, strategy evaluation results, or manager’s reports on their new initiatives for problem solving, even if they have yet to show measurable results (Gorby, 2013; de Maillard and Savage, 2012; Moore, 2003; Moore and Braga, 2003; Shilston, 2011).
A two-fold approach combining traditional indicators of police performance, as well as more qualitative measures reflecting engagement in problem-oriented policing strategies, is an ideal approach for many police agencies shifting away from traditional crime response to modern crime prevention tactics. Moreover, combining several different indicators that measure different aspects of the same issue is a recommended strategy to more fully understand the complex nature of many issues important to policing. For instance, one important indicator of police accountability is the “ability to file complaints of misconduct against the police”, but this indicator is a poor sign of accountability if there is no avenue by which such complaints are addressed (United Nations, 2011: 3). Likewise, when assessing public confidence in the police, law enforcement organizations should consider multiple complementary indicators, such as public opinion data reflecting trust in the police force, perceptions of corruption, and rates of reporting victimization to the police. Thus, in addition to performance management systems, such as CompStat, police should also regularly utilize other forms of indicators, such as public opinion polls, to gather a more comprehensive assessment of the performance of their officers.

**Accurate performance measurement**

As previously noted, in addition to assessing officer performance, it is essential that police utilize performance management systems that allow for timely evaluations and assessments of their policing strategies. In addition to monitoring traditional police performance indicators, systems like CompStat offer police a way to assess performance through an evaluation of outcomes, or an assessment of whether an agency’s strategy has achieved its particular goals and targets. Given that CompStat contains up-to-date information on incidents of crime, it allows police to immediately begin evaluating the efficiency of crime reduction strategies.

For instance, if a crime reduction strategy involved rotating proactive patrolling in theft from auto hotspots, an analysis of crime trends before, during, and after the strategy in both the targeted jurisdictions and nearby similar jurisdictions would enable police to very quickly understand the effectiveness of the strategy, as well as potential unintended outcomes, such as an increase in theft from vehicles in a community several blocks away. Using analysis in this way allows the police to monitor crime, their own performance, and to quickly modify their strategy to be more efficient.

Thus, performance measurement systems like CompStat not only allow police to evaluate the effectiveness of their crime reduction strategies, but also to monitor the specific performance of individual officers in implementing those strategies. This allows police leaders to make quick adjustments to strategies and personnel, and more effectively and efficiently reach their crime reduction target outcomes, thereby achieving more substantial reductions in various forms of criminal activity. Furthermore, in the current economic climate, such evaluations allow police to demonstrate accountability to civic leaders and the public.

For example, to measure the effectiveness of their specific policing strategies and maintain continued accountability, the Vancouver Police Department relies on CompStat. The Vancouver Police Department run CompStat meetings every 28 days to discuss crime rates based on the tracking of all the major crime types, including violent crime, property crimes, drug crimes, other crimes, traffic-related incidents, and response times. During these meetings, the department’s executives, inspectors, supervisors, and detectives meet in a large boardroom to assess whether the city’s crime rates have increased or decreased, why the numbers have gone up or down, and what needs to be done in response.
Because of the Vancouver Police Department’s remarkable analytical capacity, with over 30 highly trained civilian analysts, every inspector is assigned an analyst to assist in conducting data analysis and designing crime reduction strategies. Through this process, the executive and managers are a part of the discussion on crime reduction strategies and they can hold inspectors responsible for reducing crime in their area. It also guarantees that inspectors and their teams have a good understanding of the crime and public safety problems in their district.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the data in CompStat meetings is presented on a series of large screens, one for the previous month, one for the current month, and another with the current trends. The monthly breakdowns of crime areas are plotted on maps to illustrate the results of the department’s efforts and the location of ongoing problems. The trends are represented with bar graphs illustrating offences that are up or down compared to the previous year. Each of the patrol commanders then speak for half an hour about crime in their areas, the approaches being utilized to address them, recent projects that they have run, success stories, projects that have a shortage of resources, and any challenging assignments. As crime rates fluctuate, various months will experience spikes and dips in certain offences. When a crime trend has been identified or is in its first month, inspectors typically introduce their own crime reduction goals and their plans to achieve success. In some cases, they may require added support from outside their team and they can then confer with the other managers and the executive to suggest areas to focus on, where to designate their priorities, and how to achieve these over the next month. The CompStat meetings often close with a summary of inspectors’ priorities for the next month. If goals are not met, resources from other areas may be assigned to create joint projects. At the next month’s meeting, the managers can then review the measures implemented and evaluate success.

Following this, next month’s priorities for each district and division can be outlined and set in motion. CompStat meetings bring all of the right people together so that planning is collaborative; they review whether teams have access to the necessary resources and can quickly make any needed arrangements for additional resources. The Vancouver Police Department’s executives rely on these meetings as an accountability mechanism from which they expect perceptible results. Although members are not demoted based on the results of these analyses, there is subtle pressure to ensure that teams are performing at optimal levels. In instances where the department has identified a problem area, the district inspectors often have to be creative in their strategies, borrowing ideas from the teams to most effectively target their issues.

Unlike 20 years ago, the information utilized by the police today is very timely. They receive updates to their province-wide crime data every eight hours, so that officers are informed of their crime problems very close to real time. This helps the police identify and respond to new and emerging crime trends and problems in their districts or zones. CompStat meetings are also an excellent opportunity for managers and the executive to engage in communication with operations; it is important in keeping the lines of communication open between divisions, so that teams do not function in silos and information, tactics, and strategies are shared.

Chapter 7: Be Performance-based
In addition to the monthly CompStat meetings, there are weekly crime control meetings during which Vancouver Police Department’s inspectors sit down with their analyst, crime control sergeant, and street sergeant to review weekly activities and set district priorities for the upcoming week. These meetings also help concentrate proactive patrols on specific areas based on extensive crime information of who and where the criminals are and the time of day they are committing their offences. Although there will always be a certain degree of reactive policing, this directs any downtime during an officer’s shift towards proactive policing. As a part of their proactive approach, the Vancouver Police Department also relies on their GeoDash system mentioned above. This tool will be particularly useful for officers beginning their shifts because they can access real time crime information in their cars and specify any time frame, location, and crime type parameters that they wish to view. The system will then populate the results and officers can instantly see where all of the problems have been as recent as eight hours ago.

They can also see which suspicious people were checked, where and when these checks were done, where halfway houses and shelters are located, and so forth. This system will allow officers to re-focus their efforts depending on the location and nature of the crime issues.

**Predictive policing**

Following this, the next step for Vancouver Police Department is their predictive policing model. As the predictive policing system develops and before the predictive models have been introduced, the Vancouver Police Department is establishing early baseline measures based on the current crime rates in different areas. Once the system is launched, the police will be able to accurately see the effect of their activities based on their predictions. Deputy Chief Palmer adds that predictive policing is not only beneficial because it helps prevent crime, but when police departments have the right technology and control over their data, they can almost instantaneously know if their efforts are successful. For example, if the police use a predictive policing system to estimate that they will have a certain number of break and enters at a location between a set time frame, they can then check the data the next day for that time period to see if the number of break and enters match up, regardless if they targeted the area or not. These strategies are and will also be included in the CompStat process to monitor their impact because as Deputy Chief Palmer says “it comes down to your basic crime types. That’s really what we’re trying to do, reduce crime, make Vancouver safer.”

Another practice that assists the Vancouver Police Department to maintain accountability is the monitoring of ‘overnights’. Every day, hundreds of officers go out on patrols and respond to calls. Among these, there may be high profile serious calls, such as sexual assaults, robberies, forcible confinements, weapons calls, calls involving chronic offenders, high profile calls, incidents involving the dog squad, serious traffic incidents, or calls to the Emergency Response Team. These overnights could also be cases in which crime patterns are developing or that may be a media issue.

Regardless, all of these cases need to be shared with management. This information was once logged manually in a book that an administrative assistant would format and send out daily to supervisors, managers, and the executive. This is now automated and incorporated in the PRIME reporting system, so that officers can easily flag specific calls for their managers. Every morning, the chief, the deputies, the superintendents, and the duty officer meet to review all of the high priority calls that happened in each district the previous night. Detectives also send notifications to the managers outlining the approaches that have been delineated to address each issue, and the managers can confirm that the detectives have access to the necessary resources. A representative from HR is also in attendance for these meetings to provide additional supports in cases where officers may have experienced traumatic events. Finally, the Vancouver Police Department’s media representatives are present to strategically assess which issues they need to notify the public about. These meetings establish a detective plan, an HR plan, and a media plan.
Patrol deployment is yet another area in which the Vancouver Police Department have relied on an analytical approach to determine the appropriate size for their department to optimize their performance. As a part of the operational review, Deputy Chief Palmer and the research team examined the department’s service demand, including call load and response times during the 168 hours that make up every week. From this, they ascertained the times during which they needed to deploy the most officers and how many officers were needed during each of those hours, and they matched their shift system to these results. Unlike police departments that use a flat staffing model, the Vancouver Police Department’s shifts begin at one of five time slots throughout the day. Within these shifts, they have built in overlap times during which the Vancouver Police Department experience the highest demand for police services. Additionally, the Vancouver Police Department deploys a higher volume of officers on Friday and Saturday nights, as these are their busiest days.

Not only does the use of varying minimums assist in providing optimal response times, but it also lets officers know that there are certain days where everyone is expected to be present, and there are other days that are more suited if they want to take time off. Again, all of these adjustments and modifications are measured to ensure that the Vancouver Police Department delivers their police services in the most effective and efficient manner, while holding everyone in the department accountable for their individual and team performance.

Recommendations for Being a More and Better Performance-based Police Organization

There are a number of ways that police organizations can be more performance-based. When designing any initiative, it is important to have measures in place to determine the extent to which the initiative is operating as described and intended. It is also necessary to have indicators in place to ensure that the initiative is operating as efficiently as possible and, critically, that the initiative is effective. In effect, it is important to identify and explain what success looks like and to have thought of and put in place measures and indicators to validate success. Given the economic and political climate described above, it is no longer sufficient for police leaders to believe or state that policies, strategies, tactics, programs, and officers are effective. Instead, success, effectiveness, and efficiency must be validated with evidence.

Recommendations for being more performance-based include:

- Build accountability measures into each initiative
- Ensure everyone on the team knows the purpose of the initiative and what success looks like
- Focus performance measures on outcomes, rather than outputs
- Obtain baseline data to accurately measure progress
As such, it is important for the purposes of accountability, transparency, crime reduction, and public safety that police organizations have a performance-based management system in place to evaluate the work of all members of the police organization, as well as their policies, strategies, and programs.

To ensure that any performance-based system operates effectively, it is critical to define success at the outset of any initiative. It should be made clear to everyone in the organization what the purpose of the initiative is, what success looks like, how success will be measured, and how those responsible for success will be supported and held accountable. It is recommended that performance measures be defined in ways that they are easily understood throughout the organization, clearly expressed, and actually measurable. Whenever possible, performance and success measures should focus on outcomes, rather than outputs. For example, while the number of arrests is an important aspect of prolific offender programs, the number of arrests is an output and may not be directly correlated with the broader goal of prolific offender strategies.

Rather than simply removing prolific offenders from the streets, a goal of this type of program may be that residents have a heightened sense of public safety and a corresponding reduction in their overall fear of crime. Simply counting and reporting on the number of arrests or setting a goal for the number of arrests per month is one measure of the program’s output, but should not be the exclusive performance measure or indicator of success. Instead, a safer community as defined perhaps by fewer reported crimes or calls for service is the intended outcome and should be the performance and success measure.

In order to be able to measure the performance of initiatives or individuals, it is important to have some baseline data. Baseline data provides a depiction of the way things were prior to the introduction of an initiative and serves as a basis of comparison through which change can be measured and validated. In effect, to know that some intervention, policy, strategy, or program is achieving its stated goals, it is necessary to know what conditions were like before the change, measure conditions after the change, and take into account or control for any of the other things that could have influenced any identified changes. This will allow for a more reliable assessment of performance and success in achieving stated objectives. It goes without saying that it is critical to be honest in the reporting or analysis of measures, to identify and explore any unintended consequences associated to an initiative, and to be willing to modify or abandon well-intended initiatives that are not achieving their goals. Equally important, it is vital to celebrate successes and to disseminate the outcomes of evaluations so that all police organizations can learn from the experience of others and share promising and best practices.
Are We a Performance-based Police Organization?

There are three main indicators that a police organization is successfully using performance-based measures. First, when it is clear to independent observers that the measures being used by the police organization to assess their performance and success are externally validated and consistent with other sources of information. For example, when the view of the police is that a particular initiative has been successful and this perspective is supported by broader police opinion, crime data and statistics, and public opinion surveys, there is greater confidence the organization is using performance measures appropriately.

Another good indicator of success is that police leaders are using performance measures to understand what is and is not working. Setting benchmarks and using measures to determine whether goals have been met and that individuals are doing what they should be doing is a clear indication that the organization is performance-based.

Finally, an excellent indicator of success is when police leaders are able to routinely use performance measures in their decision-making. Being truly performance-based means no longer relying on the historical ways of doing policing simply because this was the way things have always been done and accepting that there are no sacred cows. Instead, it is commitment to hold everyone and everything that the police organization does to achieving crime reduction accountable for their actions and their initiatives. As mentioned above, it is about ensuring that, as a police organization, you are doing the right things and doing them in the most effective and efficient manner possible to reduce crime and increase public safety.
References for Chapter 7


Due to the rapid success of crime reduction strategies, many jurisdictions are enjoying substantial increases in public safety. However, an unintended consequence of this success is that some of those same jurisdictions are encountering government demands to cut back on police resources because of decreasing crime rates. The argument forwarded by these governments is that since there is less crime than in the past, the police do not require the same level of resources as they did when crime rates were higher, and police certainly do not need an increase in resources. This position risks ignoring the very principles of crime reduction and what led to the reductions in crime. With few exceptions, the gains made were achieved by having the necessary resources to deal with current and emerging crime problems. Maintaining the same level of commitment to police resources allows police agencies to remain committed to the seven principles of crime reduction outlined in this book and ensures that jurisdictions can sustain their reductions in crime and concentrate on driving crime rates down even further. While, at some point, it is expected that police would be in a position to be as effective and efficient with a realignment of resources, this should not be undertaken without careful examination, as reducing resources in the short-term could have the long-term negative effect of eliminating the police's ability to be preemptive or ahead of the crime curve. To be clear, while this book is not a plea to increase police resources, it is also not an invitation to reduce resources. Rather, it suggests a careful assessment by each police organization and jurisdiction to operationalize the principles and goals of crime reduction, understand what is needed to achieve these goals, and sustain success and resources accordingly.

Reducing resources too quickly and not focusing on how to use available resources most effectively and efficiently challenges the police's ability to move away from being a reactive force to an organization that is predictive and proactive.

Another important reason to ensure that police organizations are adequately resourced is because of their need to be nimble and have the ability to quickly respond to emerging trends. Two indicators that are consistently used to measure success by public safety agencies, governments, and academics are crime trends and crime rates. However, it is well understood that these measures can be extremely fluid and can be affected positively, and even negatively, by successful police interventions. For example, an effective police intervention could have the short-term effect of increasing calls for service associated to the crime type targeted by the intervention, or it might encourage offenders to move to a new location resulting in a spike in crime in another location. It is also possible that successful police strategies do not encourage offenders to adopt a prosocial lifestyle, but to engage in other types of crime. There is also the possibility that emerging technologies may result in new types of crimes that require a police response.

Conclusion

With few exceptions, the gains made in crime reduction have been achieved by having the necessary resources to deal with current and emerging crime problems.
Given this, police must have a readiness and ability to respond quickly to emerging crime problems or trends. To do so, they must be flexible, but must also have the ability to address these challenges with a sustainable plan that does not result in the problem simply shifting to another location or reemerging as soon as the police move on to the next issue. Rather than the traditional police approach of ‘whack a mole’, adopting and following the principles of crime reduction outlined in this book will provide police with the capacity to design and implement projects and solutions quickly, and the ability to sustain their efforts long after the initial root causes have been initially addressed.

It goes without saying that to overcome the organizational resistance to culture change that might be present will require strong leadership from within police. It will require police leaders that encourage and reward people who think outside the traditional scope of policing and includes more people in the decision-making process; a decision-making process that is always evidence-based. Effective and efficient crime reduction requires police leaders who respect innovation and are committed to getting crime rates down as close to zero as possible. It requires leaders who are risk attentive, but not risk adverse, and those who are more interested in achieving outcomes, rather than promoting activity. To be sure, introducing crime reduction practices to any police organization is not easy, as it requires police to relinquish their monopoly, both internally and externally, on public safety; it requires them to rely on data, rather than instinct; and it requires them to focus more on offenders, and less on crime. It also requires leaders who understand the need and benefit of holding their agency accountable to the goals and principles of crime reduction.

This book provides a guide for successfully implementing crime reduction strategies in any jurisdiction. The principles are based on an analysis of the experiences of police organizations from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries, and validated criminological, sociological, and psychological theories and research.

The main principles that offer the greatest opportunities for crime reduction are:
1. Be information-led
2. Be intelligence-led
3. Focus on offenders
4. Focus on crime problems
5. Participate in meaningful partnerships
6. Be preemptive
7. Accurately and honestly measure performance

As detailed in this book, the main principles that offer the greatest opportunities for crime reduction are: being information-led; being intelligence-led; focusing on offenders; focusing on crime problems; participating in meaningful partnerships; being preemptive; and accurately and honestly measuring performance. This requires that police have knowledge of and access to many more tools and options beyond apprehending, arresting, charging, and processing offenders; it means that police have access to and can integrate much more data and that police activity is evidence-based; it means that police have developed policies, strategies, and tactics based on data and analysis to predict, identify, target, manage, and intervene with their most problematic population and preempt the issues that contribute most to crime and disorder; it means that police recognize which problems are best resolved in cooperation with partners; and it means that police hold everyone and everything that the police organization does accountable for their actions and their initiatives. In effect, crime reduction is about ensuring that the police are doing the correct things and doing them in the most effective and efficient manner possible to reduce crime and increase public safety.
To assist police leaders to engage in a preliminary examination and assessment into the degree to which a police agency is oriented towards the seven core principles, the Appendix to this book includes a series of questions that police leaders should answer about their own organizations. The answers to these questions will help identify those areas that require additional attention, and help guide decision-making about the deployment of human resources, the allocation of financial, physical, and technological resources, the direction for strategic planning, strategies for dealing with offenders and crime problems, the need for additional partnerships, and how to measure success. As such, the Appendix provides a tool for police agencies to begin the internal organizational conversation about how to become more effective and efficient in delivering police services and focusing on crime reduction approaches to public safety.

There will always be a need for police to provide public order and public safety functions; however, their most essential role must always be to reduce crime. More importantly, it must be to reduce crime in the most effective and efficient manner within the parameters established in law. The research evidence suggests that the best way to achieve this is to embrace the seven key principles discussed in this book. Integrating these principles at all levels of policing will ensure that the successes already obtained in reducing crime are sustained and that even greater reductions in crime are achieved in the future.
Appendix

In order to improve the police’s capacity to respond most effectively and efficiently to crime within the context of crime reduction, police leaders should assess their organization using the broad questions presented below and use this information to guide their decision-making for moving forward.

**Human Resources**

1. What percentage of the workforce is at work on a typical day?
2. Is there a system in place to measure the daily workforce?
3. What are the main reasons for absenteeism?
4. What is the actual deployment of the workforce on a typical day?
5. What proportion of the workforce has the appropriate level of knowledge, training, and experience needed to do their current job?
6. Are the right people with the right training in the right job and what additional knowledge, training, and experience are needed?
7. What processes are used to hire and promote the best people, and to release employees who are not meeting requirements?
8. How many people are needed to completely achieve the organization’s mandate?
9. How many people would you need to provide all the activities that are currently being provided through an outsource or contract arrangement?

**Financial Resources**

1. In this fiscal year, what proportion of your jurisdiction’s total budget was allocated to police services?
2. Does the organization receive enough money to achieve its mandate?
3. What should the total dollar value of the organization’s budget be annually, including in-kind contributions?
4. What is the distribution of funding throughout the police organization?
5. What is the process for accessing financial resources?
6. What are all the activities that the police organization engages in for which it does not receive any financial support or compensation?
7. What is the annual cost for all of the organization’s activities that are outsourced or contracted out?
8. What proportion of the budget was unspent at the end of the last fiscal year?
Physical Resources

1. Does the organization have the necessary equipment to achieve its mandate?
2. Is all of the physical space assigned to the organization sufficient, appropriately designed, and geographically located to achieve the organization's mandate?
3. Is the design and layout of the organization's physical space conducive to meeting its mandate?
4. Are there dedicated employees for the research, procurement, and maintenance of all of the organization's equipment and physical space needs?

Technological Resources

1. Does the organization have the “best” available technology necessary to achieve its mandate?
2. Does the organization have the “best” information sharing technology necessary to achieve its mandate?
3. Does the organization have the “best” information management technology necessary to achieve its mandate?
4. Does the organization have the “best” crime detection technology necessary to achieve its mandate?
5. Does the organization have the necessary education, training, and people to appropriately use this technology?
6. Does the organization have dedicated employees for the research, procurement, and maintenance of all of the organization's technological needs?
7. To what degree does the organization promote best practices in crime prevention technology?

Focus on Offenders

1. What is the nature and extent of the criminal population in the jurisdiction?
2. What strategies does the organization currently employ to deal with high-risk and low-risk criminal populations?
3. What is it that the organization should not be doing or could be done more effectively by others with respect to high-risk and low-risk criminal populations?
4. What should the organization be doing that is not already being done with high-risk and low-risk criminal populations?
5. To what extent does the organization regularly do street checks and curfew checks on offenders?
6. Do you have a sufficient number of employees dedicated to identifying and responding to high-risk offenders?

Focus on Crime Problems

1. What is the nature, extent, and location of crime problems in the jurisdiction?
2. To what degree does the organization use a problem-oriented approach to identifying and dealing with those crime problems?
3. To what degree are the organization's efforts oriented towards pre-empting issues, behaviours, and activities before they become crime problems?
4. How does the organization identify a crime problem before it becomes a crime problem?
5. What are the processes that the organization uses to identify and rank the priority of these issues?
6. What, if anything, prevents the organization from engaging in proactive policing more efficiently and effectively?
7. To what degree does the organization use communication strategies directed at the public to facilitate the pre-emption and prevention of crime problems?
8. Do you have a sufficient number of employees dedicated to identifying and responding to crime problems?
Police Services

1. Which of the service activities currently expected of the organization by government should really be provided by police?
2. Which of the activities that the organization currently undertakes should police no longer participate in or could be better provided by others?
3. What are the activities that the police should be doing that they are not currently providing, if any?
4. What does the organization need to deliver essential services most effectively and efficiently?

Research and Evaluation

1. To what degree are the activities in your organization research-driven and evidence-based?
2. How does the organization measure the effectiveness and efficiency of activities?
3. What process does the organization have in place to ensure that research and evaluation informs practice?
4. Does the organization have easy access to data and to what extent is the data used?
5. Do you have a sufficient number of employees dedicated to research and evaluation?

Police Leadership

1. To what extent do the leaders in the organization consistently act in the best interest of society and public safety, irrespective of the potential for competing pressure from elected officials, police boards and associations, police department employees, and the public?
2. What does the leaders in the organization need to do to be more efficient and effective?
3. To what extent does the organization have confidence that senior management can successfully articulate and achieve a vision and direction for the organization?
4. To what extent do supervisors and senior management genuinely consider other people’s recommendations and concerns in the decision making process?
5. To what extent do supervisors ensure that the people they supervise are working productively?

Partnerships

1. Which stakeholders does the organization currently partner with?
2. Which partnerships need to be developed and which ones are not productive?
3. What are the processes or mechanisms that the organization has in place to identify and partner with community stakeholders and resources?
4. What are the processes and mechanisms that the organization has in place to ensure that partnerships are achieving their objectives?
5. Do you have an employee who is dedicated towards community mobilization?
6. What roles do volunteers play and how valuable are those roles in helping the organization achieve its mandate?

Accountability

1. What processes and mechanisms are in place to hold all members of the organization accountable for their professional conduct?
2. What processes and mechanisms are in place to hold all members of the organization accountable for achieving set goals and the organization’s overall mandate?
3. What processes and mechanisms should be put in place to improve accountability throughout the organization?
In the early 2000s, police agencies in British Columbia, Canada were forced to reimagine their approach when faced with a significant emerging crime problem. The traditional way of doing things was not proving effective against the explosion of gang activity, auto theft, drug production, and other crimes taking place throughout the province.

In their book, *Eliminating Crime: The Seven Essential Principles of Police-based Crime Reduction*, authors Dr. Irwin M. Cohen, Dr. Darryl Plecas, Amanda V. McCormick, and Adrienne M.F. Peters explore the paths taken and the lessons learned as British Columbia police agencies researched and introduced effective new policing strategies based on seven essential principles.

“In the fight to reduce crime, the trick for us all is to incorporate those ideas, strategies, and tactics that work. For law enforcement practitioners, here is a great, well-researched guide, drawn from the collective policing experience and knowledge in the Canadian framework. It is a must read for anyone who works in our business who wants to make a difference.”

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